# Alternative Methods of Criminal Profiling

Wayne A. Petherick and Brent E. Turvey

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There are two ways of viewing the application of logic to the development of scientific knowledge (Novick, 1988, p. 34). The first takes a position that facts, appropriately shaped and organized, will divulge their intrinsic connections to each other. In this system of reasoning, such facts are assumed to be evidence of inherent truths separate from the desires of those examining them. Further, in this system of reasoning, observations are considered the purest, most honest form of study. It is consequently believed that one should observe the facts and not poison their meaning with the construction of inductive hypotheses that go beyond the observable.

The second view takes the position that science requires the imposition of our hypotheses and theories on the facts to give them meaning—that our speculations bring order to chaos. In fact, it was Charles Darwin who wrote in 1861 (p. 34):

> About thirty years ago, there was much talk that geologists ought only to observe and not theorize; and I well remember someone saying that at this rate a man might as well go into a gravel-pit and count the pebbles and describe the colors. How odd it is that anyone should not see that all observation must be for or against some view if it is to be of any service!

In this text, we take a view that is closely aligned to Darwin’s. That is to say, the study of criminal behavior, and the search for related patterns, is a directed study. It is governed by an understanding of how and why people think and act. When confronted with a particular crime, it is the job of the criminal profiler to draw from this knowledge to speculate and theorize using the factual and testable elements established in a particular case. However, knowledge about crime and criminal behavior is useful only inasmuch as it might help us render informed theories about what may have occurred in a particular case. In keeping with the scientific method, the formation of these theories is not the end of a profiler’s analysis but the beginning. Only through testing and attempts to falsify do theories become meaningful when applied to interpretations of patterns in a specific case. Each time we succeed at failing to disprove something, we come closer to understanding the meaning beneath the specific patterns that we find. Unfortunately, this basic construct of scientific thought and reason evades many in the criminal profiling community.

In the previous chapter, we discussed how valid inferences are made and how scientific knowledge is built. In this chapter, we discuss the two different types of knowledge that this creates: idiothetic and nomothetic. We also discuss the major styles of nomothetic profiling, with an exploration of their strengths and weaknesses.

**IDIIOGRAPHIC VERSUS NOMOTHETIC STUDY**

In terms of the study of crime and criminals, or any subject for that matter, there are two major approaches to research and subsequent knowledge building. The first is _nomothetic knowledge, referring to the study of_
the abstract: examining groups and universal laws. The second is idiographic knowledge, referring to the study of the concrete, examining individuals and their actual qualities. Idiographic study concentrates on specific cases and the unique traits or functioning of individuals.

According to Hurlbut and Knapp (2006, p. 287), “Psychologists use the term ‘idiographic’ to refer to the characteristics of unique individuals and ‘nomothetic’ to refer to universal characteristics.” Moreover, they explain that these terms have been a part of the American psychological landscape since as early as 1898. Consequently, these concepts have a history of application that we can learn from.

Again, nomothetic studies are those conducted on groups, and idiographic studies are those conducted on individuals. In terms of criminal profiling, it is fair to say that there are nomothetic methods and idiographic methods. A primary goal of idiographic (e.g., deductive) criminal profiling, as is discussed in subsequent chapters, is to study and determine the unique characteristics of the particular offender(s) responsible for a specific crime. The primary goal of nomothetic criminal profiling studies is to accumulate general, typical, common, or averaged characteristics of offender groups. These characteristics are abstract in the sense that they do not necessarily exist in each individual case—they represent the theoretically possible and, at best, probable. Problems arise when nomothetic methods are used inappropriately to make overly confident inferences or conclusive interpretations about individual offenders—in other words, when broad nomothetic knowledge is applied to answer narrow idiographic questions.

There are several ways to conceptualize the differences between idiographic and nomothetic profiling techniques. In general, the authors like to use the example of 20 mobile phones in 20 unmarked boxes. To learn the contents of a specific box (i.e., box #20), you may approach the problem using either nomothetic or idiographic study.

Nomothetically speaking, you can use your experience with previous mobile phones and conclude that box #20 will likely contain a unit consistent with phones you’ve owned or seen in the past. But in reality, these characteristics rely heavily on you, your preferences, and your available memory. Ultimately, they will have nothing to do with what is more or less likely to be in box #20. If you like black phones and have perhaps always gravitated toward darker colors when they are available, for example, your experience will not lead you to the correct inference if the phone is pink.

Idiographically, you can approach the problem in a more organized and pedantic fashion. You can open boxes #1 through #19, examine the features of every phone you find, and then create a list of common or recurring characteristics. Using this list, you can inductively theorize about the likely characteristics of mobile phone #20. You can present this inference using computer models with tables, charts, and graphs. You can even use math to generate probabilities based on the sample you studied. Unfortunately, despite all the attention to detail, the results will be no more useful than using your experience, because any interpretation about what might be in one box based on examining the contents of the other boxes is a prediction, not a conclusion. It is an informed prediction, but it is a prediction nonetheless. Approaching the same problem from an idiographic viewpoint, you can open box #20 and examine the contents directly, interpreting the characteristics irrespective of all other phones.

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1 This should go without saying, but not all knowledge derived nomothetically results in universal laws or even useful generalizations. Occasionally, the best we may hope for is to develop a theory or theories about the group under study, and the theory may not apply outside of the study group. Knowing the difference, and saying it out loud, is an indication of scientific honesty.

2 This is referred to as the availability heuristic, which is discussed in the preface to the third edition of this book. It involves answering a question of probability by asking whether examples come readily to mind. What we recall becomes what we believe is likely. This is a common yet grave metacognitive breakdown.
In the end, nomothetic study will yield general knowledge about mobile phones that may or may not be applicable to solving the particular problem of identifying the contents of an unopened box. It will certainly assist researchers who need to discuss and describe group trends that may be found. However, in answering questions about a specific problem or situation separate from the group, nomothetic knowledge fails. It may be used appropriately to help generate theories, but nomothetic study is not fit for rendering conclusions that are phone specific: a phone may or may not have a physical keypad; it may or may not have a camera; it may or may not have a clamshell design; battery talk time varies; power supply varies; service range varies; everything varies. There are just too many types of mobile phones with too many combinations of variable features to make an accurate let alone useful inference about the contents of the last box using nomothetic knowledge (Figure 3.1).

Even the notion that the unopened box contains a mobile phone is in fact an inductive theory based on nomothetic study and knowledge. You’ve been told the box has a phone in it, but until the box has been opened, the box’s contents is an assumption. The unopened box may contain a cell phone, a rock, or nothing at all. Until the box is opened and examined, theories about its contents are only that.

Now consider that we are dealing not with boxes and phones but with crime scenes and offenders. Inside each scene is contained the behavioral patterns of a particular offense. If we study 20 crime scenes as a group (nomothetically), looking for common or recurrent patterns, we will learn little about the uniquely integrated expressions of the individual offenders responsible for each crime. The result will be averaged
and diluted, true in some cases but not in others. Moreover, there is the often-incorrect assumption that crimes and offenders are sufficiently similar to be lumped together for aggregate study. In such cases the resulting nomothetic knowledge is not just diluted, it is inaccurate and ultimately misleading. If we study the individual crime scene (idiographically—separate from all others) and establish its inherently unique behavioral constellations, then we may learn specifics not only about the crime scene but also about the person or persons responsible.

It should be clear from these examples that if you want to know the nature of a thing, you must study it—not just another that you believe may be similar. Unfortunately, the vast majority of criminal profiling methodology is concerned primarily with, or based primarily on, nomothetic study. Consequently, much of the research that exists is inappropriate for rendering conclusions about individual cases.

**NOMOTHEtic PROFILING AND NOMOTHEtic PROFilingRS**

Nomothetic (group) study results in knowledge about the characteristics of groups, which is not only useful but necessary when trying to define groups, solve group-related problems, or generate initial theories about issues in specific cases. Nomothetic offender profiles, therefore, are characteristics developed by studying groups of offenders. Furthermore, nomothetic profiles are an abstract. That is to say, nomothetic profiles do not represent an actual offender who exists in the real world. They represent varying degrees of theory and possibility. Nomothetic profilers are those who use nomothetic methods to build knowledge about different categories of crime and groups of criminals. Again, this is both necessary and useful.

This would also be the end of it for our purposes except that nomothetic profilers too often apply nomothetic knowledge of crime and criminals to interpretations of individual cases as though they are somehow conclusive and relevant when often they are neither.

In their discussion of different profiling methods, Wilson et al. (1997) identify three general types: diagnostic evaluations, criminal investigative analysis (CIA), and investigative psychology (IP). This is a good start, but it provides an incomplete picture of modern profiling methods and literature. For the purposes of this chapter, we examine the basic tenets of criminal investigative analysis (CIA), diagnostic evaluations (DE), investigative psychology (IP), and geographic profiling. We also show that they are nomothetic in nature. Behavioral evidence analysis (BEA) is detailed in Chapter 5 and is delineated as idiographic in nature.

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3 The limitations of nomothetic research when applied to individual cases are not completely foreign to the criminal profiling literature. One didactic example is Meloy (1998, p. 8), who was discussing stalkers and threat assessment in specific when he wrote “nomothetic (group) studies on threats and their relationship to behavior are not necessarily helpful in idiographic (single) case research or risk management beyond the making of risk probability statements if the stalker fits closely into the reference groups.”

4 The term conclusions has been italicized because this statement does not refer to theories. Nomothetic knowledge, again, is important in the development of theories. It is when these theories are presented as conclusions, and without mention of their limitations, that nomothetic profilers cross the line.

5 It is of note that Wilson et al. (1997) make a preliminary attempt to classify profiling efforts in terms of idiographic, nomothetic, and heuristic methodology. However, they fail to operationalize their use of these concepts or to elaborate on how they should be applied. It is subsequently unclear whether the authors actually understood these terms and whether they were applied correctly.

6 Later additions to the literature not covered in the Wilson et al. (1997) research include behavioral evidence analysis (BEA—the primary focus of this text) and geographic profiling. While other types are used that fall under the broad banner of profiling, such as racial profiling and jury profiling, they are generally noncriminal in their focus. Consequently, they fall outside of the scope of this work and are not covered.
Criminal Investigative Analysis (CIA)

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) developed the most commonly known method of criminal profiling (but certainly not the first, as explained in previous chapters). However, FBI profilers now refer to themselves as criminal investigative analysts or criminal behavioral analysts, and they refer to their profiling method as either criminal investigative analysis or crime scene analysis. In an interesting public relations move, the first thing that FBI profilers will state when asked, even under oath, is that they aren’t profilers and what they do isn’t profiling. In the interests of intellectual and forensic honesty, a brief discussion is necessary.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE ANALYSIS AND CRIMINAL PROFILING: WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE?

The generic term criminal profiling has been defined in a more or less consistent fashion throughout the published literature on the subject. A short review of these definitions is warranted here. Let’s start with criminal investigative analysis:

The FBI defines criminal investigative analysis as an investigative process that identifies the major personality and behavioral characteristics of the offender based on the crimes he or she has committed (Burgess et al., 1992, p. 310).

Criminal profiling is defined using roughly the same language, with the inference of different kinds of offender characteristics being the discriminating and defining trait of a criminal profile:

Offender profiling is the process of inferring the characteristics of an offender from the way that offender acted when committing the crime (Canter, 1995).

A criminal personality profile is an educated attempt to provide investigative agencies with specific information as to the type of individual who would have committed a certain crime (Geberth, 1996, p. 710).

The process of inferring distinctive personality characteristics of individuals responsible for committing criminal acts has commonly been referred to as criminal profiling (Turvey, 1999, p. 1).

A Criminal Profile is a report that describes the investigatively relevant and/or probative characteristics of the offender responsible for a particular crime, or a series of related crimes. ... Offender characteristics include any attributes that the examiner ascribes specifically to the unknown person or persons responsible for the commission of particular criminal acts, including those that are physical, psychological, social, geographical, or relational (Baeza et al., 2000).

Given these definitions, it is reasonable to state that any analysis, report, or opinion offering conclusions about likely, probable, or inferable offender characteristics (i.e., that an offender possesses a given trait) should be considered a form of, or a portion of, a criminal profile. Consequently, any analysis, report, or opinion offering conclusions that fall short of attributing characteristics to an offender is not a form of, or a portion of, a criminal profile.

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7 FBI agent Mark Safarik of the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit gave sworn testimony in California v. Matt Fletcher, Case No. PA 040748-01, Los Angeles County, May 2005, and California v. Vincent Brothers in Kern County, April 2007, that he was not a criminal profiler, and that criminal investigative analysis is not a form of criminal profiling. He then went on to testify to numerous offender motives and characteristics based on his analysis of the crime. This is consistent with the authors’ case experience involving FBI profilers giving sworn testimony.
But is criminal investigative analysis actually a form criminal profiling? The literature is in fact unanimous that, yes, it is. Depue et al. (1995, p. 115) states explicitly that *the term criminal investigative analysis is merely an FBI replacement term for criminal profile.*

*A criminal investigative analysis (CIA) of an illegal and violent act may give the client agency a variety of useful information depending on the service requested. Previously termed "psychological profiling" and "criminal personality profiling," the term "criminal investigative analysis" was coined to differentiate the procedure from that used by mental health professionals.***

This is also discussed in TaFoya (2002, para. 1), which states *"Criminal Investigative Analysis is the terminology used by the FBI to describe what is more popularly known as Profiling—psychological or criminal."* Geberth (1996) offers a similar definition in his glossary of investigative terms (p. 841):

*Criminal Investigative Analysis—The current term utilized by the FBI Behavioral Sciences Unit at Quantico to define their Psychological Profile and Criminal Personality Profiles of Offenders.*

It is also helpful to consider that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), which is currently in charge of the International Criminal Investigative Analysis Fellowship (ICIAF) and related training efforts, offers the following definition:*

*Criminal Investigative Analysis (CIA), also known as criminal profiling, is an investigative tool used within the law enforcement community to help solve violent crimes. The analysis is based on a review of evidence from the crime scene and from witnesses and victims. The analysis is done from both an investigative and a behavioral perspective. The analysis can provide insight into the unknown offender (characteristics and traits) as well as investigative suggestions and strategies for interviews and trial.*

While this may seem a minor point, it can be significant to the admissibility of a given profiler’s expert testimony—as is discussed in later chapters. For our purposes here, it is enough to understand that criminal investigative analysis is a method of criminal profiling. Any practitioner suggesting otherwise is either ignorant of the literature or being intellectually dishonest.

But how is criminal investigative analysis a nomothetic method of criminal profiling? This has to do with the fact that it is based primarily on knowledge built from studying groups rather than individuals—one group of offenders, to be more precise. The CIA method arose primarily from the FBI’s Criminal Profiling Project, a study of 36 incarcerated offenders and their 118 respective victims conducted between 1979 and 1983. The project’s research focused on the development of offender classifications from an examination of various features of their crimes (see Burgess and Ressler, 1985). The goal was to determine whether there were any consistent features across offenses that might be useful in classifying future offenders (Petherick, 2005). A number of FBI-backed publications have resulted from this research, including Burgess, Hartman, Ressler, Douglas, and McCormack (1986); Ressler and Burgess (1985); Ressler, Burgess, and Douglas (1988); Ressler, Burgess, Douglas, Hartman, and D’Agostino (1986); and Ressler, Burgess, Hartman, Douglas, and McCormack (1986).

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* The authors of this work (Roger Depue, John Douglas, Roy Hazelwood, and Robert Ressler) are all retired FBI agents who worked in its respective profiling units, and they are among the collective fathers of FBI criminal profiling methodology. If nothing else, they would at least be considered experts at explaining the origins of the terms used by the FBI.

* William L. TaFoya, Ph.D., is a retired FBI agent and was assigned to the FBI Academy from 1980 to 1990, where he worked for the then Behavioral Sciences Unit.


* This project was funded by the National Institute of Justice from 1982 to 1985 (Burgess and Ressler, 1985).
On a methodological level, the original 36-offender study was heavily criticized by the peer reviewers involved in the project (Fox, 2004). The sample size was small (N = 36), and not all of the offenders were serial in nature. Of the 36 offenders in the sample, 25 were serial murderers and 11 were sexual murderers who had committed either a single homicide, double homicide, or spree murder (Ressler and Burgess, 1985). Putting them in one group seems counterintuitive. Even the authors commented (p. 7):

Several limitations of the study are to be noted. First, the study population of 36 offenders and 118 victims yielded a relatively small database. This data was further reduced by incomplete or missing data for some variables. Incomplete records, conflicting responses, and offender unwillingness to respond to certain questions all contributed to the missing data situation.

As a result, some variables did not have sufficient responses for analysis, with the multivariate analysis most severely impacted. We performed a multivariate analysis to compare a set of crime scene variables with a set of profile variables. As a profiling objective is to proceed from crime scene data to a likely criminal profile, it would be useful to find the minimal number of variables that, when considered jointly, predict the profile characteristics. However, because of the limited database, results of the multivariate analysis appeared to have little utility and, as a result, are not presented.

The interviewers relied heavily on the self-report of the participants, potentially biasing the information on which the study was based, although perhaps most importantly, no inter-rater reliability was used to determine the degree to which discrete characteristics were judged. FBI agents who could not decide which category an offender fit into were told to force them into one category or another (Ressler and Burgess, 1985). Homant and Kennedy (1998) provide another aspect to the critique, in that the classification was seemingly made on the basis of information about the offender and the crime scene involved. As Burgess and Ressler (1985) noted, the study was exploratory and the concepts had been in use for some time (see Hazelwood and Douglas, 1980). Therefore, the results may actually be a self-fulfilling prophecy rather than reflecting any empirically valid classification system useful in identifying the personality and behavioral characteristics that are the cornerstone of the offender profile. If the agents had something in mind when conducting an interview, it may have introduced a level of cognitive bias that would make it easier to find the characteristics expected. Therefore, subsequent discovery that the classifications led to significant differences on a number of crime scene variables would be circular. Additionally, the study has never been replicated on an international level, so its application outside of the United States is questionable (Petherick, 2003, Woodworth and Porter, 1999).

Although widespread validation has not been undertaken, some attempts have been made to apply the CIA methodology to cases of serial sexual homicide of elderly females (Safarik et al., 2000). The data for this study were 33 cases of sexual assault for which an offender had been caught where the victim was over 60 years of age. The offenders had all committed at least two assaults. Using statistically averaged offender characteristics, the authors claim an 80% to 85% accuracy rate (which is in line with Pinizzotto’s [1984] claim of accuracy for the BSU profilers). However, while the authors discuss the relatively limited frequency of elderly sexual assault (only about 2% to 3% of assaults in the United States per year are on elderly females), the small sample size may represent a problem in determining the degree to which these results apply to a broader sample. This may be particularly true since the research sample was less than 10% of the annual number of assaults involving elderly female victims. What’s more, there is no discussion or rationale for the inclusion of cases in the study—it is not clear how they were selected. This, too, may affect the results.

However, it appears that small sample size, an issue also noted in Beasley (2004), is only one of a number of criticisms leveled at the research used to develop CIA. Consider, for example, the main critique presented
by Canter et al. (2004). This latter study, applying the method to another population of serial offenders, provides the most damning indictment of criminal investigative analysis to date (p. 296):

> From the start, then, they were illustrating how certain offense behavior and certain offender characteristics combined in their sample. They never set out to test the discriminatory power of their dichotomy on a sample that was not specifically drawn up to illustrate this dichotomy.

While the results from Canter and colleagues were quite extensive and detailed, some of the major findings are summarized as follows:

- Almost twice as many disorganized crime scene actions as organized can be readily identified, suggesting the disorganized category is more detailed.
- The frequency varies in the sample from the 91 cases in which the victim was kept alive during the sexual acts through to the 3 cases in which there was dismemberment. This suggests that, at least in some situations, few criteria will be present.
- There are some indications that certain features of the organized category may be more indicative of base rate features in serial murder rather than discrete variables useful for distinguishing between organized and disorganized features.
- Disorganized aspects co-occur even less frequently than organized ones.

## ORGANIZED VERSUS DISORGANIZED

One result of the Criminal Profiling Project and the subsequent publications cited earlier was the further development of the FBI’s organized/disorganized dichotomy. This system instructs profilers to classify offenders by virtue of the level of sophistication, planning, and competence evident in the crime scene. It is easy to teach and easy to use.

Despite past suggestions that the organized/disorganized terminology was an outgrowth of the FBI’s 36-offender study published in 1985, the terminology was actually in use before then. The terms first appeared in their original forms, *organized* *nonsocial* and *disorganized* *asocial*, in *The Last Murderer* (see Hazelwood and Douglas, 1980). Therefore, the 36-offender study is best thought of as further developing an existing concept rather than generating a new one.

The organized/disorganized crime scene classification theory represents a conceptual division, most commonly referred to as a *dichotomy*, a term that means a division into two polarized or contradictory parts or opinions. The FBI’s then Behavioral Science Unit (BSU) developed the organized/disorganized dichotomy in the 1980s as an attempt to more effectively communicate and teach profiling tools. The organized/disorganized dichotomy, arrived at through “years of experience” (Ressler et al., 1988, p. 121), was intended to simplify the language of crime scene profiling for unsophisticated law enforcement agencies requesting profiles. It also lent itself effectively as a teaching tool for FBI students of criminal profiling techniques—students who have been almost exclusively law enforcement.

As Ressler and Shachtman (1992, pp. 113–114) explain,

> Amassing this knowledge was one thing. Communicating it to our audience—those police officers who sought our help in tracking down violent criminals—was another. To characterize the types of

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12 This eight-man unit is currently referred to as the Behavioral Analysis Unit. Before that it was referred to as the Profiling and Behavioral Analysis Unit and the Behavioral Sciences Unit.
offenders for police and other law enforcement people, we needed to have a terminology that was not based on psychiatric jargon. It wouldn’t do much good to say to a police officer that he was looking for a psychotic personality if that police officer had no training in psychology; we needed to speak to the police in terms that they could understand and that would assist them in their searches for killers, rapists, and other violent criminals. Instead of saying that a crime scene showed evidence of a psychopathic personality, we began to tell the police officer that such a particular crime scene was “organized,” and so was the likely offender, while another and its perpetrator might be “disorganized,” when mental disorder was present.

It is a simple concept. An organized crime scene (characteristics shown in Table 3.1) is one with evidence of planning, where the victim is a targeted stranger, the crime scene reflects overall control, there are restraints used, and aggressive acts occur before death. This suggests that the offender is organized (characteristics shown in Table 3.2), with the crime scene being a reflection of the personality of an offender, meaning the offender will have average to above average intelligence, will be socially competent, will prefer skilled work, will have a high birth order, will have a controlled mood during the crime, and may also use alcohol with the crime.

A disorganized crime scene shows spontaneity, where the victim or location is known, the crime scene is random and sloppy, there is sudden violence, minimal restraints are used, and there are sexual acts after death. This is again suggestive of the personality of the offender, with a disorganized offender having below average intelligence, being socially inadequate, having a low birth order, having an anxious mood during the crime, and using minimal amounts of alcohol. Despite having these discrete classifications, it is generally held that no offender will fit neatly into either category, with most offenders being somewhere between the two: these offenders are called “mixed.”

This classification system is easy to use and can be applied almost without any deep case analysis or thinking, making it especially seductive to those without formal education in, or knowledge of, human psychology.

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<tr>
<th>Table 3.1 Crime Scene Characteristics of the Organized and Disorganized Offender</th>
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<tr>
<td>Psychopathic (Organized) Crime Scene Characteristics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Offense planned</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victim is a targeted stranger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalizes victim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled conversation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime scene reflects overall control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demands submissive victim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restraints used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive acts before death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body hidden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon/evidence absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports victim</td>
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</table>

From Ressler and Burgess, 1985.

13 As explained in Burgess et al. (1992, p. 9): “It should be emphasized that the crime scene rarely will be completely organized or disorganized. It is more likely to be somewhere on a continuum between the two extremes of the orderly, neat crime scene and the disarrayed, sloppy one.”
Table 3.2 Offender Characteristics of the Organized and Disorganized Offender

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<tr>
<th>Psychopathic (Organized) Offender Characteristics</th>
<th>Psychotic (Disorganized) Offender Characteristics</th>
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<tr>
<td>Average to above average intelligence</td>
<td>Below average intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially competent</td>
<td>Socially inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled work preferred</td>
<td>Unskilled work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexually competent</td>
<td>Sexually incompetent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High birth order</td>
<td>Low birth order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s work stable</td>
<td>Father’s work unstable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent childhood discipline</td>
<td>Harsh discipline as a child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled mood during the crime</td>
<td>Anxious mood during crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of alcohol with crime</td>
<td>Minimal use of alcohol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precipitating situational stress</td>
<td>Minimal situational stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with partner</td>
<td>Living alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility, with car in good condition</td>
<td>Lives/works near the crime scene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follows crime in news media</td>
<td>Minimal interest in the news media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May change jobs or leave town</td>
<td>Significant behavior change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Reissler and Burgess, 1985.

(i.e., the majority of law enforcement). In fact, that is the type of analyst it was designed for. The organized/disorganized dichotomy gives undereducated law enforcement personnel ready access to unsophisticated, simple labels with important forensic mental health and diagnostic implications. This is not necessarily a good thing.

The dichotomy is the epitome of an inductive/nomothetic profiling approach. If a crime scene has organized characteristics (determined by a group study examining shared scene traits), it is reasoned that the offender must also be organized and share the characteristics of other organized offenders (determined by group study examining shared offender traits). If a crime scene has disorganized characteristics, it is conversely assumed that the offender must also be disorganized.

The profiling implications of this classification system are that disorganized offenders are inferred to be psychotic. That is to say, by virtue of a messy crime scene, offenders are determined to be suffering from a mental illness that afflicts them with a psychosis. Because they leave behind lots of evidence, there is thought to be a deterioration of normal intellectual and therefore social functioning, and a partial or complete withdrawal from reality.

Conversely, organized offenders are determined to be psychopathic. That is to say, by virtue of a relatively clean crime scene they are thought not to be suffering from a mental illness that afflicts them with a psychosis. They are determined to be aware of, and to understand, the nature and quality of their behavior.

This author does not agree with or advocate the use of the organized/disorganized dichotomy, because it is a false dichotomy, arising from mistaken ideas about the developmental nature of criminal behavior and the role of crime reconstruction. There are some straightforward arguments supporting this position.

First, the majority of crime scenes present somewhere on a continuum between the two extreme classifications of organized and disorganized, not as simply one or the other. The FBI’s Crime Classification Manual (CCM)
(Burgess et al., 1992, p. 9) states this plainly. This fact has not kept the ignorant, as well as the unqualified, from attempting to cram crime scenes, and subsequent offenders, into these extreme classifications. Clearly, this has been one of the most overlooked passages in the CCM.

Second, only a competent forensic analysis, performed by qualified forensic scientists, can give insight into how and why a crime scene presents the way that it does in a given case (the process of determining what happened in a crime scene is generally referred to as crime reconstruction). The amount of evidence left behind or not left behind must be viewed in the context of a dynamic series of events. It cannot be interpreted at a glance through an isolating construct by the untrained.

Third, it is not generally possible to discriminate between the origins of behavior that can result in “disorganization” at a crime scene. Consequently, crime scenes involving the following can be difficult to distinguish with respect to their shared “disorganized” characteristics: domestic/intimate homicide involving rage, drug/alcohol-related homicide, and homicide committed by the mentally ill. Given the alternate possibilities, inferring that mental illness must be a cause or a factor is not appropriate. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 10, “Criminal Motivation.”

Fourth, a crime scene evidencing organized characteristics does not automatically suggest a psychopathic offender. As already mentioned, psychopathy is a specific personality disorder. It is not evidenced merely by a lack of psychotic behavior.

Fifth, labeling an offender using the dichotomy may cause a failure to account for an offender’s development over time. Some offenders become more competent and skilled over time, leaving less evidence and engaging in more precautionary acts. Other offenders may become less competent and skillful over time, decompensating by virtue of a deteriorating mental state or increased use of controlled substances.

Sixth, and related to the second and fifth arguments, the organized/disorganized dichotomy inappropriately hinges offender classification on modus operandi (MO) considerations. It takes into account what appears to have occurred physically, but does not take into account why it occurred. This bears pointing out because those who constructed the dichotomy at the NCAVC knew the difference between offender MO and signature behaviors, and they understand the investigative dangers of ignoring signature considerations. However, paradoxically, they have constructed and still advocate a crime scene classification tool that appears to completely ignore those concerns.

Seventh, an ethical danger of the organized/disorganized dichotomy is that it essentially and undeservedly empowers those who use it to speak from a clinical perspective on issues that have courtroom relevance. This is evidenced by the following passage from Ressler and Shachtman (1992, pp. 3–4):

> Looking at the crime-scene photographs and the police reports, it was apparent to me that this was not a crime committed by an “organized” killer who stalked his victims, was methodical in how he went about his crimes, and took care to avoid leaving clues to his own identity. No, from the appearance of the crime scene, it was obvious to me that we were dealing with a “disorganized” killer, a person who had a full-blown and serious mental illness.

The author of this statement presumes the ability to essentially diagnose a mental illness without the benefit of clinical interviews, years of clinical training, or a competent forensic reconstruction of what is actually in the photos, to say nothing of actually meeting the offender in person before rendering such an important clinical opinion. This is not a legitimate forensic practice.

And eighth, the classification of a scene and offender as organized or disorganized is rarely presented as merely a theory, as all nomothetic knowledge should be.
The current prevalence of use of the FBI method may be due to the mythology surrounding the bureau itself (see Jenkins, 1994). As Canter et al. (2004, pp. 294–295) observe,

> It is important to draw attention to the source and status of the reports typically used to inform criminal investigative analysis. … This information is most often disseminated in the form of popular books, clearly intended for a non-technical and inexpert audience, rather than in peer-reviewed journals. As a consequence it is less likely to be subjected to informed examination and the form of critical consideration usual within a professional or scholarly framework. However, if anything, this enhances rather than detracts from the wide uptake of these ideas by law enforcement practitioners who have no scientific training. Furthermore the mechanism, that Caniter and Young (2003) has called the “Hollywood effect,” whereby loosely formulated and often unsubstantiated theories and models are featured in widely disseminated movies and given extra credibility by such broadcast, means that these ideas can become part of apparently accepted expertise that juries and other lay groups will be prepared to accept. This also can lead to the possibility that the ideas may be incorporated into practice casually and applied in a less systematic manner than their original authors had intended. The organized/disorganized dichotomy has probably suffered this fate, being cited in a number of Hollywood films and drawn upon as a valid model by police investigators around the world.

The popularity of the FBI method may also be a function of its simplicity; as we’ve discussed, it requires little training or knowledge to apply and provides prefabricated templates of offender characteristics.

Despite having being entirely debunked at this point as a false dichotomy, the organized/disorganized classification remains in wide use today by nomothetic profilers who may in fact be ignorant of the current state of the literature.  

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**The Stages of Criminal Investigative Analysis (CIA)**

CIA is ideally comprised of a number of steps or stages in which information about the crime is gathered and determinations are made about its relevance and meaning. Despite the fact that an articulated methodology is available, there is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that practitioners of the FBI method do not adhere strictly to all steps or stages, and that they may not be qualified to perform certain analyses proposed as part of the method (e.g., crime scene reconstruction; see Chisum, 2000; Superior Court of California, 1999).

Ressler et al. (1988) suggest that CIA is a six-step method, although in reality it has five steps, with the sixth step being the arrest of an offender, if identified. The first five steps are profiling inputs, decision process models, crime assessment, criminal profile, and investigation. The final phase (ostensibly the sixth) is apprehension.

In another article preceding Sexual Homicides: Patterns and Motives (Ressler et al. 1988), Douglas and Burgess (1986, p. 9) suggest a seven-step process, which is “quite similar to that used by clinicians to make a diagnosis and treatment plan.” The seven steps are as follows:

1. Evaluation of the criminal act itself
2. Comprehensive evaluation of the specifics of the crime scene(s)
3. Comprehensive analysis of the victim
4. Evaluation of preliminary police reports

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14 For a study that debunks this dichotomy beyond the discussion provided here, see Canter et al. (2004).
6. Evaluation of the medical examiner's autopsy protocol
7. Development of profile with critical offender characteristics
8. Investigative suggestions predicated on the construction of the profile

Criminal Investigative Analysis: Efficacy in Casework

The profiling community has roundly criticized criminal investigative analysis as both methodologically deficient and outdated—yet it is still in wide use. As explained in the second edition of this text (Turvey, 2002, p. 349):

FBI profiling has failed detailed peer reviews of both casework and publications. This includes a peer review of the FBI's Criminal Profiling Project involving the study of 36 incarcerated offenders and their 118 respective victims (Darkes et al., 1993; Turvey, 1999). According to Nobile (1989), "the Justice Department rejected the study for government publication after outside reviewers flayed its statistics and methodology." Despite the utter failure of their methodology in this study, FBI agents sought publication elsewhere, in Ressler et al. (1988). This study is foundational for many current FBI profiling concepts, methods, and research models.

Specifically, FBI-trained profilers have been criticized by the court and independent peer reviewers for the following practices (Darkes et al., 1993; Homant and Kennedy, 1998; New Jersey v. Fortin, 2000; Pennsylvania v. Christopher Distefano, 1999; Tennessee v. William R. Stevens, 2001; Turvey, 1999):

Lack of reliability
Unsystematic gathering of offender biographical material for research/study
Uncritical reliance upon offender interviews as the source of data worthy of research/study
Failure to use appropriate control groups
Uncritical reliance upon law enforcement theories and opinions as fact
Treatment of investigative hypotheses and theory as fact
Failure to be forthcoming about the weaknesses of opinions and conclusions
Failure to compare profiles with actual offenders when outcomes are known
Failure to base opinions on data susceptible to testing
Cronyism (evident in both the community and the published research)

Moreover, according to Howard Teten (the first FBI profiler), in an FBI study of 192 cases in which profiling was performed, 88 cases were solved. Of those 88 cases, the profile helped with the identification of the suspect only 17% of the time (15 cases). So the known efficacy rate for FBI profiling (criminal investigative analysis) is 15 out of 192 (Teten, 1995, p. 45).

Of course, the FBI is not unaware of the limitations of their profiling methodology. According to Hazelwood (1995, pp. 176–177), a criminal profile, also known as criminal investigative analysis (Depue et al., 1995, p. 115), is an investigative tool only. Therefore, the following disclaimer should precede each such report prepared by members of the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit:

It should be noted that the attached analysis is not a substitute for a thorough and well-planned investigation and should not be considered all-inclusive. The information provided is based upon reviewing, analyzing, and researching criminal cases similar to the case submitted by the requesting agency. The final analysis is based upon probabilities. Note, however, that no two criminal acts or criminal personalities are exactly alike and, therefore, the offender may not always fit the profile in every category.
The caution demonstrated in the disclaimer is explained in Depue et al. (1995, p. 125), where it is stated that:

*CIA [criminal investigative analysis] and profiling should be used to augment proven investigative techniques and must not be allowed to replace those methods; to do so would be counterproductive to the goal of identifying the unknown offender.*

The authors have read the disclaimer on FBI profiles when reviewing criminal investigative analysis reports for court purposes. However, they have made note that the disclaimer is regularly absent when FBI profilers submit CIA reports intended for trial, when expert testimony may be needed. It could be argued that the inclusion of the disclaimer at trial might hamper admissibility, because it addresses the issue of limited reliability. The exclusion of the disclaimer seems significant, however, as the conclusions are based on the same methodology as reports prepared by FBI profilers during an investigation.

**DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATIONS (DE)**

The term *diagnostic evaluations* does not refer to or represent a single profiling method or unified approach. It is instead a generic description of the services offered by medical and mental health professionals who rely on clinical experience when giving profiling opinions about offenders, crimes scenes, or victims. Diagnostic evaluations are done on an as-needed basis, usually as one part of a broad range of services being offered. As discussed in Chapter 1, some of the earliest examples of profiling available are diagnostic evaluations conducted by forensic psychiatrists.\(^15\)

In a study of the range of services offered by police psychologists, for example, Bartol (1996) found that on average, 2% of the total monthly workload of in-house psychologists was profiling, and that 3.4% of the monthly workload of part-time consultants was criminal profiling. These results are not particularly interesting, other than they demonstrate that a percentage of profiling is being done by psychologists. However, the fact that 70% of the police psychologists surveyed did not feel comfortable with profiling and felt that the practice was extremely questionable is very interesting. Furthermore (Bartol, 1996, p. 79),

*One well-known police psychologist, with more than 20 years of experience in the field, considered criminal profiling “virtually useless and potentially dangerous.” Many of the respondents wrote that much more research needs to be done before the process becomes a useful tool.*

The authors of this work have also noted that more than a few forensic pathologists have shown a willingness to engage in profiling-related interpretation of victim and offender behavior, either in a didactic written form as part of the medicolegal death investigation or as part of courtroom testimony when asked to support expert opinions (Figure 3.2).

Without a clear and identifiable process, profiles based on diagnostic evaluations are heavily idiosyncratic, relying to a large degree on the specific background of the clinical profiler. One’s education, training, and experience dictate the approach taken at a given point in time, with the profile being an outgrowth of the clinician’s understanding of criminals and criminal behavior, flavored with his or her own take on personality and mental illness (Gudjonsson and Copson, 1997).

\(^15\) Copson (1995) suggests that over half of the profiling in the United Kingdom is being conducted by psychologists and psychiatrists using a clinical approach.
Turco (1990) provides an adaptation of the diagnostic approach through psychodynamic theory. Like Liebert (1985, p. 151), Turco is critical of anyone without clinical experience:

The experienced clinician has an underlying inherent understanding of psychopathology, experience with predictability, a capacity to get into the mind of the perpetrator and a scientific approach without moral judgement or prejudice. … The most productive circumstance likely to arise is when the profiler has both clinical (as opposed to academic) training and law enforcement experience. One cannot expect to obtain a graduate degree and make accurate predictions in the absence of a sound theoretical basis or clinical experience.

While it is possible that personality and learning theories have a role to play in assessing the likely characteristics of an offender, an overreliance on them may be counterproductive, as may be the case with the application of any general types—that is, they will apply in some cases but not others, and there is no way to determine their suitability with any certainty before an offender is apprehended and the case is unequivocally resolved.

In examining the role of forensic psychiatrists, McGrath (2000, p. 321) provides the following reasons why they may be particularly suited to providing profiles:

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16 Under cross-examination, the prosecutor presented Dr. DiMaio with a chart of Centers for Disease Control (CDC) statistics which showed that in 2003, the year of the shooting, women in the victim’s age and ethnic group were more likely to kill themselves by overdosing on drugs—not shooting themselves. Dr. DiMaio explained that the CDC’s death certificate information was often incorrect, so the statistics are flawed. The lesson here is that if you are going to cite statistics, make sure that you get them right and apply them correctly.
Their background in the behavioral sciences and their training in psychopathology place them in an enviable position to deduce personality characteristics from crime scene information.

Forensic psychiatrists are in a good position to infer the meaning behind signature behaviors.

Given their training, education, and focus on critical and analytical thinking, forensic psychiatrists are in a good position to “channel their training into a new field.”

Although these may seem obvious areas in which forensic mental health specialists can apply their skills, McGrath also notes that any involvement in the profiling process should not revolve around, or focus on, treatment issues. That is, psychiatrists should not confuse their role as investigative advisors with their role as mental health diagnosticians: “It is critical that the psychiatrist or psychologist not fall prey to role confusion and descend into treatment advice and options when acting as a profiler” (Petherick, 2006a, p. 45). In addition to the potential problems that role division poses to their involvement, it is also true that those conducting diagnostic evaluations seldom have extensive experience in law enforcement or related areas (Wilson et al. 1997). West (2000, p. 220) provides similar commentary:

However, it has to be conceded that many clinicians, whatever their professional background, do not routinely review crime scene data or witness depositions during the course of their involvement with offenders/patients. Instead, the clinical approach, with its often exclusive focus on the person of the offender, tends to preclude consideration of more exact details of the offense. All too often it is easier to believe the offender than to read the witness depositions or observe the crime scene. It seems inevitable that such omissions might lead to serious errors in any assessment.

Moreover, because their involvement in profiling tends to be sporadic, mental health specialists may lose touch with the requirements of a police investigation and therefore offer vague or irrelevant suggestions. Ainsworth (2001) claims that a profile produced by a mental health professional may contain statements about the inner workings of the offender’s mental processes that will not be directly observable, and that the explanations provided may not be as useful to investigators as those from other approaches. The problem may go further than the type of advice offered in DE profiles and extend into the political difficulties of getting invited to assist with a police investigation. According to Canter (1989, p. 13), the difficulty is that

Police officers are unlikely to admit psychologists to their investigations unless some mutual trust and reciprocal benefit is expected. This is a tricky cycle to break into, because it is difficult to make a contribution until some experience has been gained, yet difficult to gain experience until some contribution can be offered.

With regard to their role, Tamlyn (1999) claims that forensic clinicians in the United Kingdom rely on the goodwill of their employer to allow them to undertake profiling duties at potential expense to their employers. This means that many will work on their own time and be largely unpaid. It is unlikely that this situation will differ in other countries where mental health experts act in the advisory capacity of profilers. In fact, there are few “full-time” profilers from any discipline, and most offer the services as an adjunct to their usual duties.

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17 Dr. Michael McGrath is a forensic psychiatrist and president of the Academy of Behavioral Profiling. He is also a contributor to this text and co-author of Chapter 4, titled “Forensic Psychology, Forensic Psychiatry, and Criminal Profiling: The Mental Health Professional’s Contribution to Criminal Profiling.”
Although diagnostic evaluations do not comprise a unified approach with a clear theoretical framework, Copson et al. (1997, p. 16) outline the principles of clinical profiling. According to these authors, each piece of advice should be

- Custom made: the advice should not rely on the recycling of some kind of generic violent antisocial criminal stereotype;
- Interactive: at a range of levels of sophistication, depending on the officers’ understanding of the psychological concepts at issue; and
- Reflexive: the advice should be dynamic, insofar as every element has a knock-on effect on every other element, and evolving, in that new information must lead to reconsideration not only of the element(s) of advice affected but of the construct as a whole.

They also identify a number of dangers (Copson et al., 1997, p. 16):

- There is an imperative to please that must be recognized and overcome; otherwise, objectivity will be undermined by tendencies to over-interpretation and unequivocality.
- Close interaction with the officers leaves the profiler open to allegations of improper collusion, such as tailoring a profile to fit a known suspect, or devising an interviewing strategy that is unethical or even unlawful.
- The mass of data that is produced by an interactive and reflexive process means that recording is an extremely difficult and time-consuming business, even to the extent that sometimes a written report never emerges.
- The reduction of a mass of data into a summary document—and more especially the failure to produce a summary document—leaves the profiler open to being misrepresented.

These issues are not peculiar to clinical profiling though, and some, if not all, of these problems will plague most profiling methods to varying degrees.

**INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOLOGY (IP)**

The main advocate of investigative psychology (IP) is Dr. David Canter, a British psychologist who promotes a research-based approach to the analysis of individual offender behavior. IP is nomothetic, inductive, and dependent on the amount and accuracy of data collected. Although many inductive methods are criticized on the basis of sample size, Canter has performed research aimed at improving the samples on which his ruminations are based. The results are inductive but based on more empirically robust evaluations. However, enhanced empirical robustness does not make the results conclusive when applied in idiographic contexts (e.g., to the interpretation of offense behavior in a particular case). In other words, IP results remain entirely abstract and theoretical.

Like the FBI approach, IP identifies profiling as only one part of an overall methodology. This is explained in Canter (2000, p. 1091):

> The domain of investigative psychology covers all aspects of psychology that are relevant to the conduct of criminal and civil investigations. Its focus is on the ways in which criminal activities may be examined and understood in order for the detection of crime to be effective and legal proceedings to be appropriate. As such, investigative psychology is concerned with psychological input to the full range of issues that relate to the management, investigation and prosecution of crime.

As Canter (2004, p. 7) further explains:

> The broadening and deepening of the contributions that psychology can make to police investigations, beyond serial killers and personality profiles, to include the effective utilization
of police information, through interviews and from police records, as well as the study of police investigations and decision support systems, has led to the identification of a previously unnamed domain of applied psychology ... called ... Investigative Psychology.

According to the program’s description on the University of Liverpool website, investigative psychology provides:

[A] scientific and systematic basis to previously subjective approaches to all aspects of the detection, investigation and prosecution of crimes. This behavioral science contribution can be thought of as operating at different stages of any investigation, from that of the crime itself, through the gathering of information and on to the actions of police officers working to identify the criminal then on to the preparation of a case for court.

Further, to distinguish between IP and those idiosyncratic profiling approaches, Canter (1998, p. 11) notes the following:

Investigative psychology is a much more prosaic activity. It consists of the painstaking examination of patterns of criminal behavior and the testing out of those patterns of trends that may be of value to police investigators. ... Investigative psychologists also accept that there are areas of criminal behavior that may be fundamentally enigmatic.

**The Five-Factor Model**

The IP method has five main components, commonly referred to as the *five-factor model*, that reflect an offender’s past and present. They are interpersonal coherence, significance of time and place, criminal characteristics, criminal career, and forensic awareness. We now address these in turn.

*Interpersonal coherence* refers to a person’s style of interaction when dealing with others, where crime is an interpersonal transaction involving characteristic ways of dealing with other people (Canter, 1995). Canter believes that offenders treat their victims similarly to the way that they treat people in their daily lives—that is, criminals carry out actions that are a direct extension of the transactions they have with other people (Wilson and Soothill, 1996). For example, a rapist who exhibits selfishness with friends, family, and colleagues in his daily life will also exhibit selfishness with his victims. Similarly, offenders may select victims who possess characteristics of people important to them (Muller, 2000). This belief is not unique to IP, and most profiling approaches rely on the notion of interpersonal coherence in developing offender characteristics (Petherick, 2003).

As Canter (1989, p. 14) explains, “interpersonal processes gain much of their psychological nuance from the time and place in which they occur.” The second component of the five-factor model holds that *time and place* are signifiers of some aspects of the offender. That is, the time and place are often specifically chosen by the offender and so provide further insight into the offender’s actions in the form of mental maps. The implication is that “an offender will feel more comfortable and in control in areas which he knows well” (Ainsworth, 2001, p. 199). Two considerations are important: first, the specific location and, second, the general spatial behavior that is a function of specific crime sites (Canter, 1989). Canter (2003) dedicated a whole work to these aspects, which are largely based on the foundational theory of environmental criminology.

The offender’s locational choices have been the subject of extensive examination in how offenders decide on place (see Snook et al., 2005), in the accuracy of various groups in determining an offender’s residential location (Snook et al., 2002; Snook et al. 2004), and in the utility of geographic profiling models (Canter and Larkin, 1993; Canter et al., 2000; Godwin and Canter, 1997; Kocsis, 1997; Kocsis and Irwin, 1997;
Kocsis et al., 2002; Santilla et al., 2003). Snook et al. (2005) discuss a variety of factors that influence crime-site decisions (pp. 149–152):

1. **Series chronology.** Serial murderers often increase their spatial knowledge by learning from past experiences, which alters their spatial decision making.

2. **Age.** Until recently, research has shown that younger criminals tended to commit crimes closer to home, while older offenders were more likely to travel.

3. **Intellectual capability.** While the literature on the intelligence levels of serial murder is limited, some research suggests that there is a link between cognitive capacity and journey to crime, with “smarter” criminals traveling farther from home. It may be, then, that more intelligent serial murders will travel farther, with their IQ having a direct impact on the distances covered.

4. **Marital status.** Depending on the strength of the marital relationship, married offenders may travel shorter distances because of their accountability to a significant other, which affects the time they have available and therefore distance they can travel in furtherance of criminal enterprise.

5. **Employment status.** Like marriage, employment may restrict an offender’s ability to travel, although the authors note that employment can also increase the offender’s capacity for travel (by allowing access to vehicles, etc.).

6. **Motive.** Citing research by Holmes and DeBurger (1988), Snook et al. (2005) suggest that motive plays a role in a serial murder’s spatial decision making.

7. **Mode of transportation.** Obviously, transportation affects the offender’s ability to acquire and deal with victims, especially if the victim must be moved.

Then, Snook and colleagues used a sample of 50 German serial murderers and examined the location of their crimes in relation to their homes. Considering the factors just listed, the first crime was closest to the offender’s home 47% of the time, the second closest 34% of the time, and the third closest 36% of the time. If averaged across all offenders, however, none of the first crimes was closer to the offender’s home than the other two. When age was analyzed, it was shown that older (German) serial murderers dumped the victims’ bodies closer to home than did younger murderers, with intellectual capacity increasing the home-to-crime distance. The distances traveled by married offenders were not significantly greater than those of unmarried offenders, nor did employment status affect locations. Offenders who committed crimes for sexual motives traveled a median of 10 km, while those motivated by burglary traveled a median of 8.8 km (although the differences were not significant). As would be expected, the distance traveled was greatest with a car (median = 15.5 km), followed by public transport (median = 5.9 km) and walking (median = 2.2 km).

**Criminal characteristics** provide investigators with an idea of the type of crime they are dealing with. The goal is to determine “whether the nature of the crime and the way it is committed can lead to some classifications of what is characteristic... based upon interviews with criminals and empirical studies” (Canter, 1989, p. 14). This is an inductive component of the approach, and it is similar to attempts made by the FBI in applying the organized versus disorganized typology.

Studying the offender’s criminal career provides an understanding of how offenders may modify behavior in light of experience (Nowikowski, 1993). The criminal career may exhibit adaptation and change, with learning and experience leading to responses to victim, police, or location dynamics. For example, a criminal may bind and gag a current victim, based on the screams and resistance of a past victim (Canter, 1989). Learning and experience may account for the evolution of modus operandi displayed by many offenders, who learn through subsequent offenses and continuously refine their behavior. Furthermore, the nature and types of precautionary behaviors may provide insight into whether the offender has experience with, or exposure to, investigative practices.
Finally, forensic awareness applies to learning based on past experience with the criminal justice system. Perpetrators may be sophisticated enough to use techniques that hinder police investigations, such as wearing a mask or gloves, or to make attempts to destroy other evidence (Ainsworth, 2000). A rapist may use condoms to prevent the transfer of biological fluids used for DNA analysis.

The criticisms of investigative psychology parallel those of other inductive approaches. McGrath (2000) is concerned that these approaches use predictions about offender characteristics or behaviors that may not be applicable to a specific case (that is, the average does not apply to every single case). Therefore, generalizations may erroneously guide the conclusion, as opposed to the conclusion’s being offense specific.

**GEOGRAPHIC PROFILING**

Geographic profiling focuses on determining the “probable spatial behavior of the offender within the context of the locations of, and the spatial relationships between, the various crime sites” (Rossmo, 1997, p. 161). It assumes that an offender’s home or other locations he or she is familiar with can be determined from their crime locations. As with other branches of profiling, geographic profiling is not intended to be an investigative panacea; rather, it is a tool to assist law enforcement in prioritizing search areas (Laverty and McLaren, 2002; Ratcliffe, 2004; Rossmo, 1997). Ideally, a geographic profile should only follow from, and augment, a completed full criminal profile (Rossmo, 1997), although this appears not to be the case, with Rossmo (2005) identifying geoprofiling as a form of offender profiling.

Its practitioners characterize geographic profiling as a decision support system used to identify the likely geographic region of an offender’s home location (Rossmo, 2000), although it may also identify where he or she works (Ratcliffe, 2004) or other locations that are familiar (referred to as activity nodes). Essentially, geographic profiling makes use of the nonrandom nature of criminal behavior, presupposing that most crimes have patterns (Wilson, 2003).

> Crimes are not just random—there’s a pattern. It has been said criminals are not so different from shoppers or even from lions hunting prey. When an offender has committed a number of crimes, they leave behind a fingerprint of their mental map, and you can decode certain things from that. We put every crime location into a computer program and it produces a map showing the most probable areas the police should target.

Despite the relatively recent advances in the use of computers in geographic profiling, its theoretical basis has been around for some time. The next section considers some of its theoretical underpinnings (Figure 3.3).

**Lazy Criminals: The Least Effort Principle**

The least effort principle at its most fundamental level suggests that, given two alternative courses of action, people will choose the one that requires least effort—that is, people will adopt the easiest course of action. According to Rossmo (2000, pp. 87–88),

> When multiple destinations of equal desirability are available, the least effort principle suggests the closest one will be chosen. The determination of “closest,” however, can be a problematic assessment. Isotropic surfaces, spaces exhibiting equal physical properties in all directions, are rarely found within the human geographic experience.
As this statement suggests, the ability to impose arbitrary concepts of nearness onto crime is made difficult by the fact that our geographic environment is largely nonuniform. This means that not only does the layout of the environment affect an offender’s decisions, but our physical location in a three-dimensional space comes into play as well. This may be particularly critical in major cities, such as New York and Sydney, Australia, where high-density housing is the norm. In rural areas, where travel routes are typically straighter and naturally larger, the application of the least effort principle may also be problematic. The caution is not necessarily against the application of the least effort principle generally, but against applying the same principle in an open environment that one applies in city spaces.

**Distance Decay**

*Distance decay* refers to the idea that the frequency of his or her crimes decreases as the offender travels farther from home (Rengert et al. 1999; Van Koppen and de Keijser, 1997). Distance decay is a geographical expression of the principle of least effort (Harries, 1999) and results when an offender shows a preference for closer-to-home crime sites.

Distance decay does not mean that crime sites are closely clustered around the offender’s home, because this would obviously constitute a risk of the offender’s discovery. Therefore, Roßmo (2000) posits the existence of a comfort or “buffer zone” directly around the offender’s home. Within the comfort zone, targets are viewed as less desirable because of the perceived risk associated with offending too close to home (Roßmo, 2000). This is confirmed by Van Koppen and de Keijser (1997, p. 1), who note that “offenders rarely commit offenses on their own doorstep, presumably because the chances of recognition by people who know them are higher.”

Distance decay is also affected by opportunity in the same way that the least effort principle is. According to Rengert et al. (1999), regardless of how much criminals would like to choose the locations of their offenses, they are unable to, given the lack of opportunities and the random and unpredictable behavior of others, which may foil even the best laid plans (pp. 428–429).

**The Circle Theory**

Another basis for geoprofiling is the circle theory, first discussed by Canter and Larkin (1993) and developed directly from environmental psychology research. Two models of offender behavior, known as the “marauder” and “commuter” models, were developed from the circle theory. The marauder model assumes that offenders will “strike out” from their base in the commission of their crimes, whereas the commuter model assumes that offenders will travel a distance from their base before engaging in criminal activity. The base is not necessarily the home location of the offender; it may be some other place to which the offender has a psychological or physical affinity (Canter et al., 2000, p. 458):

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18 The utility of circle theory has been examined or tested in Kocsis and Irwin (1997), Meaney (2004), and Snook et al. (2002), with mixed results.
The “base” in question that provides the anchor for the criminal activity may take many forms. For some forms of base, delimiting the area where this base may be will be of more assistance to an investigation than for others. It will be of particular value when the base is in fact the home or some other location with which the offender will be known to have some affinity, such as a workplace or frequently visited recreation facility. It will be of less value when the base is an anonymous stopover point on a lengthy route that the offender is following, or any other location from which it is difficult to identify the offenders.

These two models are shown graphically in Figure 3.4.

In Canter and Larkin’s study, they found no support for a commuter model in a sample of 45 sexual assaulted, but, in 41 of the 45 cases, the offender’s home was within the circle, which, they suggest, is a “strong support for the general marauder hypothesis as being the most applicable to these sets of offenders” (Canter and Larkin, 1993, p. 67).

While circle theory seems plausible and attractive, it poses some problems. First, Canter and Larkin (1993) identified 91% of offenders as marauders, but classifying an offender as a marauder or commuter when the offender’s home base is not known may be a matter of luck or educated guess. If the profiler relies on a statistical probability that the offender is a commuter, then the same general cautions apply as with any inductive method (e.g., whether the degree of probability is statistically anomalous; in this particular study this would imply an error rate of 9%). In addition, the following cautions apply (Petherick, 2006b):

- The “base” may not be at the center of the circle of crimes, which would affect search areas, and the population of densely populated areas will also be important.
- The eccentricity of the model is important because it may reflect the developmental processes of the offender whereby he or she travels farther from home during different parts of the offense.
- As a result, the differences between marauding and commuting offenders could be explained by increases in criminal skill or confidence.
- The representation of ranges using circles is overly simplistic; research has shown that in North America, city expansion from downtown areas may be better indicated by elliptical or sectoral patterns.
- The number of offenses per offender was relatively small.
- It is possible that the information used in the modeling was not an accurate representation of all of the offenses committed by the offenders.

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*The same theory applied to a different sample may well produce results that are far less convincing than a result of 91%. Remember, this is one set of results with one sample.*
Limitations of Geographic Profiling

In all nomothetic and inductive profiling methods, problems arise when broad theories are applied to actual cases in too certain a fashion. In the Washington, D.C., sniper case, there was legitimate concern about the application of geographic profiling. The concerns ranged from the estimation of “anchor points” (when none existed) through to low probabilities. Grierson (2003) cites Keith Harries, a pioneer of geographic profiling, as saying “in the sniper case [Rossmo’s algorithm] was just not able to handle the level of variation in the data” (the D.C. sniper case is discussed at the end of this section).

In the first edition of this text (Turvey, 1999, pp. 262–263), we identified a number of concerns with geographic profiling that remain unresolved. They include the following:

- This method breaks the same tenet of behavioral-evidence analysis as the others. It takes a single manifestation of offender behavior (offense location selection) and attempts to infer its meaning out of the overall behavioral and emotional context that it was produced in.
- This method is actually employed without the benefit of a psychological profile. Though Rossmo states that he requires a full psychological profile for a competent geographical analysis, he has been known to proceed without one or to construct his own.
- Since it ignores overall behavioral evidence and case context and does not utilize full criminal profiles, geographic profiling cannot, and does not, distinguish between two or more offenders operating in the same area.
- This method assumes that all cases that are submitted have been positively linked by law enforcement. It does not check the veracity of this or any other information provided by law enforcement.
- This method assumes that offenders most often live near or within easy reach of their offense area.
- Rossmo’s dissertation very competently outlines the weaknesses and the shortcomings of the published research on serial murder. Then, his dissertation goes on to base theories regarding geographic profiling, and the CGT (Criminal Geographic Targeting) software, on those admittedly flawed studies.
- The technology used in CGT is impressive, but amounts to only so much scientification. Inferences regarding offender anchor points and spatial behavior must still be drawn by the analyst.

McGrath (2000) has similar reservations, believing that geographic profiling may not be effective with a small number of cases and that it is further hamstrung when cases have not been linked (the same may apply if the case linkage is questionable). Also, the theory of geographic profiling is largely derived from the analysis of burglaries and other property crimes, so its larger-scale application to interpersonal crimes may not be sustainable. Similarly, a change of crime site resulting from interruption or change of opportunity may not provide significant insight into the offender, because the choice of where to offend is not made entirely by the offender and so is not reflective of his or her “mental map.” That the crime site may be incorrectly identified or that crimes may not be reported are also possibilities (Ainsworth, 2001).

Geoprophiling Unit Closed

It should not need mentioning that any method of criminal profiling must be abandoned if it does not work. Certainly this was part of the decision-making process revealed in Rossmo v. Vancouver (City) Police Board (2001, at ¶21 and ¶38, respectively), where the following claims were made by the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) about Dr. Darby Kim Rossmo and his geoprophiling techniques:

A cursory analysis seems to suggest that a choice to extend the contract would not be a good business decision. In short, there is little apparent evidence of enhanced policing outcomes. And establishing the extent and durability of prestige is problematic.
The question for the Vancouver Police Department and the Police Board is to what degree do we wish to continue what is essentially an international police program. There have been no definitive applications of geographic profiling in the VPD and the department is facing significant budget issues that require decisions on funding priorities.

This underscores that, while Rossmo enjoyed being flown around to give training, his unvalidated techniques had not helped with any casework at home. Consequently, there was no cost-benefit argument to be made that might keep the Geoprofiling Unit alive. In “Profiling Section Wasn’t Good Value,” the Vancouver Sun reported (June 28, 2001):20

The contract of a detective-inspector in charge of the city police’s geographic profiling section was terminated because the department felt it wasn’t getting good value for its money, deputy chief Gary Greer testified Wednesday.

The termination had nothing to do with jealousy or the existence of a so-called boy’s club on the force, he said in B.C. Supreme Court.

“It wasn’t cost effective,” he said.

Kim Rossmo, a 22-year member of the force, is suing for wrongful dismissal after his five-year contract wasn’t renewed last Dec. 31.

Greer was an inspector when he recommended that Rossmo’s job be one of three positions the police department cut to meet city budget requirements.

Rossmo’s lawsuit against the city of Vancouver and the Vancouver Police Department for wrongful termination was ultimately dismissed.

**Geoprofiling the D.C. Sniper(s)**

In October of 2002, because of his associations with the FBI, authorities tapped Rossmo to assist in the D.C. area sniper case (Figure 3.5). At the time, Rossmo was working in D.C. as director of research for the Police Foundation, a private nonprofit agency that trains police departments in law enforcement strategies. All of the assumptions of his software were put to a very public test in a case that had not been solved, and the result was a dismal failure.21 Grierson (2003, pp. 63–68) provides a two-sided discussion of the outcome:

>“Geographic profiling isn’t about prediction,” Rossmo says. “Efforts to predict the location of crimes don’t show a lot of focus.” Instead of pushing forward into an unknown future, Rossmo’s method pulls back to an origin, to the time and place the crimes were hatched. A center.

>“You know those sprinklers where the little metal thing hits the water stream and it sprays around in a circle?” Rossmo asks. “You could look at that and say, ‘There’s a good probability that the next drop of water will land within this ring,’ but it’d be hard to know precisely where. If you took the sprinkler away, though, and I looked at the pattern of water, I could tell you where the sprinkler was.”

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20 It was acknowledged that Rossmo’s international celebrity was good for the Vancouver Police Department (VPD). However, this comment shows that it is hard to quantify celebrity and prestige. In reality, the actual return to the VPD was difficult to gauge because geoprofiling was not solving cases.

21 Previously, Rossmo had great public success applying his model to already solved cases where the offender was known, although this could have biased the results, given the “artful” nature of Rossmo’s geoprofiling technique.
FIGURE 3.5
John Allen Muhammad, a 42-year-old desert storm veteran, and his 17-year-old stepson, John Lee Malvo, were arrested, tried, and convicted for the shooting deaths of 10 people and for wounding 3 others critically in and around Washington, D.C., throughout the Baltimore-Washington metropolitan area, and along interstate 95 in Virginia. Before they were arrested, FBI profilers assumed that the shootings were the work of a single white male, likely a loner, who lived in the area. Instead, it turned out to be precisely the opposite.

What Rossmo hoped to do with his algorithm was to add rigor to the traditionally somewhat “soft” science of profiling, to create something that, once the crime sites were established, leaned more on deduction than induction. (Here’s the difference: When Sherlock Holmes notices that the tips of your fingers are yellow and concludes you are a smoker, he’s being inductive; when he concludes that if you are a smoker you cannot be the killer, because the killer is known to be fatally allergic to cigarette smoke, he is being deductive.)

“Induction is what most science is; You record observations and make generalizations about them,” Rossmo says. “The only true deductive system is mathematics.”

22 This is actually false, as we have demonstrated here. Mathematics can be deductive, but so can logic and reasoning. And induction is not by itself science. It is among the first steps of the scientific method.
walking his faithful hound, Rigel. Rossmo himself is “soft science”—a sleuth out gathering data from crime sites—while Rigel represents “hard science.” The dog is off like a shot, programmatically, when the evidence is placed under his nose.

On the surface, the Beltway sniper case seemed a perfect candidate for geographic profiling, if only by default. Here was a serial killer against whom the arsenal of high-tech forensic tools—the mass spectrometers and gas chromatographs and scanning electron microscopes that can practically pull a DNA sample from an errant thought—appeared useless; whoever it was seemed to glide across the landscape without leaving a trace. What the sniper was leaving, in every pool of blood in every suburban gas station or parking lot, were data points. And Rossmo knew what to do with those.

And yet: Early on in the rampage, Rigel guessed the sniper’s anchor point to be somewhere in the northern suburbs of D.C. (It turned out, in fact, that the killers may have had no anchor point at all.) It’s tough to say whether it hurts or helps Rossmo’s cred to point out that every pseudo-profiler who went on a TV news show with a half-cocked opinion was spectacularly wrong. In any case, though, when an anonymous tip attributed to the snipers gave police the clue they needed, the solution still seemed to be a long way away, buried deep in those 15,000 daily tips and an armada of irrelevant white vans.

“There are instances where profiling will probably be quite helpful, and there are a lot where it doesn’t work at all,” says Keith Harries, a professor of geography at the University of Maryland Baltimore County and a pioneer in “geography of crime” research. “In the sniper case, [Rossmo’s algorithm] was just not able to handle the level of variation in the data.”

As Ned Levine, a Houston-based urban planner who himself developed a geographic profiling model called Crimestat for the National Institute of Justice, points out, the two men arrested in the sniper case, John Allen Muhammad and John Lee Malvo, never kept a home base for long. (They had lived most recently in Washington State.) The distances they traveled were so large as to make the models imprecise. They killed not in areas they knew, but in areas like areas they knew, Which, in increasingly homogeneous America, can encompass quite a lot of real estate. Itinerant assassins like Andrew Cunanan and Aileen Wournos have resisted accurate geoprofiling. (Evidence shows that U.S. serial killers are almost twice as nomadic as serial killers from elsewhere.) The increasing mobility of offenders and the increasing complexity of travel patterns could, Levine suggests, create ever-larger problems for geoprofilers. …

Rossmo’s competitors assert Rigel hasn’t yet proven itself. In the long run, they believe, Rossmo’s model will reveal itself as no more accurate than their own—indeed no more accurate than straight centography, the old pushpin method. “The business of the training is a way of making it seem terribly special and exotic, and imply that there are all sorts of skills that they can charge a lot of money for,” says David Canter, director of the Center for Investigative Psychology at the University of Liverpool, who sometimes makes his own program, Dragnet, available free to researchers as open-source software. No one has ever done a head-to-head comparison of all the competing models, but, says Levine, “it’s certainly overdue.”

Rossmo says he can’t discuss the Beltway Sniper case in any detail, in part because he doesn’t have all the details about the suspects’ movements throughout the killing spree. But he is pretty sure that Rigel wasn’t as wrong-footed as it appeared. “Based on everything I know, the patterns of their behavior seemed, geographically, to be what we expected. That’s all I’ll say. I didn’t find anything very surprising.” In any case, he says, with any methodology there are assumptions and limitations. “I’d say of the requests I’ve received, 85 percent of the time we could provide some help,” he says.
Dr. Rossmo is currently a research professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at Texas State University and the director of the Center for Geospatial Intelligence and Investigation. His recent publications have focused on applying geoprofiling techniques to animal foraging and the hunting behavior of sharks.\textsuperscript{23}

\section*{CONCLUSION}

As evident by the inclusion of this chapter, the authors are concerned about the reliability of many currently available methods of criminal profiling. This has to do with the fact that nomothetic profilers habitually isolate individual behavior and then interpret it out of context. Further, they tend not to explain, let alone understand, the differences between theories and conclusions. This may be a reflection of the close association between law enforcement and criminal profiling. Law enforcement investigators applying profiling techniques either do not have a strong scientific background or come to it late and with a law enforcement bias. In any case, nomothetic profilers too often apply their unique heuristic knowledge of crime and criminals to interpretations of individual cases as though they are somehow conclusive and relevant when often they are neither.

Criminal investigative analysis (CIA) is an unfinished, untested, nomo-inductive, law enforcement-oriented profiling method based on a small study of inappropriately grouped offenders from the 1970s. This study, which focused on unvalidated offender interviews, was used to further the FBI's organized/disorganized dichotomy, along with the current incarnation of criminal investigative analysis. The dichotomy has been debunked as false and lacking real-world application; and CIA, despite an overall lack of reliability, is being used in a forensic context to achieve criminal convictions, despite its original investigative purpose, by analysts who don't seem to understand the difference.\textsuperscript{24} CIA-profile conclusions are too often rooted in general crime statistics, unqualified reconstructions of the evidence, and heuristic “experiential” interpretations of the evidence buttressed by fallacious appeals to the presumed authority of FBI-trained profilers.

Diagnostic evaluations (DE) represent the profiling work of clinicians (medical doctors and mental health professionals) operating in a forensic context with varying degrees of education, training, and experience. Individual clinicians approach the task of profiling from within the confines of their own treatment models and experience in a highly subjective fashion. The result is a lack of uniform methods and application and an overall detachment from the real-world case concerns of detectives who are trying to solve cases. DE profile conclusions are diagnostically oriented, ranging from exhaustively complex psychodynamic interpretations of obscure offense behavior to one-page diagnoses that have been cut and pasted directly from a clinical guide.

Investigative psychology (IP) is an attempt to bring science to profiling, but it fails because math and statistics are not by themselves scientific. They become scientific only in their interpretation and application. Certainly some interesting and even useful research has been published in the area. However, when applied to an actual criminal case, an IP profile deems it sufficient to blast statistics across its pages, citing study after study, but often without connecting the research or the percentages to the case at hand. An IP profile is more often than not a dissertation-style data dump, which is of no value to police investigators, who often work

\textsuperscript{23} See Le Comber et al. (2006).

\textsuperscript{24} This issue is explored throughout the text via case example.
without a strong background in research methods and statistics. The IP model is purely academic and often entirely irrelevant.

Geographic profiling is essentially the same as investigative psychology, from an end user standpoint, with the exception that geoprofilers have no trouble providing criminal profiles with their work as well. It is profiling through numbers; it presents inductive probabilities as the ceiling of scientific inquiry. This is despite the fact that geoprofilers are not typically educated or trained in the areas related to criminal profiling (or the scientific method in some cases). Moreover, unlike IP, geoprofiling has the added benefit of a map with a circle or a wedge drawn on it, which can have as good as a 50-50 chance of derailing the investigation if detectives actually use it to narrow their search.

If this review sounds harsh, that’s because it’s meant to be. Investigatively and forensically speaking, nomothetic methods should be used to examine individual cases only with the greatest of caution and with utter humility about their limitations. This means theory development only. In their current application, this is not what happens. Instead, it is more often the case that nomothetic profilers present inductive-nomothetic methods and findings as conclusive, and without regard for their actual limitations. This practice is scientifically dishonest at best. As is discussed throughout this text, there have been some disastrous consequences.

**SUMMARY**

The application of the scientific method creates the two different types of knowledge: idiographic and nomothetic. Nomothetic (group) study results in knowledge about the characteristics of groups, which is not only useful but necessary when trying to define groups, solve group-related problems, or generate initial theories about issues in specific cases. Nomothetic offender profiles, therefore, are characteristics developed by studying groups of offenders. Furthermore, nomothetic profiles represent an average, or abstract.

There are four main types of nomothetic profiling: criminal investigative analysis (CIA), diagnostic evaluations (DE), investigative psychology (IP), and geographic profiling.

The FBI’s profiling method, criminal investigative analysis, is the most commonly known nomothetic method of criminal profiling. At its core is the widely used organized/disorganized dichotomy, based on the FBI’s Criminal Profiling Project—a study of 36 incarcerated offenders and their 118 respective victims conducted between 1979 and 1983. Despite its notoriety and use by law enforcement, CIA and its methods have been widely debunked in the published literature as lacking accuracy, efficacy, and utility.

Diagnostic evaluations are not a single profiling method or representative of a unified approach. They are services offered by medical and mental health professionals who rely on clinical experience when giving profiling opinions about offenders, crime scenes, or victims. DE profiles are commonly offered as a footnote to primary reports, such as mental health evaluations, personality inventories, or autopsy findings.

Investigative psychology purports to cover all aspects of psychology that are relevant to the conduct of criminal and civil investigations. It involves research on various offender groups. Commonly, the result is a profile that is more or less a literature review of published studies examining ostensibly similar cases.

Geographic profiling focuses on determining the likely location of the offender’s home, place of work, or some other anchor point. It assumes that an offender's home, or other locations the offender is familiar with, can be determined from the crime locations. It is based on theories and assumptions built from group studies of offenders that do not necessarily hold true in individual cases.
CHAPTER 3:  Alternative Methods of Criminal Profiling

Questions
1. Knowledge developed based on the study of groups may be referred to as ________________.
2. Knowledge developed based on the study of individual cases may be referred to as ________________.
3. True or False: Nomothetic offender profiles represent an abstract that does not exist in the real world.
4. The FBI's current method of criminal profiling is ________________.
5. True or False: Nomothetic profiles represent a prediction regarding potential offender characteristics, not an actual analysis.
6. According to a study by the FBI's first profiler, Howard Teten, the bureau's method of profiling helped with the identification of the suspect only ________________% of the time.
7. ________________ involves the examination of spatial relationships between an offender's home and the locations of the offender's crimes.

REFERENCES