THE CHANGING FACE OF ‘COMMUNITY POLICING’ IN SOUTH AFRICA, POST-1994

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ABSTRACT
One of the legacies of the pre-1994 apartheid style repressive and authoritarian policing was the lack of trust by black citizens of the South African Police (SAP). The poor public image of the police and lack of credibility in terms of policing and crime reduction obviously required a drastic change, not only in the mindset of police members themselves, but also in the way the new South African Police Service (SAPS) policed communities in the newly-democratic South Africa. This had to occur within the new democratic-oriented and rights dispensation as outlined initially in the Interim Constitution of 1993 and the final Constitution (1996). This changeover was premised and underpinned on the acceptance of the policing approach or strategy of ‘Community Policing’, which in turn was strongly based on community policing models emanating largely from best practices culled from the USA. In South Africa, community policing was implemented with a number of support ‘legs’, namely victim empowerment and restorative justice, inclusive of so-called democratic or human-rights oriented policing. Furthermore, community support structures as mandated by the Constitution such as Community Police Forums were also crucial to the envisaged roll out of community policing. Other policing approaches in South Africa that aimed to encompass community policing were the operational approaches termed ‘visible’ and ‘sector’ policing which in turn were premised on an intelligence-led policing approach. However, all these policing changes had to be operationalised within a context of continuing high levels of crime, in particular of violent crime. This article looks at the policy development and operational implementation by the new South African Police Services of a broad-based multi-pronged form of community policing and social crime prevention in a transitional democratic state in the period 1994-2009. It also postulates the relative failure of ‘community policing’ per se in the context of the continuing high levels of crime particularly violent crime with the return to a more structured operations based formal policing approach in the last three years. It also briefly examines some of the initiatives and ‘community policing-oriented’ post-ANC Polokwane Conference of December 2007 particularly the so-called Community Safety Initiatives, coupled to the national roll-out of Sector Policing in preparation for the Soccer World Cup to be held in South Africa in 2010.

INTRODUCTION
In the negotiations for a peaceful transition of power, prior to the April 1994 elections (which installed the first ever black majority democratic government in South Africa) the drafters of the interim Constitution (1993) were well aware of the need to transform the South African Police (SAP). The emphasis in this transformation was firstly on changing the way that the South African public were policed (away from the previous apartheid repressive and authoritarian policing style). Secondly, previously under-policed communities were better policed with regard to service delivery and the allocation of resources. Thirdly, policing strived to follow a more democratic and human rights oriented form of policing. To fulfil this new ‘vision for policing’ in South Africa the policy makers decided to make so-called ‘Community Policing’ the core of this transformed policing approach in South Africa.

While it can be said that South Africa had no real tradition of any form of formal “Community Policing”, in the days of political repression there were various forms of community self-policing that did occur. The activities in the black townships of the ‘anti-
crime street committees’, and the ‘Peoples Courts (See Human Rights Committee (HRC), (2001:12) for estimated numbers operating during the 1980s) are examples of euphemistically self-administered “Popular Justice” in the townships in the late 1970s and 1980s.

These largely politicised struggle activities were all but put an end to by 1988 with the then government’s use of the Emergency Regulations powers to suppress all political dissent and public protest. However, a number continued to perpetrate anti-crime vigilante acts in trying to self-police their neighbourhoods in a covert manner (Minnaar 2001). The subsequent large increase in violent political protest all but halted formal policing in many areas with the exception where shows of massive force were implemented – all in an effort to bring down the political violence rather than crime control initiatives. In addition, during the period up to 1994 the activities (political community control) of the so-called Self Defence Units (SDUs – African National Congress (ANC) aligned) and the Self Protection Units (SPUs – Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) aligned) also formed part of this self-protection ethos in the townships (Minnaar 1996). Another factor in this self-policing, were the activities of the so-called ‘warlords’, particularly in the informal settlements (squatter shacklands) that proliferated around the major metropolitan areas of South Africa. These warlords would often set up their own community courts and own ‘police force’ of community guards which were funded largely with forced household levies. These warlords exerted absolute control over the communities they controlled politically and economically (Minnaar 1992).

However, this ‘self-policing’ (anti-crime self-protection and crime prevention activities) became part of the problem in black communities’ involvement and implementation of the new envisaged “community policing” in South Africa. What the policy makers tried to formulate was not always in line with township communities’ ideas of how their communities should be policed. Many thought that this new community policing was where citizens would police themselves merely under the supervision of the formal police agencies. It was also thought, that the state police would provide the communities with resources to enable them to police themselves, prevent crime, patrol their neighbourhoods and like the anti-crime street committees, arrest criminals, and hand them over for prosecution by the criminal justice system (Minnaar 2001). Furthermore, some communities thought that Community Policing would be a logical extension to the People’s Courts’ structures of the civic organisations in the townships. In other words that it would legitimize their activities by bringing down criminal justice structures to community level where they would be directly involved in the whole process. This would be done by their own community police, court officers and even judges of these community courts in their midst. Many thought that these ideas would be accommodated by the insertion in the interim Constitution of the establishment of Community Police Forums (CPF). Moreover, these perceptions were a direct result from the poor policing that most black communities had suffered from for years at the hands of the SAP.

Mistry (1997: 40) states that the “adoption of community policing has to be understood against the background of the massive shortcomings of the ‘old’ [pre-1994] policing system”. By the mid-1990s, policing in South Africa was characterised not only by exceptionally high crime levels (by any international standards), but also by an almost total lack of trust, which in turn led to low levels of actual reporting of crime. If any policing was being experienced by these traditionally under-policed communities it was purely reactive and of the so-called “fire-engine” type. Members of the police, often fearing for their own safety and well aware of the strong antagonism of ordinary members of the public towards them, merely responded to crime (if they responded at all or at the best a delayed response) with a quick ‘in-and-out’ approach to policing of any crime (if it was reported). By 1994 any patrolling or forms of
‘visible’ policing had all but ceased to be performed by the police with policing in most black townships being merely reactive.

It was no wonder then that the newly renamed South African Police Services (SAPS), being ordered by the policy makers and politicians to ‘police in a more humane and sensitive to the needs of communities manner’ went searching for models for community policing, having as they did no tradition or background in this form of policing at all. Moreover, community policing in South Africa was initially more concerned with political rather than policing issues.

There were also a number of structural problems facing the South African Police (SAP) among which was the militaristic-type of training they received; top-heavy management structures staffed largely by white officers; overcoming public perceptions of them being used by the previous (pre-1994) regime largely for political repression and the forceful suppression of township protest actions (as the tool of oppression by the apartheid white government). Prior to 1994, policing in South Africa was traditionally highly centralised, para-military and authoritarian. While these characteristics ensured that the police were effective under the pre-1994 apartheid government in suppressing political protest and opposition to white rule, it also meant that they were poorly equipped for crime control and prevention in the newly democratic South Africa. Under the apartheid rule the police force (SAP) lacked legitimacy and functioned as an instrument of control rather than as a police service dedicated to ensuring the safety of all citizens. In essence, such authoritarian policing has few, if any, systems of accountability and oversight and does not require public legitimacy in order to be effective. Thus, with the advent of democracy in South Africa, systems of police accountability and oversight were not present.

Furthermore, the new South African Police Service had a poorly developed, historically disadvantaged, criminal detection capability (unlike the police in other democratic societies) because of the previous apartheid form of policing. The collection, collation and presentation of evidence to secure the prosecution of criminals was underdeveloped. This was reflected by, among other indicators, the training levels and experience of the detective component of the new SAPS. The problems of criminal detection were also mirrored in the area of crime intelligence. Intelligence gathering structures prior to 1994 were also orientated towards the covert surveillance of political opponents of the apartheid state (White Paper 1998:4).

All of this impacted severely on perceptions about their legitimacy and led to high levels of distrust which in turn led to ordinary township citizens being reluctant to report crime to the police. This was often in desperation against the depredations of criminals turning to vigilante actions through people’s courts or simply violent mob justice. A further drawback was the need to amalgamate eleven different policing agencies in South Africa. In the lead up to the 1994 elections these smaller policing agencies (from the so-called Bantustans and independent tribal homelands) had often promoted wholesale members to higher officer ranks without the requisite officer and management training. This in turn created a number of personnel problems with the placement into positions in the new national amalgamated policing service.

To give structure and form to the envisaged new form of policing in South Africa, policy advisors to the political parties/groupings negotiating the peaceful transfer of power at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations (held between December 1991 and 1993) made various study trips overseas to look at various forms of Community Policing. One of the results of this was the formulation and insertion into the interim Constitution of the concept of Community Police Forums – designed to be the link between...
communities and the new SAPS in order to oversee the implementation of the new model of community policing.\(^8\)

**Community Policing Forums**

In South Africa a Community Police Forum (CPF) is a legally recognised entity that represents the policing interests of the local community. CPFs were also intended to exert civilian oversight over the police at various levels, in particular the local police station level.

CPF s were provided for in the Interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993 (Section 221(1)) (and their establishment by way of an Act of Parliament). The Interim Constitution was also explicit on the role of CPFs in respect of evaluating visible policing (s221(2)). The Interim Constitution clearly saw CPFs as a mechanism through which communities, in particular black communities, could build a relationship with the police, given the way these communities in South Africa had been policed in the past. Essentially CPFs were meant to provide some sort of civilian oversight of the police at the local level, supplementing the role performed by the National and Provincial Secretariats for Safety & Security and the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) (which was established in 1996 and began operations in April 1997) at national level.

**Green Paper on Safety and Security**

As early as the end of 1994 and building on the Interim Constitution, a *Green Paper on Safety and Security* was issued as a policy guide for policing in the ‘new democratic’ South Africa. This outlined the principles such as community policing, democratic control, and accountability, as well as introducing a new style of policing that required a demilitarised approach whereby civilian values would inform every aspect of the new policing services. This latter was an important concept within the context of the past way of policing (pre-1994) in South Africa.

An immediate start was made in drafting a new piece of legislation to restructure the amalgamated policing agencies. This new piece of legislation, The SAPS Act No. 68 of 1995, was passed in early 1995. The Act which also tried to give structure to some of the principles and guidelines for a new South African democracy inserted in the Interim Constitution, was a comprehensive attempt at defining and setting up a ‘new look’ policing service for South Africa, with a new approach to crime prevention, crime reduction and combating of crime. The Act provided for an accountable, impartial, transparent, community-oriented and cost-effective police service. The Act also provided for a civilian ministerial secretariat, community police forums (CPF s), an independent complaints directorate (ICD) (all issues inserted into the Interim Constitution) and the institution of the National Secretariat for Safety & Security largely staffed with civilians such as academics and practitioners from other branches of the criminal justice system. The National Secretariat resided directly under the Minister of Safety and Security, i.e. did not report to the new National Commissioner of SAPS. They were tasked to undertake policy formulation and provision of management information and advice to the Minister. This task included (as per the new Act) the evaluation of service delivery and performance of the police as well as to promote democratic accountability and transparency in the new Police Service. Other changes looked at such aspects as training which was adapted to reflect a non-military style of policing; different policing styles or approaches such as ‘community policing’ and even a brief flirtation with ‘zero tolerance’.\(^9\)

There was recognition by top management of the new SAPS and the National Secretariat that an urgent look at policies, legislation and guidelines for a new way of policing in South Africa was needed. Work began in 1995 on a more comprehensive (than the Green Paper) document, the *National Crime Prevention Strategy* (NCPS). The NCPS document was
approved by Cabinet in May 1996 and represented the first time ever that South Africa had formulated such a national policy or strategy which clearly identified crime prevention as a national priority. The NCPS motivated for a change from the previous exclusive focus on law enforcement to now include ‘crime prevention’ (i.e. away from a narrow ‘crime control’ focus). Other important changes envisaged in the NCPS which impacted extensively on the future way of policing in South Africa, were looking at crime as a ‘social issue’ and that responsibility for dealing with it be shared by all agencies; a movement away from the emphasis on a state-centred criminal justice system to that of a victim-centred restorative justice system. Although the NCPS was of necessity wide-ranging, covering the whole criminal justice system many of the issues raised in this document focused more on the role of the police in operationalising these needs in fighting crime than on operational aspects of Community Policing.

The Green Paper (1994), the SAPS Act of 1995 and the NCPS (1996) in advocating a new approach to police practices made an important policy or paradigm shift by strongly advocating that policing be made more community-oriented. To ensure that these principles were implemented in actual policing and building on the impetus given by the policy acceptance of the NCPS (and the Green Paper) the Minister of Safety and Security approved the development of a White Paper in June 1997, with the main aim of reviewing existing policies and programmes and finally to set the policy framework for the next five years.

Prior to the actual release of the White Paper in 1998 the Department for Safety & Security had released a detailed document titled: Policy Framework and Guidelines for Community Policing, in April 1997. As a consequence the White Paper made little operational reference to Community Policing per se, other than to mention that the SAPS policing approach continued to be ‘underpinned by the philosophy of community policing’ and that this focus was “directly in line with international trends in policing which demonstrate that the participation of communities and community policing form the bedrock of effective law enforcement” (White Paper 1998: 3 & 10).

In the White Paper the emphasis had shifted towards improved service delivery, at the heart of which was the principle that “a partnership between the police and communities is essential to effective service delivery” (White Paper 1998: 3). The White Paper went on to proposed certain interventions for “a safer and more secure society” in two main areas, namely law enforcement; and social crime prevention (White Paper 1998: 19). In the latter problem-oriented partnership strategies were implied, which again drew from international trends (White Paper 1998: 40). The Department of Safety & Security’s and SAPS view of serving the community better through Community Policing, would inter alia involve more effective management of both direct and indirect victims and witnesses of crime as a vital part of successful police investigations. This was in fact integral to the accepted community policing philosophy (that the SAPS subscribed to in the guidelines document) which sought to build relationships between the police and local communities. There was thus, a further acceptance of the link between victim support and successful investigations being critical to improving service delivery and therefore to enhancing public confidence in the police (White Paper 1998: 24).

While the 1998 White Paper of the Department for Safety & Security emphasises the role and involvement of other new role-players outside of the SAPS within a framework of social crime prevention programmes, (White Paper 1998: 5) this White Paper did not spell out how this would be implemented in practical terms for these other role-players (e.g. private security industry) in South Africa. In terms of partnerships, the White Paper merely states
that, with reference to visible policing, the “capacity to implement visible policing be augmented through partnerships with local government” (White Paper 1998: 13). The implication here is that this would be done in conjunction with the proposed metropolitan or municipal policing structures.

The White Paper does not provide a practical guide to private-public policing even though it explicitly mentions the private security industry in terms of being a ‘partner’ in the fight against crime (White Paper 1998: 7).

Finally, the White Paper refers only to areas of intervention to ensure effective crime prevention by way of Community Crime Prevention where:

These interventions involve communities taking responsibility for crime prevention in their own neighbourhoods. Such interventions involve localised programs, which mobilise a range of interest groups to address crime prevention on a town or city basis. Projects could include improving surveillance through schemes such as car guards or community marshals[...](White Paper 1998: 17)

It would appear then that the above-mentioned created some sort of opportunity for the private security industry to engage in crime prevention exercises at a community level. However, as in the past, no legal or regulated framework for such initiatives was established or proposed at all. The implication within this omission is that any such action would actually occur in a legal and practical vacuum.

Uncertainty remains in a number of quarters as to what kind of support, co-operation or service would be provided by the security industry to the police. The wide diversity of services provided by the general private security industry in South Africa further complicates the matter. Although a number of so-called joint or co-operative partnership initiatives have already been launched between certain companies/individuals and police stations at a local level, these have proceeded without the formal recognition or approval by the South African Police Services management and also without due acknowledgement to the legal implications of such actions.

There is in fact no formal national co-operation agreement in existence between the SAPS and the Private Security Industry. Accordingly, the outsourcing of some of the operational functions of the SAPS is at best problematic. There is also no mandate from the South African Police Service that supports or gives any proposed guidelines regarding the expected standard service delivery in terms of outsourcing any policing functions to the private security industry. There are no clear guidelines regarding the role of the Security Industry and the police or any clear-cut instructions defining the exact relationship between these two entities.

IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY POLICING

The question remains: What then of the accepted philosophy of ‘Community Policing’ by the SAPS? As part of the policy changes (Green Paper, Police Act, NCPS and the later White Paper) in formulating a new way of policing, the SAPS had officially adopted “Community Policing” as the way to go. The Community Policing policy framework and guidelines (CPPFG), released in April 1997, was intended to serve as guidelines for implementing this official policing style in South Africa.

The Community Policing Model as outlined in the policy framework was largely an adaption of traditional Western European and American principles, inter alia the emphasis on establishing police-community partnerships within a problem-solving approach responsive to the needs of the community (SAPS 1997: 1). The CPPFG further accepted the following broad concepts of: i) service orientation (community being the client and SAPS the service
provider); ii) partnerships (co-operative effort to facilitate a process of problem-solving); iii) problem solving (joint identification and analysis of the actual and potential causes of crime within communities); iv) empowerment (creation of sense of joint responsibility – joint capacity for addressing crime and service delivery); v) accountability (mechanisms for making police answerable for addressing needs and concerns of communities) (SAPS 1997: 2-3).

The policy document itself gave detailed guidelines for the establishment of CPFs in every policing precinct – every police station commissioner was instructed to be “responsible for the establishment of Community Police Forums in their respective areas” (SAPS 1997: 5). They were delegated to undertake “the identification and mobilization, through consultation, of community resources and organizations that may assist in combating and preventing crime and the constant development of this capacity” (SAPS 1997: 4). All police members were tasked in the policy guidelines “to develop new skills through training which incorporates problem solving, networking, mediation, facilitation, conflict resolution and community involvement” (SAPS 1997: 4). This in itself was a tall order for the SAPS who remained under-trained, under-skilled, poorly resourced and almost overwhelmed by a high workload and persistent high levels of crime as they were, without even mentioning the other socio-economic problems facing an emerging democratic and developing country like South Africa.

Obviously like most policy documents it tended to veer towards idealistic best practices models culled from other international law enforcement jurisdictions. The real test in South Africa would be its practical implementation, and what structures would be implemented to support this philosophy.

At police station level the police members were tasked to establish, within each precinct, a SAPS Implementation Committee, whose first task was to conduct an Internal Audit of current strategies, existing structures, police culture, available resources. They also had to determine shortcomings and areas where changes needed to be done and adaptations undertaken. An analysis of each particular police station’s response to calls for service from the community they were serving also had to be done. In addition, an audit to be instituted of what community initiatives and community crime prevention programmes were operational and functioning in the precinct area. These related more specifically to crime and other policing-related problems such as poor standard of service delivery, poor community relations being experienced by the community, as well as the operations of such community activities as Neighbourhood Watch patrols. Finally, a change in management style was required – from para-militaristic bureaucratic style to a more participative and strategic management style that emphasised not only accountability but also a more proactive responsive form of policing (SAPS 1997: 25-28). On the basis of the reported audit findings (list of strategic and critical issues) each police station, because of their community and station uniqueness, had to develop a comprehensive Action Plan (SAPS, 1998: 36). Part of this Action Plan was the compiling of a individual community profiles – to be inclusive of a demographic, unemployment and crime analysis in each area – in order to facilitate consultations, forming partnerships and engaging in joint problem-solving with each specific community (SAPS 1998: 37-38).

All of these new community policing initiatives required skills that the SAPS did not have or which were simply in short supply. It was no wonder then that it took more than five years before the South African style of Community Policing could be said to have become operational.

Various endeavours were embarked upon to institutionalise community policing. As from the beginning of 1998, a comprehensive programme was launched within the SAPS to train all
members in the philosophy, values and principles of community policing.\textsuperscript{16} The old SAP certainly did not have the ethos or culture of following such a type of ‘softer’ policing, as opposed to the more “hard” militaristic and forceful style of the past. In the South African context, this policing style was based on the premise that a community and its police service are equal partners with shared responsibilities in ensuring safety and security. But with its implementation police members tended to fear that community members would “tell them what to do”, which in turn led to police resistance to community policing and CPFs (Mistry 1997: 47).

The Community Policing document also focused on the establishment of Community Police Forums (CPF\textsuperscript{s}) and CPF Area Boards as official structures to co-ordinate partnership policing initiatives at community level. The White Paper, on the other hand, provided for a supplementary role for local government in CPF activities by directing the CPF\textsuperscript{\textit{s}} towards a more co-operative relationship with municipalities and metropolitan councils in what was termed “social crime prevention”. Thus shifting the CPF\textsuperscript{\textit{s}}’ community role to one of community mobilisation in order to address priority crimes in each community by maximizing civil participation in crime-prevention initiatives (Smit & Schnetler 2004: 14).

According to Brogden and Nijhar (2005: 138): “From a police point of view, community policing assumed an intelligence gathering character in which the community would hopefully become a police resource.” A survey of police officers in Gauteng Province revealed that the introduction of community policing simply meant to them that the community should help them in fighting crime (Mistry 1997). This was diametrically opposed to the perceptions of communities, especially those who had suffered at the hands of the old apartheid police where repression and oppression were the order of the day. Most communities viewed the new form of (community) policing as an opportunity to change the balance of power in their communities and make the police accountable to community needs and structures (inter alia via the new CPF\textsuperscript{\textit{s}}). Especially in the poorer and largely black communities (townships) community policing “was about the control of the police – and much less about preventing crime” (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 138).

At the beginning of 1999 the Gauteng provincial government tried to harness widespread public anger and outrage against perceived escalating crime by launching a public campaign to set up 1980s-era style street committees in an effort to constructively engage communities in the fight against crime. The then Gauteng MEC for Safety & Community Liaison, Paul Mashatile, was a strong proponent of setting up street and block committees since he felt that this would be the only means of getting the community involved by way of small units to really reach the people on the ground in order to achieve any sort of success in a provincial anti-crime campaign. The difference between the apartheid-era committees and the present envisaged ones for Mashatile was that “then it was an alternative to the state machinery, while today it will be complementary to the criminal justice system. The focus today.... will be the elimination of crime.” The old M-Plan of the ANC consisted of command structures that in the past stretched from the local civic association that had representatives of block committees, who in turn consisted of representatives of street committees. The new street committees in the Gauteng model envisaged the Community Policing Forum (CPF) on top, followed by area sub-forums, block communities and eventually, street communities at the lowest level. The Gauteng Secretariat for Safety & Community Liaison planned to assist their establishment in each community so that they would not mushroom on their own by themselves in an uncontrolled manner. The structures would then to be monitored by the Secretariat on an ongoing basis. A further major safeguarding mechanism built into the new model was that the police would be involved and informed of what the committees were up to.
The first such street committee model was implemented in Ivory Park\(^{17}\) (the scene of one of the post-1994 vigilante killings in early January 1999). The Ivory Park CPF was divided into eight zones, each under a sub-forum, and in turn the local police station dedicated one policeman to liaise with every two sub-forums as a link between the police and community. To promote this new concept of community policing, to co-ordinate crime prevention and to deal with vigilantism the Gauteng government declared the month of March 1999 as ‘Safety & Security’ month during which Mashatile and the then Gauteng Premier Mothale Motshekga toured the province promoting the street committee system (Masipa, 1999). At a series of ‘Don’t do Crime’ rallies the new street committee/CPF model was strongly punt by Mashatile. However, in encouraging communities to ‘fight crime’ individuals were still inclined towards taking the law into their own hands, and in their eyes, quite justifiably so, as part of their efforts to combat crime since the authorities were still perceived to be totally ineffective in dealing with crime in their neighbourhoods. Therein lay the crux of the problem, since after the initial burst of enthusiasm, as it became apparent the no real improvement in policing per se let alone in the full implementation of community policing was occurring, communities in black townships fell back into ‘old ways’ of either vigilantism or apathy, with the CPFs becoming either non-active, dysfunctional or merely a police-controlled ‘talk-shop’.

From the SAPS and the government side, in this roll-out of CPFs and community policing, the most important thing in this situation was for the authorities to formalise the whole system of ‘informal vigilante’ justice by channelling these anti-crime activities into a more formal structure, i.e. the new CPF/street committees in liaison with the local police structures. However, with the implementation of CPFs, as the foundation of the new community policing, disputes arose between forum members and local police station members, particularly over the operational independence of the SAPS themselves. Clashes erupted over CPF community crime priorities and the official SAPS priorities – which were set at national level\(^{18}\) (Shaw 2002).

It took only a little more than five years after the initial community police policy document for the new community policing style to largely become abandoned, or at best simply ignored or disregarded in terms of operational planning, in all but name throughout the SAPS. This ‘abandonment’, with SAPS personnel strongly believing it to be ‘too soft’ for the tough crime conditions in South African townships, was also due in part to a number of inherent constraints. One of these being that at the time of its inception the personnel of the SAPS were still largely undertrained and under skilled, with estimates that almost 25% of its 128 000 members were considered to be functionally illiterate (Pelser 1999: 7). Even more members had never received formal training in the actual methodology of community policing. Initially the SAPS members had also tended to ignore the local CPFs or alternately took the initiative in setting local CPFs. In other words, members were merely co-opted from the community onto the CPFs, which were in any case administered by, had their meetings at and resourced from local police stations. CPFs doing their critical monitoring role and advising police on priority crimes in their areas or even what crime prevention programmes should be implemented (theoretically in partnership with communities) were few and far between. In the more affluent predominantly white areas the tendency was for the local CPF to turn itself into a Section 21 Company (not-for-profit) and then to contribute money towards the purchase of equipment and vehicles for the use of the police station in their area, so as to ensure that the type of quality policing previously received from a well-resourced police station in the apartheid era, would continue to be received by its residents (Pelser, 1999: 8).
This was a deliberate response to what was perceived as the siphoning-off of resources to the under-resourced and poorly policed areas in the black townships. So inequalities in levels of policing continued – albeit unintended – to be perpetuated, since CPFs in poorer areas could not afford to equip their local police station at all. The effectiveness of CPFs was being questioned, particularly since they ended up being unelected by being co-opted by the local police station commissioner. Community elections were tried but became a waste of time since very few community members turned up for voting at community meetings. There were also instances where particular interest groups, such as mini-bus taxi associations, got their members voted onto a local CPF thereby dominating proceedings with their narrow crime concerns. Criminals also infiltrated some CPFs and became privy to policing activities in their areas of operation. Within the SAPS itself CPFs were treated with disdain and regarded ‘as a necessary evil’ required by law to bring members of the public into contact with the police. CPFs ended up having little impact or say on the day-today conduct of the police. In addition, this situation led to disputes arising between CPF members and the SAPS as to the latter’s operational independence and eventually those CPFs, other than the ones who merely funded additional equipment and vehicles, were sidelined and ignored (see Shaw, 2001).

In a study conducted by Pelser, Schnetler and Louw in 2002 it was found that essentially community policing and CPFs appeared to have been subtly downgraded (operationally as well as a guiding policing philosophy) by the Ministry and the SAPS as far as policies, regulations and funding were concerned, while communities had also (through apathy and disinterest) abrogated any involvement in community policing viewing crime prevention, reduction and control as solely ‘police business’ (Pelser et al 2002: 26-27 & 64).

Community policing in South Africa, as originally intended as an alternative policing model to assist the police to prevent crime in communities soon came to be subsumed into other forms of policing. Although not initially apparent, while still paying lip service to a community-oriented approach (using all the appropriate terminology), the SAPS, as early as the launch of the Community Safety Plan in 1995, had already demonstrated – if one carefully read between the lines and observed the special operations launched as part of this plan – “their intention to revert to more traditional methods to combat crime” (Burger, 2007: 136). In addition, all pretence to community policing was in fact abandoned with the more formal Policing Priorities and Objectives (otherwise known as the Police Plan) of 1996/97 and the implementation of Operation Sword and Shield with its “return to basics” policing approach.19

So, in essence, Community Policing per se, faded into the background, and other forms of policing, such as visible and sector policing, were pushed forward by the SAPS, ostensibly in support of Community Policing, but all the more designed to improve the SAPS operational effectiveness in fighting crime, rather than dealing directly with community sensitivities and needs which were supposed to be policed in a more considerate, sympathetic, compassionate and sensitive manner.

### Visible Policing

The 1998 White Paper emphasised the implementation of more “visible policing” linked to better service delivery to victims, as well as co-ordinating an integrated criminal justice system. The White Paper advocated a dual approach to safety and security – effective and efficient law enforcement and the provision of crime prevention programs to reduce the occurrence of crime. Furthermore, the White Paper set out priority law enforcement focus areas inter alia on: improving criminal investigations by expanding and retraining investigative capacity in the SAPS; implementing targeted (active) visible policing and service to victims by meeting the needs of victims through adequate service delivery. Visible
Policing was designed to fill the gap between operational crime combating activities and Community Policing by “providing a proactive and responsive policing service that will prevent the priority crimes rate from increasing” (SAPS Annual Report 2007: 31). The emphasis was, however, on specialised crime prevention operations.  

Core to the visible policing approach was the implementation of the following three phases: i) preventative patrolling, i.e. a constant police presence in for instance an identified ‘hot spot’ crime area; ii) directed patrol, i.e. police officers assigned for a limited period for a particular purpose; and iii) sector policing (White Paper 1998: 6).

Of the three forms of visible policing as outlined in the White Paper, Sector Policing became the most important of the new initiatives with reference to the implementation of Community Policing. But this required an unprecedented change, not only in training but also in the thinking of ordinary policemen and women on the ground. The over loading of police officers and detectives within the context of the continued high crime levels made it virtually impossible to implement meaningful training programmes across the board. Members could simply not be spared to go off on training courses for weeks on end.

So while the policy changes seemed to be on the right track in practical terms, policing in South Africa still continued to suffer from ineffectiveness and delays or lack of full implementation. Ultimately this failure led to no significant and meaningful reductions in reported crime levels, especially from the perspective and perceptions of the public as reflected in the official crime statistics.

FURTHER ADDITIONS TO POLICY STRUCTURES
By the turn of the century, six years after democratisation, there still remained huge structural and operational problems facing a transforming SAPS. With the realization that much of the intended changes were simply not being properly or adequately operationalised, the new Minister of Safety & Security, Steve Tshwete, initiated a review of the NCPS and in 1999 a Strategic Implementation Plan was approved by Cabinet in September 1999. In addition, a Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster made up of the departments of Justice, Correctional Services, Safety & Security, Constitutional Development, Defence, Social Development, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, South African Revenue Services, National Intelligence Agency and the National Directorate of Public Prosecution, was established in order to focus on addressing the incidence of crime and public disorder while improving the efficiency of the criminal justice system. (Smit & Schnetler, 2004:15-16). The JCPS developed a National Security Policy (NSP) aimed at integrating crime prevention and crime-combating activities with socio-economic upliftment.

As part of implementing the priorities of the JCPS cluster the SAPS developed its own National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) (launched on 1 April 2000) (as outlined in the SAPS Strategic Plan: 2002-2005) (Smit & Schnetler 2004: 17; SAPS Strategic Plan 2000).

Sector policing
As part of the NCCS the SAPS also launched (as envisaged in the White Paper of 1998) an intensive policing and patrol strategy officially termed ‘Sector Policing’. This approach basically meant that each police station area (precinct) was divided into smaller, more manageable areas. Police resources were then directed to those specific high-crime identified areas within the precinct in order to increase police visibility, improve community involvement by inter alia building trust and getting the public to report all crime and any suspicious activities in their neighbourhood, and to try to address the causes of crime and the fear of crime (Smit & Schnetler 2004: 17). Better visible and sector policing was based on the premise that if crime levels could be brought down, communities would feel safer, trust the police more, and as a consequence better report crime to the police. Hence operational
improvements and increased policing effectiveness would then indirectly support and grow ‘Community Policing’.

Further changes implemented via the new NCCS, included the restructuring of the detective division in the SAPS. Allied to the restructuring of the detective service was the roll-out of so-called visible policing with its sub-component sector policing. The SAPS’ Division for Crime Prevention was tasked to “reduce opportunities to commit crime by optimising visible policing” (SAPS Annual Report 2002/3). In addition, as part of the commitment to extend and make Community Policing more effective this Division was also responsible for victim support programmes.

Sector policing, as one of the prioritised focus areas in the SAPS Strategic Plan (2002-2005), was officially only launched in 2001 with a pilot project in the Johannesburg area. Sector policing was seen as the final practical manifestation of community policing. The official SAPS view then being that the concept of Community Policing as “focusing on building partnerships at a broader level in specific areas” was now strongly coupled to a planned national roll-out of Sector Policing whereby the SAPS were to work on mobilising and organising “communities at micro-level (for example within the boundaries of neighbourhoods, or sectors) to bring police closer to the communities” (SAPS, 2010: 39). In other words Sector Policing was to be a tool for the full implementation of community policing.

The basic concept of Sector Policing as exhibited in the South African context consisted of at least one police official being allocated on a full-time basis to a sector (i.e. geographically manageable area within a police precinct) for which he/she is responsible to enhance safety and security.

Crucial to the successful implementation of this concept is the involvement of all role-players in identifying the policing needs in that particular sector and in addressing the root causes of crime as well as the enabling and contributing factors. The responsibilities of the sector police official also included the determining on a continuous basis, in co-operation with non-police role-players, policing needs, and identifying crime problems, tendencies, crime, “hot spots”, criminals, etc. In addition, their role included the initiating and co-coordinating of policing projects, for example special patrols, and other safety and security initiatives. They would also be responsible for overseeing the activation of other role-players (e.g. municipalities, government departments and NGOs). Underlying these actions would be first establishing direct communication with community members, often via CPFs – if there was a functioning one in the area. Alternately Sector Police Officers would usually start off with a public awareness campaign sometimes involving “knock-and-drop-off” of information sheets and pamphlets and the holding of monthly crime discussion meetings with community members. Essentially the ‘new’ sector policing initiative looked at addressing local crime problems and, where possible, the root causes of crime.

At the end of 2003 the SAPS had sent out a directive to police stations across the country to start implementing Sector Policing on the basis of the positive results from the Johannesburg pilot project. (But many precincts delayed and dragged their feet on this implementation citing a lack of resources, operational vehicles and manpower in preventing them in setting up sector units dedicated to each neighbourhood (sector) in their precincts. (It was only with the approaching Soccer World Cup in 2010 that a National Directive for the national rollout of Sector Policing was sent out at the end of 2009 that such dedicated Sector Polcing Units were established in policing precincts countrywide (see Bezuidenhout 2010).

In essence Sector Policing is an amalgam of past policing initiatives drawing on elements of CPF structures, community policing, visible policing, special operations, crime analysis and
intelligence-led policing. It also creates a perfect platform for the involvement and integration and co-ordination of policing activities of certain sectors of the private security industry. Within all these policy changes there were persistent calls by the private security industry to be allowed to play a larger role in assisting the police to combat and prevent crime or at least to outsource certain services still being provided by the SAPS which could very easily be outsourced without compromising any strictly policing functions of the SAPS.

As can be seen from the above analysis an integrated system of crime combating and crime reduction based on the policy frameworks outlined in the Interim Constitution (1993), Green Paper (1994), NCPS (1996), White Paper (1998) and the NCCS (2000) was slowly being implemented and operationalised by a restructured, transformed (in its policing approach and policing culture) and re-engineered (operational changes) SAPS. Unfortunately, with this new operational policing emphasis, and the fact that the NCSS was formulated entirely by police officers, the philosophy of Community Policing increasingly became “lost” with it merely being paid lip service as a separate policing form in the South African context. Officially it was stated that Community Policing was supported and served in practical terms by the roll out of the new operational forms of visible and sector policing. But the roll out of sector policing was a slow process. After the Johannesburg Pilot Project in 2001, Sector Policing was only introduced countrywide in 2002/3 at selected policing precincts in order to “increase police visibility and accessibility”, particularly in areas having limited infrastructure and high levels of crime. By the end of the 2003/4 reporting year (1 April-31 March) it had been introduced at 47 priority and 14 presidential stations and in 2005 further roll-out occurred to 169 high-contact crime (including the priority and presidential) police stations. But by the end of the 2006/7 reporting year Sector Policing as a crime prevention strategy, and by implication a Community Policing intervention, had only been implemented in a total of 76% of the sectors at these 169 high-contact crime police stations out of the approximately 1 200 police stations in South Africa (SAPS Annual Report 2007: 2-3).

Within the context of more Visible Policing under the programme of Social Crime Prevention the SAPS tried to implement specific community policing oriented strategies or programmes inter alia the following: Anti-rape Strategy involving community awareness campaigns (additionally with active involvement of police personnel in the annual national “16 Days of Activism” week (starting in the last week every year in November)); further implementation and training around the Domestic Violence Act (under the 2006 revised SAPS Domestic Violence Learning Programme); participation in the National Action Plan for 365 days to end Violence- and Gender-based Violence; as well as the Youth Crime Prevention Capacity Building Programme (e.g. Safe Schools Programme, Drug Reduction Programme (for youth) and Child Protection Programme); and the roll out of the National Victim Empowerment Programme. Participation in all these was designed to grow and extend the ‘human’ face of the SAPS and build trust and faith in the police throughout communities. This is a central tenet of the philosophy of community policing.

One of the accepted tenets of Community Policing in the South African context had been the aim of the establishment of active partnerships between the police and the public through which crime and community safety issues can be jointly addressed” (SAPS 1997: 5). In South Africa these ‘partnerships’ were largely structured through the CPFs and under the premise of fulfilling the Community Policing approach of recognising “the interdependence and shared responsibility of the police and the community in establishing safety and security” (SAPS 1997: 4). This was fine where there were effective and properly functioning CPFs but real crime prevention partnerships, other than commercial and for profit ventures like private security operations, were few and far between.
Although by 2006/7 there were officially 1,064 CPFs established at police stations around the country – many operated under varying degrees of success or inadequately fulfilled their legislated mandate. In 2007 the SAPS and Parliamentary policy makers entered into discussions to change the legislation governing CPF activities to allow the CPFs to act to a greater extent on behalf of the communities they were supposed to represent. Part of these envisaged changes would be greater interaction (in terms of identifying and setting) with each police station’s crime and policing priorities and performance targets and the drawing up of a policing programme for each precinct which would be co-owned by both parties. Formal regular feedbacks were to be provided by station commissioners to the local CPF and then back to communities on crime trends and progress in dealing with them. In turn, the communities had to be actively involved in assessing police performance at the local police station based on the policing priorities and targets set in the jointly formulated policing programme for that police station (SAPS Annual Report 2007: 51). One of the implications of these changes would be better funding and provision of resources to CPFs but these changes were to date still at the policy formulation stage. The Minister of Safety & Security had also in 2007 indicated his intention of investigating the expansion of the role of CPFs by transforming them into “Integrated Community Safety Centres” – with the obvious implications of funding resources and infrastructure to better serve communities.

Other initiatives (again SAPS led) were the re-introduction in November 2006 of the National Community Policing Consultative Forum (NCPCF). One of the first initiatives of the reconstituted NCPCF was the drafting of a Uniform Constitution for CPFs (which finalisation had to await the changes in the CPF legislation and the SAPS Act currently under discussion in Parliament). A task team, to draft a Community Policing Training Manual, was also established by the NCPCF but this too awaits final approval before being released to all CPFs. In 2009 the NCPCF was renamed the CPF National Board while in November of that year a SAPS Partnership Unit was established and tasked to look at not only (in conjunction with the CPFNB) “a redefinition and enhancement of the role of CPFs and CPF Boards” (SAPS, 2010: 74), but also to the future rollout of pilot so-called ‘Community Safety Forums’, i.e. to develop policy guidelines on the roles and functions of such CSFs. CSFs being, apparently, more inclusive than CPFs by including role players from departments of Justice, Home Affairs, Corrections and Social Work and Community Development, as well as local government Emergency and Disaster Recovery Services and community service organisations like Childline and victim support groups.

CONCLUSION
By the end of 2007, while the policy framework made provision for the wider implementation of Community Policing through such initiatives as social crime prevention, CPFs and supported by the activities of Visible and Sector Policing, it had only been accepted as a wider philosophical guideline without real community implementation and participation in its envisaged form. Since its official acceptance in 1994 it was largely only accepted through other, largely police operational structures, with the communities having limited say in the evolvement of an adapted South African model. Most community policing initiatives appear to be led and managed by SAPS structures, all the way down to police station level. The usual order of business is that CPFs are called to a monthly meeting at the police station and then informed of various police actions and crime trends with very little, if any, inputs from their side or self-initiated community crime prevention activities.

Ultimately, as Burger (2007: 102) put it, in South Africa: “the role of community policing, and specifically of community policing forums (CPF), was much more focused on the monitoring of the police than on solving community problems”. But more than that, Burger
considers it in South Africa to be “a failed strategy because it had little or no positive (reductive) impact on crime.” Although Burger (2007) does concede that it had a positive contribution “in its real or potential ability to improve the legitimacy of the [South African] police” (Burger 2007:103).

In the early years of the South African democracy, community policing had been launched with great expectations of not only being the answer and solution to the high (and continuing) crime levels, but would also facilitate the transformation of the SAPS. But its failure to fulfil community expectations of a “more humane” and community-needs oriented form of policing in their communities, and to better combat crime itself, the SAPS had soon increasingly reverted to more traditional methods of policing in an effort to improve service delivery and operational effectiveness with its unofficial abandonment of any pretence of following a Community Policing approach at all.

SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
While these changes to the way the SAPS polices South Africa were being made and implemented there were other changes occurring in other spheres of safety and security. Since 1994 there has been significant growth in the size and numbers of the private security industry. There was also the concomitant infiltration of private policing services into the terrain of the traditional public police areas such as responding to alarms, patrolling areas, and even investigating crimes. Much of this growth was because of public perceptions at the poor service delivery and the virtual absence of visible policing in many suburban areas, which was one of the main reasons for the implementation of the policy of visible and sector policing. Those who could afford it, hired armed response companies to protect their homes and businesses and installed sophisticated surveillance and alarm systems. Another phenomena was the proliferation of the so-called ‘Security Villages/Estates’ as well as the institution of ‘gated neighbourhoods’ – the installation of boom gates (‘booming off’) of suburbs with access control and CCTV surveillance systems.

The increasing role of the private security industry in policing and crime prevention led to the revival of interest in so-called ‘partnership’ or ‘co-operative’ policing. In practical terms, co-operation has occurred but usually on an ad hoc basis and in areas of mutual interest and benefit, e.g. cash-in-transit heists. In some of the City or Business Improvement Districts (CIDs), set up in the major cities in particular Cape Town, private security companies have been contracted to provide security services. Typically these would include inter alia CCTV surveillance, access control and street patrolling, security officers. Such services have been at the forefront of dealing with crime but only on the level of petty street crime by means of crime deterrence (their presence) or first response to a crime in progress – simply because they are closest to the action - and then detaining offenders and handing them over to the SAPS.

One upshot of the relative failure to implement fully the concept of ‘Community Policing’ as a more effective policing approach in the South African context has been the continuation of other ‘self-policing’ methods of the past, especially in the poorest sections of black townships such as the informal shack settlements, of vigilante activity. In these areas not a week goes by without a report that members of the public have ‘caught’ a suspected criminal and meted out their own rough justice. This ‘justice’ is usually a beating so severe that the victim either dies later or lands up in hospital with serious injuries. Many of those victims who do survive such vigilante action only do so because they were luckily ‘rescued’ by police arriving timeously on the scene. This ‘taking-of-the-law-into-own-hands’ actions, so reminiscent of pre-1994 days, is redolent of all the old sentiments of ‘police do nothing against criminals’, ‘we have to protect ourselves from the depredations of criminals’, the ‘criminal justice system does not
punish criminals, so we have to punish them ourselves’, and ‘take back control of our communities’. This vigilante action is also a ‘self-protection’ response since, because of individual fears of retribution by gangsters, mob (crowd) vigilantism is used and seen as a subtle form of protecting their identities (recognition) through the anonymity of crowd action, and therefore an opportunity to strike a community blow against criminal depredations in their communities (see Minnaar 2001).

The recognition of the ‘failure’ of any real form of community policing in black communities led to the National Conference of the ruling African National Congress, held in December 2007 in Polokwane, Limpopo, passing a resolution for the reinstatement of ‘street committees’ at local level to replace or assist the operations of CPFs as part of the ANC’s revised policy on fighting crime. At the beginning of 2008, the new ANC president, Jacob Zuma, had toured a number of communities with the message that communities must not wait for the government or the SAPS to set up these street committees but that ANC structures in the townships to go ahead and ‘take back the streets’ themselves by establishing their own street committees to fight against crime. This response to the non-functioning of CPFs and community policing was again couched in such terms as ‘community vigilance’ and being ‘tough on criminals’.  

Although President Zuma had been careful to emphasise that the creation of these new street committees was “not a vote of no confidence in the police, nor… an endorsement of vigilante justice in the fight against crime” (Quintal, 2008) (see also Mbanjwa, 2008 and SAPA, 2008), this establishment of new street committees and CPFs (or kickstarting moribund CPFs back into life) was conspicuous for its absence of use of any community policing terminology.

However, new impetus and ‘life’ was breathed into community policing structures when on the 13 July 2009 Sector Policing was formally instituted by means of a National Instruction from the SAPS National Commissioner and officially ‘ordered’ that in 2010 (with an eye to the hosting of the FIFA Soccer world Cup in June-July 2010) that it should be rolled out in all precincts close to and around soccer stadiums and fan park venues with the view that by 2012 it would be operational in every police station precinct (1 116 of them) in South Africa by 2012 (Bezuidenhout, 2010: 6).

From mid-2009 onwards the institution of so-called ‘Community Safety Initiatives’ in neighbourhood after neighbourhood grew apace as resuscitated or existing CPFs set about, with renewed vigour, setting up formal links and relations with local police station precinct Sector Commanders. Security and crime prevention strategies, co-ordinated with the Sector Policing activities (visible patrols, reporting of suspicious activities and crimes-in-progress, sharing incident report information, etc.) were launched in many communities (albeit starting in the more affluent urban neighbourhoods in the major cities) where residents in neighbourhoods/sectors became more involved in ‘looking after their own safety and security needs’ in the fight against crime. Generally the safety and security of residents in each sector was based on such initiatives as negotiating with a dominant private security company for the institution of a 24/7 proactive patrol vehicle. Such contracted private security company patrol vehicle would typically only have one unarmed security officer dedicated to patrol only in one sector as a visible crime deterrence presence in what was being termed in company jargon as ‘Localised Security Services’ (LSS). Such service was to be based on a written Service Level Agreement (SLA) outlining its functions and patrol activities. Such LSS patrol vehicle would not only be connected to the contracted security company’s radio control room but would also link into the specific neighbourhood sector’s – and oftentimes adjacent sectors – local two-way radio network and cellphone sms systems.
Other community policing activities involved residents of a sector (neighbourhood) organising their own patrols (day and night time), setting up a two-way radio network (sometimes on a repeater sending station), having a ‘roll-call’ check-in via the radio network every evening, linking all residents (or those willing to participate) in an SMS cellphone service whereby any suspicious activities, crime incidents or other information could be rapidly spread on via cellphone to the sector’s residents as well as alerting the local Sector Police Commander to such incidents for possible police response.

Sector Committees are also increasingly doing their own fundraising to purchase such security surveillance equipment as CCTV cameras placed on high masts at the entrances to their sectors. As these Community Safety Initiatives became better organised reductions in crime from their sectors began to be reported. The security systems as outlined above also lead to a number of successes where community patrol members observed crimes and immediately alerted the local police, continued to follow the suspects until the police arrived and gave chase apprehending the perpetrators. Such overlapping levels of security have infinitely improved the safety levels within such organised sectors. Currently, this form of ‘Community Policing’ in conjunction with the Sector Policing roll outs (in 2010) has led to many neighbourhoods becoming more confident that they can deal more effectively with existing crime levels in their areas and go a long way towards reducing existing crime. But like all past community policing initiatives the levels of effectiveness and success are largely dependent upon the buy-in, commitment and participation of each resident in a sector, even if only to be the ‘eyes-and-ears’ for your neighbour or the houses in the street in which you live. Unfortunately, even at this early stage of the roll-out of Sector Policing, there are signs that, after the initial burst of co-operative enthusiasm and involvement, interest has tended to fall away and participation dwindle, once again leaving a small core of between 10-15% of sector residents actively involved in various ways. It therefore remains to be seen how sustainable and ongoing this form of South African ‘community policing’ will be in the near future.

LIST OF REFERENCES

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ENDNOTES


2 Recognising the force control aspects of ‘saturation’ policing in high conflict areas the SAP in March 1991 had taken the first step towards some form of community policing by introducing so-called Police-Community Liaison Forums in black townships to deal with issues of crime control (as opposed to suppressing the political violence). However, these failed (on perceptions of police bias, involvement in covert operations and fanning the political violence with support for hit squads and IFP SPUs) and this particular initiative came to an end with the signing of the National Peace Accord (NPA) in September 1991 and the start of the CODESA negotiations (See Scharf 1991).

3 As early as end of March 1992 Deputy Minister of Law & Order, J. Scheepers, had announced that consultative community forums would be established on a national level in order to “implement the principle of community involvement, and thus provide the community a say in police matters” [italics for emphasis] (Scheepers 1992).

4 A phrase coined to describe them merely ‘dropping in to put out the metaphorical fire (crime) and then leave immediately’.

5 From 1990-2000 the police members were murdered at a rate of more than 200 per year – one of the highest per 100 000 of the population in the world. For detail of how and reasons for these killings of police see Minnaar (2003).

6 In 1994, only about 26% of detectives had been on a formal investigation training course while only 13% of detectives had over six years’ experience. In any event, those detective skills present in the police before 1994 were concentrated largely in white areas (White Paper 1998: 13).

7 See Minnaar (2002b) for more detail on this aspect.

8 Initial impetus to these policy formulations had come from the National Peace Accord (NPA) of 1991 which committed the police to a new type of accountability that emphasized better communication and consultation with communities by the SAP through the setting up of NPA Local Dispute Resolution Committees (See Scharf 1992).

9 Commissioner William Bratten of the New York Police Department and the main architect of the operationalisation of “zero tolerance” and “broken-windows” policing principles came to South Africa in 1997 and gave a series of workshops on this form of policing, mainly to SAPS officials at management levels (author attended one of these).

10 The NCPS started with 14 initial projects, some focusing on areas that were in need of immediate attention, such as the Integrated Justice System (IJS) (information systems to be shared), while others addressed specific areas of crime prevention, such as victim empowerment. Other initial projects included border control, an integrated security system, environmental design, vehicle crime and corruption. Many of these projects also had identified sub-issues. For example, the border control project with 19 ongoing activities, while the project on streamlining the IJS encompasses victim empowerment, organised crime, corruption, commercial crime, gangsterism and domestic violence. Other new projects envisaged by the NCPS centred on what was called...
'social crime and situational crime prevention'. Social crime prevention to focus on the cycle of violence that begins with young children and continues into adulthood. Efforts to develop projects in conjunction with the departments of Health and Education were outlined in the document which intended to reach young children in schools and at home. Situational crime prevention also involved the planning of safer areas through, among other things, improved access and lighting, in essence Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) which was a fairly new concept in South Africa (outside of purely academic circles).

11 The author was a member of Committee No. 5 of the formulating Task Team.

12 The White Paper, for the first time officially made use of the term ‘social crime prevention’. Implied here was where the community at large are involved in initiatives or projects run by themselves that aim to prevent crime in their own neighbourhoods. These typically involve volunteer neighbourhood watches that patrol certain residential areas, or being the ‘eyes and ears’ of the police like in ‘e-block watches’ where private citizens would organise themselves in ‘blocks’ and report any suspicious activities either to each other or directly to the local police by cell phone (or other means).

13 Briefly these legal implications refer to civil and public liability, as well as ‘peace-officer-powers’. For the private sector to provide assistance to the police beyond just the provision of information or being the eyes and ears for local police is still legally guided by the existing powers extended to members of the public, i.e. they have no additional powers legislated specifically for this industry. For a more detailed discussion of these issues see Minnaar (1997).

14 There are, however, ad hoc agreements for co-operation between individual companies and the SAPS. A notable example being that of some vehicle tracker recovery companies.

15 See Minnaar & Mistry (2003) for more detail on outsourcing of policing activities.

16 See Mistry (1997) for detail of this training.

17 An informal settlement in Midrand (a new growing urban area midway between the cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria).

18 National SAPS priorities of responding to murder, armed robbery and other violent crime did not accommodate CPF/community priorities such as dealing with rape, domestic violence and child molestation.

19 This operation went back to using the more traditional policing methods of visible and targeted patrols (vehicle, foot and horse); high-density (‘flooding’) operations with numerous cordon-and-search, stop-and-search and roadblock operations; and air-supported operations in the identified high risk (priority ‘hotspot’) areas in selected communities (Burger 2007: 137).

20 Inter alia these in practical terms were the institution of roadblocks, cordons and searches, searching of premises and vehicles, vehicle patrols, visits to schools , farms and private homes – all in an effort to make communities feel safer and more secure, i.e. Community Policing.

21 The NCPS, while having inputs from SAPS management, it was almost entirely drafted and formulated by the civilians and academic consultants attached to the National Secretariat. With the NCCS it was an entirely SAPS exercise and effort.

22 Through such a geographic approach, the NCCS began to focus on 145 of the 1,130 police stations in South Africa, which generate more than 50% of the reports on crime in South Africa. During 2000/01, all these 145 identified high-crime risk police stations were provided with a Geographic Information System and the appointment of crime analysts in order to analyse the crime in these specific precincts on a daily basis. The identified stations were also instructed to focus all policing activities and scarce resources (special operations, patrols, roadblocks, surveillance actions, etc.) on reducing the high crime levels in their precinct areas (Smit & Schnetter 2004: 17)

23 By the end of 2006/7 reporting year the Sector Policing rollout had involved the SAPS in distributing 15,000 learner manuals on sector policing; 2,500 booklets on community safety; 16,000 posters on sector policing; and 300,000 flyers on sector policing in five African languages (SAPS Annual Report 2007: 61).

24 These were specific police stations identified as ‘high risk’ lacking infrastructure and adequate resources and having high levels of crime in their precinct areas which were made ‘Presidential Stations’ in terms of being prioritized for additional allocations of resources, manpower and funding.

25 These Centres to incorporate victim counselling rooms and other victim empowerment services; advice /information service, and to basically evolve into crime prevention community resource centres with a host of other criminal justice services located there, i.e. ‘one-stop’ criminal justice centres dealing with other services like witness and court services, parolee (probation) services, community sentencing management, etc.

26 The Forum represents role-players from the SAPS, the National Secretariat for Safety & Security and the provincial chairpersons of CPFs.

27 By the end of March 2010 the whole private security industry had approximately 980 000 persons registered with the Private Security Industry Authority (PSIRA) of which only 387 273 were termed as ‘active security officers’ with 7 459 service providers (companies) registered (PSIRA, 2010: 4). See Minnaar (2004) for detail on this growth and reasons for it. At the same time the numbers of the SAPS stood at approximately 150 000 (operational members) (SAPS, 2010: xv).
For more detail on this aspect of the growth of private policing see Minnaar (2005).

In Johannesburg one scheme to harness cellphone technology was launched in 2001 and called eBlockWatch whereby a network system using cellular telephones can send crime alerts via SMS to signed-up members' cellphones. These crime alerts are everything from attempted hijackings to burglaries. Its founder, Andre Snyman, stated that he wanted to use the system as a "crime fighting" tool. (See www.eblockwatch.co.za for more detail on this community initiative).

Again this growth has partly been attributed to public perceptions about the failure not only of effective policing but also to that of any form of Community Policing, with those who can afford it paying for private security while communities not able to afford it have tried to institute more self-policing activities with own community and street committee patrols, e-block or neighbourhood watch systems. These typically involve volunteer neighbourhood watches that patrol certain residential areas, or being the 'eyes and ears' of the police like in 'e-block watches' where private citizens would organise themselves in 'blocks' and report any suspicious activities either to each other or directly to the local police by cellphone (or other means). Another danger of these perceptions has been the regular and frequent use of anti-crime vigilante actions (mob justice) by highly frustrated and angry communities tired of the depredations of criminals and perceptions that such criminals act with impunity not being afraid of ever being arrested by absent or ineffective police and ever being prosecuted by the courts.

For the implementation of public CCTV surveillance systems see Minnaar (2007).

A report for the SAPS was written as early as 1997 outlining the problems and issues involved in any partnership policing between the SAPS and the South African private security industry (see Minnaar 1997).

For more detail on partnerships in CIDs in Cape Town see Berg (2004).

In his various tours around the country launching street committees Zuma had stressed the importance of not being soft on criminals. "I warn you not to be lenient with criminals because they do not respect lives. These street committees must not be user-friendly to criminals but that does not mean that you must kill. Just catch the criminals and hand them over to the police." He had also stated that police should not ask too many questions when the committees bring caught criminals to the local police station. He also clearly stated that the setting up of the street committees was because the ANC wanted to help communities to "get rid [from their areas] of drug traffickers, rapists and other criminals" (SAPA, 2008).

Information in this section based on the author’s own experiences as a member of his local CPF Sector Committee.

‘Dominant’ in the sense that one specific company having the largest number of residents in one particular area signed up (contracted) for the provision of alarm and armed response services would then be approached. By the nature of competition this was often a different security company even in neighbouring sectors.

For example to patrol every street in the sector to which it had been designated every two hours at a speed of not more than 20kph. To have an incident report book.

Such security systems are being installed as an alternative to physical road closures with access control boomgates (as a result of the moratorium on road closures and the booming off of public streets to make ‘gated’ neighbourhoods (see Minnaar, 2010 for more detail on this). Typically such CCTV surveillance cameras are being installed not only with licence number plate recognition (LPR) but also with facial recognition capabilities with information so collected being recorded and sent through to a central control room where video analytics can also be administered to such recorded images. Such a comprehensive system using all available surveillance camera technology is more cost effective than the old boomgate access control labour intensive systems previously used for enclosed or gated neighbourhoods.