Durkheim's Theories of Deviance and Suicide: A Feminist Reconsideration

Jennifer M. Lehmann
University of Nebraska

In *The Division of Labor in Society*, Durkheim conceptualizes deviance as an essentially asocial phenomenon, and he conceptualizes "woman" as an essentially asocial being. Both theories contradict Durkheim's characteristic social determinism, and both encounter, in *Suicide*, two further contradictions. First, *Suicide* demonstrates conclusively that relatively asocial individuals, women, are actually much less prone to deviance than relatively social individuals, men. Second, *Suicide* introduces the theory that deviance is an essentially social phenomenon that is produced by pathological social forces or "currents" rather than by "excessive individualization" and "insufficient socialization." Durkheim's second theory of deviance thus simultaneously rescues his theory of the social nature of men and his theory of the asocial nature of women.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the most compelling claim made by liberals on behalf of modern industrial capitalism is that it bestows human rights universally on the abstract human being, the modern human "individual." Perhaps the most compelling critique of modern industrial capitalism and its liberal doctrine is that "universal" human rights, such as economic opportunity, political power, and cultural expression, are systematically and effectively denied to the majority of human beings under its purview. It follows that an investigation of the relationship between "the individual" and "society" in modernity accepts the terms of the liberal problematic but also bears the potential of critiquing liberal society on its own terms, according to its own criteria.

The question of whether, in theory and in practice, modern industrial capitalism actually realizes its own individualistic ideals has been posed repeatedly, diversely, and with widely varying results. The most persis-
tent critical answers to this question have explored the limits of liberal individualism as demonstrated in the exclusion from the social contract of distinct individuals according to group identities such as class, race, and sex. Thus, the debate about modernity inevitably turns equally on the liberal categories of individual-level freedom and equality and the critical categories of group-level subordination and exploitation.

The critical perspective tends to evaluate modern society against an alternative and as yet unrealized modern society that has been reformed or revolutionized to produce greater de facto liberty and equality. It is also possible to evaluate modern society against traditional or feudal society, so that one may assess the extent to which modernity and liberalism have fulfilled their promise to eradicate ascriptive social systems of caste and conservative social theories of natural, group-level difference and inequality. Marxists argue that industrial capitalism is predicated on economic, political, and cultural inequality, notably on the basis of economic class. Multiculturalists argue that modern Westernism is Eurocentric and predicated on the internal and external colonization of non-European groups by Europeans. Feminists argue that liberal democracy coexists with feudal patriarchy and has been conjoined with sexual inequality, which is reflected in conservative social theory and patriarchal social practice, since its inception.

At stake in these theoretical and practical discussions is the issue of whether modern society and the modern world system can be procedurally reformed to be more inclusive or whether they must be structurally transformed to be more egalitarian. Can inequalities of race, class, and sex be eliminated through equal opportunity and individual mobility in the process of competition for stratified positions? Or must they be addressed through equality of outcome, and the leveling of political, economic, cultural, sexual, racial, and national hierarchies? For the feminist debate about modernity, this issue devolves in large part on the nature of the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy.

According to the liberal feminist view, capitalism and patriarchy are inimical to each other. Caste systems in which social positions are allocated ascriptively and on a group basis, are seen as anomalous and anachronistic, irrational, inefficient, inequitable, unprofitable, and thus ultimately incompatible with capitalism. The meritocracy of equal opportunity and individual mobility is seen as rational, efficient, and equitable, and ultimately the natural, necessary distribution mechanism of a market economy, polity, and culture. In the liberal view, modern capitalism must, can, and will be reformed to include both women and men as generic "individuals" in both the public and private spheres.

According to Marxist, socialist, radical, and multicultural feminism, modern capitalism and patriarchal castes are inextricably linked. (For
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descriptions of these feminist paradigms and readings by their proponents, see, e.g., Jaggar and Rothenberg [1993].) The public, social, male sphere, where capitalism, individualism, and liberalism prevail, is not incompatible with, but contingent on, a private, natural, female sphere, where patriarchy, caste, and conservatism prevail. Patriarchy is not a feudalistic survival that modernity will ultimately displace, but an intrinsic part of the modern, dual, social, and world systems. Caste systems based on sex, like caste systems based on class, race, ethnicity, culture, and nationality, are rational sources of reserve, low-paid, and unpaid labor and thus are rational sources of hyperexploitation and superprofits as well as conflict between and within subordinate groups. Therefore, caste systems such as patriarchy are not only compatible with but essential to capitalism and cannot be reformed or eliminated within its structural confines.

Within the context of this theoretical and practical debate among feminists about the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy, my article constitutes a feminist rereading of the sociology of Émile Durkheim. Modernity appears in Durkheim's work as a complex configuration of reformed capitalism and patriarchy. In fact, Durkheim's social theory actually comprises two social theories: a theory of the public sphere, capitalism, and men, and a theory of the private sphere, patriarchy, and women. The objective here is to determine the relationship between these two spheres—capitalism and patriarchy—and these two groups—men and women—as they coexist within Durkheim's thought. I hope that this determination can shed light on the coexistence of capitalism and patriarchy, men and women, within contemporary thought and reality.

Durkheim's dominant theoretical system represents and constructs the relationship between "the individual" and "society" as they confront each other in modernity. This theory of generic "individuals" is complex and ambiguous, but in many instances a predominant theoretical position can be identified and relative theoretical consistency can be established (Lehmann 1993). Durkheim's subordinate theoretical system represents and constructs the relationship between women and men as they confront each other in modernity. In general, Durkheim's theory of women, like his theory of individuals, is characterized by internal consistency (see Lehmann 1990, 1991, 1994). However, in all instances, Durkheim's theory of individuals and his theory of women are completely contradictory.2

2 Commentators generally recognize the contradictory relationship between Durkheim's theory of women and his theory of individuals in society, and most agree that Durkheim depicts women as less social, or asocial, relative to men (see also Besnard
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The consistent contradiction between the nature of individuals and the nature of women in Durkheim's theory of modernity is emblematic of the persistent contradiction between capitalism and patriarchy, individual mobility and caste, liberalism and conservatism in the reality of modernity. These contradictions, the theoretical and the real, can be resolved in two contrasting ways. The contradiction within Durkheim's theory can be attributed to the anomalous and anachronistic presence of patriarchy and thus can be interpreted as an artifact of his theoretical and social context and as an intrusion of ambient patriarchal ideology into his progressive theory of modernity. In this view, Durkheim's theory of women is simply erroneous and can simply be corrected. Theoretical contradiction can be transformed into theoretical consistency, if Durkheim's women are subsumed into the Durkheimian category of the individual. This revisionist corrective to the theoretical contradiction of patriarchy is equivalent to the reformist corrective to the ontological contradiction of patriarchy. In liberal theory and practice, the anomalous reality of patriarchy will be eliminated through the assimilation of women into the capitalist world of men.

An alternative resolution of the contradiction between Durkheim's theory of individuals and Durkheim's theory of women is to interpret Durkheim's "women" as women and Durkheim's "individuals" as men and Durkheim's dualistic theory as an accurate description of a dualistic modernity. According to this view, the so-called contradiction in Durkheim's theory is not erroneous, and not even contradictory. Durkheim's theory of the relationship of difference and inequality between men and women and the relationship of compatibility and complementarity between the dual spheres of capitalism and patriarchy is consistent with the contradictory nature of so-called modern reality. The dual Durkheimian configurations of organicism, social determinism, and liberal individual mobility with respect to men and conflict, biological determinism, and conservative caste ascription with respect to women reflect and shape the modern world and our modern theories about that world.

This article will examine Durkheim's theories of suicide as a site where
Durkheim discusses women relatively extensively and where he encounters numerous, symptomatic, theoretical difficulties. In *The Division of Labor in Society* Durkheim ([1893] 1933) delineates a coherent, dualistic model of sexual differences and dual spheres. In *Suicide* (Durkheim [1897] 1951) empirical findings concerning female suicide patterns contradict theoretical positions in *The Division of Labor in Society*, and Durkheim is forced to develop a specific new theory, female fatalism, to reconcile social facts and social theory. In “Divorce by Mutual Consent,” an article written nine years later, Durkheim ([1906] 1978) retracts his theory of female fatalism, reinterprets his data, and neutralizes the troublesome, feminist, political implications of *Suicide*.3

**THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY**

*The Division of Labor in Society* (hereafter *The Division of Labor*) focuses primarily on the division of labor among individuals in the public sphere, the sphere Durkheim identifies as “society.” Durkheim postulates that the division of labor initially destroys mechanical social solidarity through individuation but ultimately creates organic social solidarity through interdependence. According to his organicist theoretical scheme, the social division of labor is necessary, beneficial, functional, and moral.4

The social division of labor is necessary because the social organism, like all natural life, is subject to the inexorable process of evolution. Durkheim interprets the European transformation from agrarian feudalism to industrial capitalism as an adaptive metamorphosis from simplicity to complexity. This transformation, interpreted as a division of labor,

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4 “The division of social labor” would be a more accurate translation of *De la division du travail social*. However, I employ the term “social division of labor” for purposes of comparison with the term “sexual division of labor.” It is important to note that, although Durkheim portrays society as the public sphere of economic and political activity from which women are absent, French women participated extensively in society thus defined. Offen (quoted in Boxer and Quataert 1987, p. 183) reveals that, since the mid-19th century, “France had led all other nations with the highest percentage of women active in the labor force.” According to Offen, the percentage of French women in the paid labor force grew from 24% in 1866 to 38% in 1911. In 1896, Jeanne-E. Schmahl (in Bell and Offen 1983, p. 101) estimated that 6,000,000 French women were engaged in waged labor. Bell and Offen (1983), Boxer and Quataert (1987), Landes (1988), and Tilly (1981) provide vivid documentation of women’s participation in political activities in Third Republic France.
Durkheim equates modernity with the structural differentiation and functional specialization among human individuals, conceived of as cells in a complex, superior social organism.

The social division of labor is also necessary because it solves an intractable problem: the natural and inevitable pressure on scarce resources created by the natural and inevitable process of population growth. The social division of labor is an unconscious, species-level, adaptive, evolutionary response to an environmental stimulus; fortuitously, it is an optimum response and engenders many beneficial, though unintended, consequences.

One consequence of the social division of labor is that it radically alters the way in which functional abilities are distributed and transmitted to structural elements in the social organism. According to Durkheim, in primitive society, functional abilities are distributed at the societal level. They are identical among all individuals, and they are transmitted genetically and without differentiation within each society. In feudal society, abilities are distributed at the group level. They are identical among all individuals within a particular caste, and they are transmitted genetically and without differentiation within each caste. In modern society, general abilities may be distributed at the group level and transmitted genetically; specific abilities are distributed at the individual level and are transmitted socially.

The social division of labor is obviously beneficial because structural differentiation and functional specialization are optimally efficient means of production. However, the supreme and moral benefit of the social division of labor, according to Durkheim, is that it creates functional interdependence and therefore eventually creates organic solidarity among the differentiated, specialized individuals in modern, divided society. Organic solidarity means that differentiated, specialized individuals are integrated with each other and regulated by each other, because they must engage in cooperative productive interactive processes and because they must exchange the products of their labor. Furthermore, organic solidarity implies organicism, or collectivism. Differentiated and specialized individuals are integrated with and regulated by society because they stand in relation to the social organism as single cells stand in relation to a complex biological organism. In modern society, individuals are completely dependent on the collective social organism, and the interests of individuals are completely utterly aligned with the interests of the collective social organism.

How do women fit into this model of modern society? There are two possible answers to that question. The most obvious answer is that women are human “individuals” who are structurally differentiated and...
functionally specialized, and who are, consequently, organically inte-
grated and organically regulated, in relation to other individual social
cells, to occupational and institutional social organs, and to the collective
social organism. The problem with this obvious answer is that it is not
the one given by Durkheim in The Division of Labor.

In The Division of Labor, Durkheim introduces the concept “the sexual
division of labor” in a section entitled, “Cases Where the Function
of the Division of Labor Is to Bring Forth Groups Which Would Not
Exist Without It” (see esp. pp. 56–61; see also pp. 122–23, 247, 250,
264–65, 320). According to Durkheim, “the sexual division of labor is
the source of conjugal solidarity” (1933, p. 56). In primitive society, there
is no sexual division of labor; therefore, “marriage is in a completely
rudimentary state” and conjugal solidarity is “very weak.” “On the
contrary,” Durkheim says, “as we advance to modern times, we see
marriage developing. . . . It is certain that at the same time sexual labor
is more and more divided. . . . Today, among cultivated people, the
woman leads a completely different existence from that of the man. One
might say that the two great functions of the psychic life are thus dissoci-
ated, that one of the sexes takes care of the affective functions and the
other of intellectual functions” (1933, pp. 59–60).

Structural differentiation develops concomitantly with functional spe-
cialization between the sexes. As primitive society evolves into modern
society, women remain primitive. “One may . . . see in the female form
the aboriginal image of what was the one and only type from which the
masculine variety slowly detached itself” (1933, p. 57). Conversely, men
evolve, and thus become structurally differentiated from women. “With
the progress of civilization the brain of the two sexes differentiates itself
more and more . . . due both to the considerable development of mascu-
line crania and to a stationary or even regressive state of female crania”
(p. 60).

Just as the division of labor among individuals creates modern society
and organic social solidarity, the division of labor between men and
women creates conjugal society and organic conjugal solidarity. The role
of the division of labor in each case is “to render societies possible which,
without it, would not exist. . . . Permit the sexual division of labor to
recede below a certain level and conjugal society would eventually subsist
in sexual relations preeminently ephemeral. If the sexes were not sepa-
rated at all, an entire category of social life would be absent” (1933, p.
61). Durkheim apparently felt that the sexual division of labor in his

\[^5\] This statement can be interpreted as a warning against feminist policies, as can this
discussion: “By constitution woman is predisposed to lead a life different from man.
Nevertheless, there are societies in which the occupations of the sexes are in fact the
same” (1933, pp. 264–65).
own era was sufficiently developed to ensure the existence of organic conjugal solidarity, and therefore, of conjugal society. “Conjugal solidarity, for example, such as today exists among the most cultivated people, makes its action felt at each moment and in all the details of life” (p. 61).

In fact, Durkheim uses the sexual division of labor as an exemplar for the social division of labor. Challenging the notion that the progress of the social division of labor could be finite, limited by the “organico-psychic constitution” of men, Durkheim invokes the extreme functional specialization within biological organisms and the ultimate structural differentiation between women and men: “Moreover, in the very order of psychic and social functions, has not the division of labor, in its historical development, been carried to the last stage in the relations of men and women? Have not there been faculties completely lost by both?” (p. 401n.2)

In The Division of Labor, then, Durkheim actually articulates not one but two “divisions of labor in society.” The first is, properly, a social division of labor, in the sense that it pertains to social labor—that is, labor in the public sphere—and to social individuals, that is, men. I argue that the second division of labor is the structural differentiation and functional specialization between these social individuals, men, taken collectively, that is, society—and a monolithic Other—that is, woman.

The sexual division of labor is radically different from the social division of labor because it divides and unites two finite groups, men and women, as opposed to uniting and dividing an infinity of (male) individuals. Apart from this crucial difference, the sexual division of labor is strikingly similar to the social division of labor. Like the social division of labor, the sexual division of labor is, for Durkheim, necessary, beneficial, functional, and moral.

Like the social division of labor, the sexual division of labor reflects the universal law of evolution. The two sexes, like all individuals, are destined to become structurally differentiated and functionally specialized. In primitive society, the two sexes, like all individuals, are structurally and functionally identical. As the social organism evolves and develops, the individual cells that constitute society and that are constituted by society (men) necessarily evolve and develop concomitantly. The Other or woman, who is outside society and its influences, is not altered by social evolution and therefore remains the same while becoming increasingly different from men.

There are two primary implications of woman’s static, unevolved, primitive nature. First, woman’s functional abilities are distributed at the group level rather than at the individual level. The only differentiation and specialization woman is involved in is external—the differentiation and specialization between woman and men. “Woman” comprises
women, who are structurally undifferentiated and functionally unspecialized in relation to each other. Second, woman's functional abilities are transmitted genetically rather than socially. Woman cannot become, and does not need to be, individualized, socialized, or modern. In relation to each other, women constitute a caste. In relation to men, women constitute a caste.

Like the social division of labor, the sexual division of labor is not only necessary but beneficial. Primarily, the sexual division of labor functions to unite the two differentiated and specialized sexes in exchange, interdependence, and organic sexual or conjugal solidarity.

Durkheim's organicism always privileges the prerequisites of the collective social organism, and the reproduction of its individual cells, the most essential condition of its existence, is ensured through the compulsory heterosexuality of a sexual division of labor. Furthermore, the traditional family that results from the sexual division of labor, serves to unite not only women and men, but through them the individual biological organism and the collective social organism. The traditional family, structured by the sexual division of labor, represents the intersection and integration of nature (women, reproduction, the private sphere) and society (men, production, the public sphere).

**SUICIDE**

While objectionable from a feminist perspective, the theory of the sexual division of labor articulated in *The Division of Labor* is consistent and coherent. Women are asocial beings, consigned to the private, domestic, familial sphere, and thus situated outside society. Men are social beings, interacting with each other, who constitute and are constituted by the social organism and the collective consciousness that together constitute society. The two sexes are divided by their respective structures and functions and united by their interdependence in organic sexual solidarity within a second, parallel society: conjugal society.

*Suicide* was published in 1897, just four years after *The Division of Labor*. In many ways, *Suicide* provides testing and validation of Durk-
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Durkheim's theories about primitive, transitional, and modern societies, as delineated in the earlier work. *Suicide* is equally an application and demonstration of Durkheim's methodology, as explicated in *The Rules of Sociological Method*. Thus, there is a great deal of theoretical congruity between *Suicide* and Durkheim's other major works. However, *Suicide* both reveals and creates several major contradictions within Durkheim's theory of society and between his theory of society and his theory of sexual difference. In particular, it is the data on women's suicide rates that betray the contradictions within the Durkheimian theoretical structure.8

In the first place, *Suicide* reveals a crucial but neglected contradiction in Durkheim's social theory, the contradiction between two alternative theories of deviance. Durkheim's theory of deviance is consistent to a point. In transitional and modern society, deviance occurs because of excessive individualization, or, conversely, insufficient socialization. The separate beings that emerge through the division of labor initially tend to be unintegrated and unregulated. Egoistic and anomic individuals tend to be antisocial, deviating from collective identity, collective interests, and collective norms and limits for individual behavior. Thus, individualism is responsible for social problems as well as for profound individual unhappiness. One extreme form of anomic and egoistic deviance is the object of Durkheim's study, suicide.9

The question remains: What causes individualism and individualistic deviance? Specifically, is individualistic deviance caused by individuals or by society? Durkheim's simplest answer to the problem of deviance is that it is caused by individuals, particularly those who are insufficiently integrated and regulated by society. The question then becomes: What is the nature of the individual? The individual primarily appears in Durkheim's work as a physical, biological, natural entity, a mere organism or body.

Durkheim's alternative answer to the problem of deviance is that it is caused by a society that insufficiently integrates and regulates individu-

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9 Durkheim chooses to study suicide because of all the forms of modern, individualistic deviance, it is the one most amenable to psychological explanation and thus serves as the most powerful test case of the sociological method. For Durkheim, suicide is a typical example of deviance; it is not an exceptional example or something other than deviance.
The question then becomes: How can society create its own problems? Several answers to this question can be found in Durkheim’s work. First, society can cause individualism and social problems by producing the absence of social forces, and thus producing the presence of individualism, in transitional and modern society. Second, society can cause individualism and social problems by producing negative social forces, the social “currents” of egoism and anomie in transitional and modern society.10

Durkheim’s theory of transitional and modern deviance is that it is caused by excessive individualism and insufficient socialization. These formulations elide the question of whether deviance is caused by individuals acting independently of society or by society acting through individuals. Similarly, Durkheim’s (1951, p. 258) explanation of egoism and anomie leaves the question unresolved: “Both spring from society’s insufficient presence in individuals.”11 Is society’s insufficient presence in individuals absolute? Is it the abandonment of individuals to their own biological imperatives or their own ideas and behaviors? Or is society’s insufficient presence in individuals relative? Is it the failure to counterbalance negative social forces with positive social forces? If Durkheim begs the question, his work in Suicide forces the issue.12

In addition to revealing an underlying contradiction in Durkheim’s

10 Besnard (1973) similarly describes two disparate theories of suicide in Durkheim’s work: “le juste milieu” (the golden mean) or “la courbe en U” (the U curve) and “l'équilibre entre des forces contraires” (the balance of contrary forces) or “l'action de courants suicidogènes” (the action of suicidogenic currents) (pp. 34–36).

11 Besnard (1973, p. 34) aptly calls this Durkheim’s “philosophie du juste milieu” (philosophy of the golden mean). According to Durkheim’s logic, there is an ideal, optimum level of socialization and an ideal, optimum level of individualization. Mechanical society produces excessive socialization and insufficient individualization, expressed as altruism (excessive integration) and fatalism (excessive regulation). Transitional society produces excessive individualization and insufficient socialization, expressed as egoism (insufficient integration) and anomie (insufficient regulation). Durkheim predicts that a golden mean between individualization and socialization will be produced when newly differentiated and specialized individuals are reintegrated and reregulated under conditions of organic solidarity. I agree with Besnard that Durkheim’s concepts egoism/integration/altruism are distinct from his concepts anomie/regulation/fatalism. For contrasting views, see e.g., Johnson (1965) and Pope (1976).

12 The related question, of what constitutes a balance between individualism and socialization—a balance presumably struck in modern society through organic solidarity—also remains open. Is this to be a balance between two genuine entities, the individual and society, or is it to be a balance between two social forces, individualism and socialization? I contend (Lehmann 1993) that Durkheim considers even the modern individual an entirely social product, and that “individualism” in the positive sense refers exclusively to structural differentiation and functional specialization—not to the existence of actual individual ideas or behaviors.
social theory, *Suicide* creates some contradictions in his otherwise coherent sexual theory. In particular, *Suicide* calls into question two central aspects of Durkheim's theory of women as it appears in *The Division of Labor*: the asocial nature of women and the organic sexual or conjugal solidarity ideally connecting women to men. Unlike the contradiction in Durkheim's social theory, which remains unresolved, the contradictions in his sexual theory are forced into provisional resolution by the cold, hard statistical facts in *Suicide*.

There are two specific empirical findings in *Suicide* that expose or generate serious theoretical problems for Durkheim. Both of these findings concern female rates of suicide. In the first place, Durkheim ascertains that women's suicide rates are much lower than men's. Viewed in isolation, this statistic is neither surprising nor problematic. Viewed in the context of Durkheim's theories of women and his theories of deviance, it is quite disruptive. If women are asocial, as Durkheim asserts, and if unsocialized individuals tend to be deviant, as one of his theories of deviance asserts, then women should have higher rates of suicide than men. Conversely, men who may be relatively unsocialized compared to other individual men but who are as a group relatively socialized compared to women, should have lower rates of suicide than women.

In his second chapter on egoistic suicide (chap. 3), Durkheim claims that it is precisely because women are asocial relative to men that they have lower rates of suicide relative to men. In this chapter, Durkheim identifies the family—the presence and number of children—as a form of social integration that reduces the tendency to egoism and egoistic suicide. He then explains that, due to their asocial nature, women have no need for social integration and thus no tendency to egoism or egoistic suicide. In this respect, Durkheim compares women to "children," "the aged," "an animal," "lower societies," and "primitive man" (1951, p. 215). "If women kill themselves much less often than men, it is because they are much less involved than men in collective existence; thus they feel its influence—good or evil—less strongly. So it is with old persons and children, though for different reasons" (p. 299).

There is a second empirical finding in *Suicide* that disrupts the theoretical edifice erected in *The Division of Labor*. Women and men are both affected by marriage, as indicated by the differential suicide rates associ-
ated with marital status. However, the effects of marriage are diametrically opposite for women and men. Specifically, marriage attenuates male suicide rates while it exacerbates female suicide rates. Durkheim demonstrates, for example, that childless married men have substantially lower rates of suicide than unmarried men (644 to 975 per million, respectively), while childless married women have substantially higher rates of suicide than unmarried women (221 to 150 per million, respectively). “From this table and the preceding remarks, it appears that marriage has indeed a preservative effect of its own against suicide. But it is very limited and also benefits one sex only” (p. 198).

Durkheim’s interpretation of this statistical evidence is that, while marriage is beneficial for men, it is detrimental for women. In France at least, “conjugal society is harmful to the woman and aggravates her tendency to suicide.” Conversely, there are “special benefits bestowed by marriage on the male sex” (p. 189). This theme is repeated throughout chapter 3. “Conjugal society, so disadvantageous for women, must, even in the absence of children, be admitted to be advantageous for men” (p. 193). Clearly, then, this finding problematizes Durkheim’s theory of organic solidarity between women and men precisely at the site of that alleged unity of interests, “conjugal society.” However, while the family functions to integrate potentially egoistic individuals, marriage functions to regulate potentially anomic individuals. Therefore, Durkheim defers his explanation of the effects of marriage to his chapter on anomic suicide.

It is in this chapter that Durkheim’s theories of deviance, suicide, and women confront each other most dramatically. Here, Durkheim begins by examining the respective effects of divorce on the suicide rates of men and women. Once again, these effects are not merely different, but diametrically opposed. Specifically, the rate of divorce is directly related to the suicide rate of married men and inversely related to the suicide rate of married women. Durkheim sums up these statistical relationships in the form of a “law” that he describes as “beyond dispute”: “From the standpoint of suicide, marriage is more favorable to the wife the more widely practiced divorce is; and vice versa” (p. 269; emphasis in the original).

Durkheim argues that divorce has contrasting effects on men and women because marriage has contrasting effects on them. “And indeed, marriage may very possibly act in an opposite way on husband and wife. For though they have the same object as parents, as partners their interests are different and often hostile” (p. 269). Having established the conflict of interest between men and women, concerning both marriage and divorce, Durkheim ventures to explain it. It is crucial that Durkheim attributes the sexually specific effects of marriage and divorce to the
central difference between the sexes: the difference between social and asocial beings.

Men are quintessentially social. Even their sexuality is social rather than natural, mental rather than physical. As an "intellectual" phenomenon, male sexuality is not subject to biological regulation and requires social regulation. For men, marriage provides such regulation, satisfying their potentially insatiable sexual desire by defining and limiting its object. In the absence of such social regulation, men are subject to conjugal or sexual anomie: a "morbid desire for the infinite" in the realm of sexual relations. The possibility of divorce effectively deregulates sexual desire, producing sexual anomie and, ultimately, suicide. Sexual anomie, therefore, accounts for the higher rates of suicide among men in regions where divorce is practiced, as well as higher rates among unmarried men.

Women, however, are quintessentially asocial. Women's sexuality is natural and physical rather than social and mental, and it is therefore regulated—limited and satisfied—biologically. "Woman's sexual needs...are more closely related to the needs of the organism, following rather than leading them, and consequently find in them an efficient restraint. Being a more instinctive creature than man, woman has only to follow her instincts to find calmness and peace...Marriage is not in the same degree useful to her for limiting her desires, which are naturally limited" (Durkheim 1951, p. 272).

For women, marriage represents unnecessary regulation. More important, it constitutes excessive regulation for them. "By fixing the conjugal state permanently, it prevents all retreat, regardless of consequences. By limiting the horizon, it closes all egress and forbids even legitimate hope" (p. 272). The excessive sexual regulation that women experience is diametrically opposed to the insufficient sexual regulation that men experience, and in this opposition Durkheim finds the solution to the riddles posed by his suicide data. "Speaking generally, we now have the cause of that antagonism of the sexes which prevents marriage favoring them equally: their interests are contrary; one needs restraint and the other liberty" (p. 274). Durkheim labels the excessive sexual regulation peculiar to women "fatalism":

"The above considerations show that there is a type of suicide the opposite of anomic suicide, just as egoistic and altruistic suicides are opposites. It is the suicide deriving from excessive regulation, that of

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15 For Durkheim, anomie has two dimensions: it is a lack of rules for behavior, primarily in the newly specialized economic sphere, and a lack of limits on aspirations, primarily material aspirations, in the economic and sexual sphere.
persons with futures pitilessly blocked and passions violently choked by oppressive discipline. . . . To bring out the ineluctable and inflexible nature of a rule against which there is no appeal, and in contrast with the expression ‘anomy’ which has just been used, we might call it fatalistic suicide” (p. 276n.25).

Sexual fatalism accounts for the higher rates of suicide among women in regions where divorce is prohibited as well as higher rates among married women. Since fatalism is restricted to primitives and women, Durkheim finds it uninteresting and relegates it to a footnote. Ironically, he compares the fatalistic suicides of women to the suicides of slaves and others suffering from “excessive physical and moral despotism” (p. 276 n.25).

Durkheim’s theory of sexual anomie and fatalism explains the contrasting effects marriage and divorce have on women and men. It can also be invoked to help explain the fact that women’s rates of suicide are universally and substantially lower than men’s. If women, as asocial beings, are not unregulated, but biologically regulated, then they are not susceptible to anomie or anomic suicide. This is parallel to the notion that women, as asocial beings, do not need social integration and are not susceptible to egoism or egoistic suicide. Women, while outside the purview of social integration and regulation, do not need social integration and regulation and thus should be not more but less deviant than men.16

Durkheim’s solution to the problem of women in Suicide has important implications for his conceptualization of deviance (1960). Specifically, it externalizes the individual/society dichotomy described in “The Dualism of Human Nature” (Durkheim [1914] 1960). Durkheim imputes the asocial, animalistic, “individualistic” dimension of human nature to women. But he divests the asocial, animalistic being of its antisocial, deviant tendencies. Asocial beings are not subject to socialization or social determinism, but they are subject to instinctual control and biological determinism.

At the same time, Durkheim imputes the social, mental, and moral dimension of human nature to men. But he invests the social, mental, and moral individual with antisocial, deviant tendencies. Social beings are subject to socialization and social determinism; but they are also subject to insufficient socialization, either as a relative absence of social forces or as the predominance of negative social forces over positive social forces. Suicide, then, inclines toward support for Durkheim’s second theory of deviance. Deviance is the product of society working through

16 Elsewhere, however, Durkheim pointedly attributes women’s lower crime rates not to their morality, their feminine socialization, or even their biological regulation, but to their “lack of opportunity” (1951, p. 342).
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absolutely social individuals, that is, men. It is not the product of autonomous individuals, which do not exist, or of absolutely asocial beings, that is, women. Like all social facts, deviance has a social cause; like all social facts, deviance does not apply to women.

Durkheim's answer to the question of women in *Suicide* has decisive implications for his conception of deviance in modern society. It has devastating implications for his conception of organic solidarity in conjugal society. Durkheim's theoretical maneuvering, his theory of sexual anomie and sexual fatalism, leaves two problems unresolved. In the first place, what are the policy implications of the fact that marriage appears functional for men and dysfunctional for women, while divorce appears functional for women and dysfunctional for men? Durkheim's initial answer is simple: "Must one of the sexes necessarily be sacrificed, and is the solution only to choose the lesser of the two evils? Nothing else seems possible as long as the interests of husband and wife in marriage are so obviously opposed" (1951, p. 384).

In fairness to Durkheim, he does suggest another, long-term, solution to the problem of the sexual differentiation of suicidal etiology. Durkheim attributes the "antagonism" of interests between men and women to the social nature of men, which predisposes them to sexual anomie, and the natural nature of women, which predisposes them to sexual fatalism. Of marriage, Durkheim says: "It cannot simultaneously be agreeable to two persons, one of whom is almost entirely the product of society, while the other has remained to a far greater extent the product of nature" (1951, p. 385).

Durkheim consequently advises that women play "a more active and important" part in society. However, this solution is one that also causes more problems. First, Durkheim retains his theory that the structural differentiation and functional specialization between women and men is not only irreversible but also progressive in nature. "To be sure, we have no reason to suppose that woman may ever be able to fulfill the same functions in society as man. . . . The female sex will not again become more similar to the male; on the contrary we may foresee that it will become more different" (1951, p. 385). It is hard to imagine that, as women become ever more different from men, women's sexuality could somehow become more similar to men's sexuality.

Second, Durkheim qualifies women's "more active and important"
part in society to the point that it becomes meaningless. Woman’s part in society must be different from man’s; it must be “peculiarly her own”: “Both sexes would thus approximate each other by their very differences. They would be socially equalized, but in different ways” (1951, p. 385). In addition, Durkheim cautions that even legal equal opportunity would not serve to integrate the structure of “woman” into the functions of men. Should legal barriers to women’s social participation be dismantled, natural barriers would remain. “She could choose more freely, but as her choice would be determined by her aptitudes it would generally bear on the same sort of occupations. It would be perceptibly uniform, though not obligatory” (1951, p. 385n.16).

In *Suicide*, Durkheim recognizes that the sexual conflict of interest in relation to marriage and divorce undermines his own support of marriage and opposition to divorce. He takes sides in the conflict, supporting the interests of men and marriage at the expense of women and divorce. He also, unconvincingly, suggests means to attenuate the conflict of interest between women and men—as it specifically pertains to the effects of marriage and divorce, and in the unforeseeable, in fact unlikely, future. With respect to the more general and more immediate question of the relationship between women and men, women’s interests and men’s interests, Durkheim appears to accept a sexual conflict of interest as inevitable. His own findings in *Suicide*, combined with his overarching theory that women are “the product of nature,” while men are “the product of society,” destroys his thesis of organic sexual solidarity. In *Suicide*, sexual difference between social men and asocial women overrides sexual interdependence between differentiated and specialized members of conjugal society.

“DIVORCE BY MUTUAL CONSENT”

*The Division of Labor* establishes that women and men are structurally differentiated and functionally specialized. It further purports that sexual

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18 This is one of the most equivocal passages in all of Durkheim’s work. In addition to the quotes in the text, compare the following statements about sexual difference and conflict: “It is by no means certain that this opposition must necessarily be maintained. Of course, in one sense, it was originally less marked than now, but from this we cannot conclude that it must develop indefinitely. For the most primitive social states are often reproduced at the highest stages of evolution, but under different forms, forms almost the opposite of their original ones. . . . Only when the difference between husband and wife becomes less, will marriage no longer be thought, so to speak, necessarily to favor one to the detriment of the other. As for the champions today of equal rights for woman with those of man, they forget that the work of centuries cannot be instantly abolished; that juridical equality cannot be legitimate so long as psychological inequality is so flagrant.” (1951, pp. 385–86)
difference and the sexual division of labor are natural and that they are evolutionary. As such they are both functional and adaptive, necessary and beneficial, immutable and progressive. Women are asocial and affective by nature, predisposed to physical and emotional functions in the private sphere. Men are social and intellectual by nature, predisposed to mental and moral functions in the public sphere. The sexual division of labor is the social expression of natural sexual difference. More important, it serves an essential sociobiological purpose: it unites women and men in organic solidarity within conjugal society.

Suicide maintains the structural difference between asocial women and social men, and the functional specialization of women in the family and men in society. However, instead of creating sexual unity and solidarity, sexual difference and the sexual division of labor are shown to divide women and men in a sexual conflict of interest at the heart of conjugal society. The fact that marriage and divorce have opposite effects on women and men creates a theoretical problem for Durkheim. He solves it with his novel theoretical explanation: the dual constructs sexual anomie and sexual fatalism. Nonetheless, the fact remains that marriage is somehow detrimental to women, and divorce is somehow beneficial to women. This fact creates a political problem for Durkheim. He supports indissoluble marriage and opposes legalized divorce, policies that he shows have negative—even lethal—consequences for women. More generally, Durkheim supports the sexual division of labor, which he shows creates a conflict of interest, rather than organic solidarity, between women and men.

The theoretical and political problems posed by Suicide apparently continued to haunt Durkheim. He returned to the subject of marriage, divorce, sexual difference, and suicide nine years later, in an article entitled "Divorce by Mutual Consent" (Durkheim 1978b). In this article, Durkheim reverses his own statistical analysis and retracts his own theoretical explanation of women's suicide rates. Actually, all of the problematic implications in Suicide are caused by two specific empirical findings, and Durkheim's reinterpretation of the data eliminates both of them. According to Suicide, marriage is associated with an increase in female suicide, and divorce is associated with a decrease in female suicide.

These two correlations alone imply that marriage is detrimental to

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\(^{19}\) Besnard (1973) gives this crucial article the attention it merits and provides a brilliant analysis of the article and its impact on Durkheim's theory of suicide. However, Besnard—like Johnson (1972), Pope (1976), and Tiryakian (1981), e.g.—tends to interpret Durkheim's theory of women as prejudice or a product of the times—i.e., as an error, a mistaken or unconscious intrusion of ideology or even ad hoc reasoning into his more methodical theory of society. Writing later, Gane (1983) is also familiar with "Divorce by Mutual Consent" and tends to believe, as I do, that Durkheim's sexual theory is a deliberate theoretical strategy, a reasoned and essential ancillary to
women, divorce is beneficial to women, and that each affects women and men in opposite ways. These two correlations alone prompted Durkheim to develop his theory of sexual anomie and fatalism. And it is these two correlations, with all of their implications and consequences, that Durkheim denies in “Divorce by Mutual Consent.” Here, Durkheim asserts that the apparent effects of marriage and divorce on female suicide rates are precisely apparent effects.

“Divorce by Mutual Consent” consists of three sections. Sections 1 and 3 describe the negative effects of divorce and militate against the legalization of divorce by mutual consent. Section 2 addresses the woman question: “It is true that the preceding facts apply solely to men” (1951, p. 245). In Suicide, Durkheim had emphasized that divorce is beneficial for women, as evidenced by the lower rates of suicide among married women where divorce is practiced. In “Divorce by Mutual Consent,” Durkheim asks, not how beneficial divorce is for women, but how detrimental it is: “Divorce does not appear unfavorable to married women” (1978b, p. 245). In addition, he has a new explanation for the fact that the suicide rate of married women in Paris, where divorce is prevalent, is lower relative to unmarried women than in the provinces, where divorce is rare. It is that unmarried women kill themselves more frequently in Paris than in the provinces. Thus, “the advantage enjoyed by married Parisian women is purely apparent.”

As he had done in Suicide, Durkheim once again relates the effects of divorce on women to the effects of marriage on them. However, in “Divorce by Mutual Consent,” he produces an entirely different “general law” concerning the nature of these effects. “It does not seem that the practice of divorce affects feminine suicide in an appreciable way. Moreover, this fact should hold no surprise; it is a specific case of a more general law, which can be formulated as follows: the state of marriage has only a weak effect on the moral constitution of women” (1978, pp. 246–47).

his social theory. These alternative interpretations are contrasted in the conclusion below. Besnard and Gane concur that Durkheim’s description of women excludes them from ostensibly universal categories, such as “l’homme,” “l’humanité,” “humans.” I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for the following pertinent, fairminded, and well-stated observations: “The question of whether divorce by mutual consent was to be allowed by French law had become a contemporary political issue by 1906 in a way it was not in 1897; and this, in turn, reflected progress in the Third Republic’s avowed policies of anti-clericalism and laicization, in which Durkheim played a major role.”

20 Durkheim speculates that young unmarried women in Paris are exposed to “special dangers” and commit suicide more frequently there “as a result of the conditions in which they live, or of the inherent weakness of their moral temperament, or for both reasons at once” (1951, p. 246).
In *Suicide*, Durkheim had emphasized that marriage is detrimental for women, as evidenced by the higher rates of suicide among married women than among unmarried women. In “Divorce by Mutual Consent,” Durkheim asks, not how detrimental marriage is for women, but how beneficial it is; he responds that it is not beneficial. “This lack of effectiveness of conjugal society is particularly evident as far as suicide is concerned. When there are no children, married women seem to kill themselves somewhat more than unmarried women of the same age. . . . Since, therefore, marriage, in a general way, has only a slightly beneficial effect on her, it is quite natural that divorce has no very pronounced harmful effect on her. She stands somewhat beyond the moral effect of marriage” (1978, p. 247).21

In “Divorce by Mutual Consent,” then, marriage does not have a positive effect on women’s suicide rates, it has no effect on women’s suicide rates. By implication, marriage has no effect on women, thus no detrimental effect on women, and no effect on women that is opposite to the effect of marriage on men. Similarly, divorce does not have a negative effect on women’s suicide rates, it has *no* effect on women’s suicide rates. By implication, divorce has no effect on women, thus no beneficial effect on women, and no effect on women that is opposite to the effect of divorce on men. Durkheim’s new explanation of these new statistical relationships is actually an old explanation, reaffirmed and revitalized. Women are unaffected by marriage and divorce because marriage and divorce are social phenomena, and women, as asocial beings, are immune to all effects of all social facts.

Durkheim’s statistical maneuvering in “Divorce by Mutual Consent” is slight, but its theoretical and political consequences are considerable. In the first place, Durkheim’s suicide data no longer have any feminist implications. Women’s suicidal tendencies no longer substantiate a critique of marriage, or an advocacy of divorce, based on the interests of women. Durkheim’s opposition to legalized divorce is still a choice based on the interests of men and their society, but it no longer represents a choice between “two evils.” If women are not affected by marriage and divorce, they have no interests with respect to marriage and divorce. If women have no interests with respect to marriage and divorce, there is no conflict of interest between women and men with respect to marriage and divorce. Durkheim forges a unity of interest between women and men by dissolving women’s interests altogether.

In the second place, the contradiction of *Suicide* contained in “Divorce

21 Notice that Durkheim now inexplicably interprets the fact that married women commit suicide more frequently than unmarried women to mean that marriage has “only a slightly beneficial effect on her.”
by Mutual Consent” negates the contradiction of *The Division of Labor* contained in *Suicide*. In *The Division of Labor*, men and women are joined in organic solidarity within conjugal society. In *Suicide*, men and women are put asunder in a conflict of interest over conjugal society. In “Divorce by Mutual Consent” men and women are reunited in organic solidarity and unity of interest within and over conjugal society. Durkheim’s theory of the sexual division of labor, and organic sexual solidarity, is restored. And Durkheim’s theory of the relationship between men and women—at once a relationship of differentiation, specialization, and interdependence that mirrors the relationship among individuals (men) in (male) society, and a relationship that connects the private society of men and women to the public society of men—is tacitly reconstructed.

There is a specific discontinuity in Durkheim’s theory of women, between *The Division of Labor* and *Suicide*, that “Divorce by Mutual Consent” rectifies. At the same time, there is a general continuity in Durkheim’s theory of women that characterizes all three works—in fact Durkheim’s work in its entirety. The elements that remain constant are as follows:

1. *Sexual difference.*—Women and men are structurally differentiated. Women are essentially asocial; men are essentially social.
2. *Sexual division of labor.*—Women and men are functionally specialized. Women specialize in asocial functions of reproduction in the private sphere; men specialize in social functions of production in the public sphere.

Durkheim’s theory of women, whether characterized by sexual solidarity or sexual conflict, is a theory of separate spheres. No matter how the relationship between men and women is conceived, it is a relationship of difference. No matter how the relationship between the public sphere of social society and the private sphere of conjugal “society” is conceived, society and conjugal society are two different worlds.

**CONCLUSION**

Durkheim’s theory of women contradicts his theory of individuals in every facet of his social ontology. The key to the absolute dichotomy between individuals and women is based on the absolute dichotomy between social beings and asocial beings. Durkheim’s contribution to social theory is his insistence that human individuals are socially determined. Conversely, his “contribution” to sexual theory is his insistence that women are precisely not socially determined. This dichotomy is, of course, a hierarchy. Asocial women are different from, other than, individuals; asocial women are inferior to social individuals.
In *The Division of Labor*, women's lack of social determination appears as a group-level structure or essential nature, which is primarily emotional and biological. This sex-specific structure predisposes women to specialize in affective and reproductive functions in the private, familial sphere. Thus women are incapable of individual differentiation and individual specialization in the intellectual and practical functions of the public, social sphere. Since women do not participate in the social division of labor, they do not participate in organic social solidarity. However, they do participate in the sexual division of labor and, therefore, in organic sexual solidarity. Women are linked to men, and the private, natural sphere is linked to the public, social sphere—society—through a second, subordinate silent "society," conjugal society.

In *Suicide*, women's lack of social determination appears as their relative immunity from social problems and deviance. They are asocial, biological beings, yet they do not suffer from the diseases of insufficient socialization and excessive individualism: egoism and anomie. They are asocial, biological beings, thus they do not suffer from the predominance of negative social forces, which lead to egoism and anomie, over positive social forces, which lead to integration and regulation. They are asocial, biological beings, thus they suffer from fatalism when social regulation penetrates the natural realm of conjugal society in the form of indissoluble monogamous marriage.

In "Divorce by Mutual Consent," women's lack of socialization appears as their complete immunity from all social forces. Women are not affected less than, more than, or differently than men by social forces, as their relatively lower and opposite rates of suicide would suggest. Instead, women are totally unaffected by social forces, as their absolutely low and invariable rates of suicide would suggest. Women are "individuals" in the pejorative sense of the term, as biological bodies. They are not, however, subject to individualistic deviance. Women are not "individuals" in the positive sense of the term, as social personalities. Therefore, they are not subject to socially induced maladies. While women do not suffer or cause social problems in their proper place, the implication is that they would both suffer and cause social problems in the public sphere, as men presumably do, to the extent that they resemble women—individual organisms without social minds.

The relationship between Durkheim's women and Durkheim's individuals (I revert here to the sense of the term "individual" employed throughout the article, i.e., the positive, social sense) is a relationship of difference—a primary difference between the biological and the social, and secondary differences between emotional and intellectual abilities, reproductive and productive functions, private and public spheres, biological and social problems and solutions, sexual and social conflict and
solidarity. Durkheim’s theory of women seems to contradict his theory of individuals. Alternatively, it seems to complement his theory of individuals.

The difference between contradiction and complementarity is the difference between two views of Durkheimian theory and two views of modern society. According to the first view, Durkheim’s theory of women is an anomaly, a contradictory exception to his modernist liberalism. Similarly, the persistence of sexual castes in modern society is an anomaly, a contradictory exception to the structural tendency of capitalism toward individual mobility and equal opportunity. According to the second view, Durkheim’s theory of women is both accurate and prescient. Durkheim ingenuously describes and advocates an actual dualistic system of sexual specialization and separate spheres. Durkheim correctly comprehends that capitalism is compatible with, perhaps even contingent upon, the persistence of sexual and other castes.

The first view epitomizes a liberal, revisionist approach to Durkheim’s work and a liberal, reformist approach to modern society. From this perspective, Durkheim’s theory of women and his theory of individuals could both be corrected. Women could disappear from the private sphere, disappear as women, disappear into the public sphere, and disappear into the abstract, universal, anonymous, and inclusive category, individuals. Similarly, modern capitalism could be corrected, to extend the privileges of individualism to more and more individuals, and to eliminate the vestiges of caste from more and more enclaves. Modern capitalism could be reformed, to be, in Durkheim’s (1933, p. 435) words, “more like itself.” Women and men could be assimilated in theory and integrated in reality.

In many important ways, the trajectory of capitalism is precisely the increasing inclusion of excluded groups into society: politically, culturally, and economically. For women in particular, this inclusion comprises political gains in the form of suffrage, equal opportunity legislation, and the legalization of divorce; cultural gains in the form of feminist influences on social theory and practice; and economic gains in the form of substantial paid labor force participation and the sexual integration of most occupations. These transformations in sociosexual structures were being wrought even as Durkheim wrote; to some extent, especially in Suicide, he acknowledges them.

Alternatively, the second view epitomizes a critical but preservationist approach to Durkheim’s work, and a more radical, transformative approach to modern society. From this perspective, Durkheim’s sexual theory of women and his social theory of individuals are complementary. His dual theories represent the dual realities of modern society: the organic interdependence of capitalism and patriarchy, public society and private
families, waged labor and unwaged work, masculine men and feminine women. More generally, the Durkheimian duality reflects the way in which capitalism contains castes—group-based inequalities of opportunity, structural inequalities of outcome, and the cultural forms that sustain these inequities—and individualism pertains to a minority of individuals.\textsuperscript{22}

In many, equally important ways, patriarchy has survived capitalism, and women are still politically, culturally, and economically differentiated from and subordinate to men. Politically, although women vote, they do not hold political office or positions of power in proportion to their numbers. Culturally, while feminism has made inroads into social beliefs and behaviors, sexism and misogyny are pervasive in attitudes and actions alike. Economically, women have substantially lower rates of paid labor force participation than men. When they do work for pay, they earn substantially less money than men, they work a double day or second shift, and they are concentrated within the pink-collar regions and below the glass ceiling, in dual, split, and segmented labor markets, wherein occupations, firms, and industries are segregated according to sex.\textsuperscript{23}

In summation, both readings of Durkheim's classical combination of liberalism and conservatism, and both readings of the late 19th-century combination of capitalism and patriarchy, can be instructive for contemporary theories of late 20th-century ideologies and realities. Both readings suggest the necessity of a complex reading of "modernity," and both readings suggest that the promises of modernity cannot be fulfilled without substantial social change.

\textsuperscript{22} At the same time, Durkheim's theories exemplify the dual philosophy of modern society, the combination of liberal individualism with a conservative belief in castes, the way contemporary liberalism theorizes universal human rights and infinite individual differences, while making exceptions of (theorizing separately and differently, i.e., conservatively) entire groups on the basis of sex and sexuality, race and culture, class and nation. I view Durkheim's political position as a complex synthesis of conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism. The secondary literature is remarkably divided on this point; most recent work explores the progressive and radical implications of his thought; see, e.g., Fenton (1980, 1984), Gane (1983), and Pearce (1989).

\textsuperscript{23} In 1992, women's civilian labor force participation was, at 57%, about 74% that of men's (76.6%). In 1991, women in the paid labor force continued to earn 70% of what men earned, a level not much higher than the 1920 level (63%; see U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993; Marini 1989). For a theoretical discussion of economic sexual inequality and labor market structure, see, e.g., O'Donnell (1984) and Rebitzer (1993). For a theoretical discussion and empirical evidence of women's income inequality and the sexual segregation of labor markets, see, e.g., Tomaskovic-Devey (1993) and Marini (1989). For a discussion of the second shift and the double day, see, e.g., Shelton (1992), Hartmann (1984a). For a discussion of the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy, see, e.g., Hartmann (1984a, 1984b) and Pateman (1988).
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