Class Dynamics and State Transformation in South Africa

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Abstract
An attempt is made in this article to dissect the state of the South African state post-1994 as well as class dynamics that attach to the challenge of the liberation movement’s ascendancy into formal organs of political power. In this regard, ideas presented in various fora are integrated. Few issues have been selected 21st to illustrate the strategic challenges that South Africa faces as it strives to build a state that can speed up social transformation. For purposes of this treatise, it is not necessary to trace the evolution of the state as such – the Athenian and Spartan versions, the pre-colonial manifestations of social organisation as in the Mapungubwe and other African civilisations and the mfecane wars of nation-formation, or the rise of the colonial state in the geography today called South Africa. Nor is an attempt made to interrogate the Weberian, micro-foundational and Marxist theories of the state and their utility. Drawing from this tapestry, some generalisations are made on the state of our state today and its interplay with class dynamics, and the actions required to ensure that the state plays an optimal role in leading the efforts to improve people’s quality of life.

Concept of the State and Class Dynamics Within the Colonial State

Why is the state central to social organisation, at least during particular periods in the evolution of human society? It has been argued quite cogently that the very existence of the state arises out of the need to manage social conflict. Friedrich Engels in his seminal work, The origin of the family, private property and the state, makes this assertion in the following manner:

The state is . . . by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it ‘the reality of the ethical idea’, ‘the image and reality of reason’, as Hegel maintains. Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, these classes
with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power, seemingly standing above society, that would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of 'order'; and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state.²

But should we infer one-directional causality between the level of development of economic organisation and industry, on the one hand, and instruments of social organisation, on the other? As many would argue, forms of social organisation can evolve and assume autonomous identities. Indeed, Engels himself makes this qualification in his Letter to Bloch:

> According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Other than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure – … political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas – also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form.³

The evolution of the state in a unified South Africa bore all the hallmarks of a colonial imposition, promoting and protecting the material interests of the colonial settlers. The formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 represented racial solidarity founded on dispossession, exclusion and repression of the black people. However, within this racial solidarity, and indeed reflecting what Engels in the Letter to Bloch refers to as "an infinite series of parallelograms of forces", various secondary contradictions played themselves out. While issues of language and culture were an important veneer, the essence of these tensions was about how to narrow the divide between numbers and real power, between the statuses of a ruling political elite and a ruling class. With the introduction of racially circumscribed "democracy", the Afrikaners, as the majority within the white community, ensured through corrective or affirmative action not only that their political dominance translated into general socio-economic benefits, they also sought to translate their position as the political ruling elite into becoming a full part of the ruling class across South Africa, that is, owners of the means of production beyond agriculture.

As this happened, and as is in the nature of the capitalist system, massive stratification also took place within the Afrikaner community, putting a strain on the nationalist project of mutual solidarity. Thus, the supposed communal nationalist cause had to be re-invented and rationalised afresh. In an article, entitled Die Calvinistiese beskouing van die arbeid⁴ in the Journal, Koers, of
October 1946, the point is made by the ideologues of Afrikaner Nationalism about the white lower classes that:

No one’s task is too humble, because in the national economy we are all members of one body, in which there is indeed a head and a heart, but also the lesser members without which the body would be crippled. There is nothing wrong with the types of work we do … it is all needed to serve the church, the volk and the state.

One of the unique features that attach to this experience is that this political ruling elite had the possibility to use job reservation, land dispossession and other forms of racial discrimination and the super-exploitation of black people, to accord the white lower classes privileged status. This somewhat ameliorated the intra-communal tensions and delayed their acute manifestations, which later took the form of the intense broedertwis of the 1970s and beyond. Where is all this quasi-historical meandering leading to?

**Tragedy or Farce or Neither?**

In his observation on Hegel’s remark “somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice”, Karl Marx⁵ says Hegel "forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce". And so, to become more explicit: contained in this experience of the Afrikaner nationalist movement are three illuminating dynamics about:

- Firstly, the conduct of a political elite that is not as such the ruling class, using political office to capture part of the commanding heights of the economy, and for a section of this elite to ascend to higher socio-economic status
- Secondly, how such progress can also be facilitated by the extant ruling class courting the political masters by ceding some of its economic power
- Thirdly, how advancement of a supposedly communal nationalism, within a capitalist socio-economic formation, may benefit all its adherents somewhat, but in fact also results in a small minority rising to the very top, and thus generating disquiet within the nationalist broad front.

In other words, if this truncated account of the experience of Afrikaner nationalism does invoke familiar images about the present, it is because there are instructive parallels. At the centre of this is the question of the capture of political power by a coalition of forces in a "nationalist movement", its attempt within an unchanged (capitalist) socio-economic formation to use political power to re-order the distribution of income and wealth, and the stratification and tensions that ensue, as the elite within this political elite climb faster and higher in the economic stakes than the rest.

It can be argued that in the past 19 years, within an unchanged socio-economic formation, the South African black political elite has been striving to use political power to re-order the distribution of income and wealth.
The new elite, much like the Afrikaner elite did throughout the apartheid period, has been straining to use such power to ensure that the elite within the nationalist movement rises to become part of the ruling class, the owners of the means of production. The established white ruling class has, in turn, been courting this elite in various ways, thanks to post-apartheid transformation instruments such as black economic empowerment and affirmative action. As in the past, it is a begrudging compliance, but they are doing it all the same. Stratification and inequality have intensified within the black community; and the disquiet of the masses is manifesting on a grander scale than in the broedertwis, as reflected in the August 2012 Marikana tragedy and the ensuing mineworkers’ and farmworkers’ revolts. The challenge with these social dynamics is that the changing class structure within the black community, the bourgeoning of black middle and upper strata, is largely driven by the political project itself and consequently raises concerns of patronage and parasitic tendencies.

Another challenge is that these mainly first-generation middle and upper strata quite legitimately aspire to and pursue the artificially high standard of living of the white community. This endeavour is legitimate because it forms part of the project of social change and non-racial equality. Yet, unlike their white counterparts, these emergent middle strata do not have historically accumulated assets, and they have large nuclear and extended families to support. As a consequence, they have to rely on massive debt and the windfall of patronage. Having dipped their toes into that lifestyle, but with no such historical assets as are available to the white middle and upper strata, some then try to acquire the resources by hook or by crook. Ascendancy to these higher rungs of the social ladder happens through a variety of channels, including:

- management positions in the civil service and state-owned enterprises
- ‘streetwise’ unemployed people who get into political leadership positions at local level and by the stroke of a pen become councillor or parliamentarian and migrate to the middle strata (of course, other streetwise peers then want to displace them in phuma singene mobilisation)
- the university student leadership where, besides perks attached to SRC positions, some student leaders now demand a seat in university tender committees to get kick-backs
- trade union leadership, which exercises authority over pension funds amounting to billions of rands, or even at shop-floor level where shop stewards can influence catering and other service tenders.

While there is a new crop of young black professionals and entrepreneurs who are rising on the social ladder only due to their skills and acumen and who do not require affirmative action, they are still the exception that proves the rule. In the main, the position of the emergent middle and upper strata is tenuous and insecure. The consequence of this
is that, unlike the middle strata in "mature" class societies, the *raison d'être* of these emergent strata is not so much pride in the professions, or engagement in discourse on the nation’s vision, or the shaping of positive value systems for society, but rather, it is survival and climbing up the steep social ladder; or inversely the strongest impulse that drives their conduct is the fear of falling.

The "sins of incumbency" derive in large measure from this. Within parties, intra-party patronage and corruption take root. The political centre is unable to correct the local mediators to mass constituencies and the foot soldiers on whom it relies to garner votes. In pursuit of numbers, a price is attached to a conference delegate’s vote. And, to paraphrase a lecturer at a Gauteng ANC political education workshop, a toxic leadership then begets toxic members, some of whom actually demand financial and other incentives to vote in particular ways. Within society, there develops among rabble-rousers, a nationalism of convenient victimhood, where radical slogans are used to hide incompetence and greed. The logic in this instance is: because you were oppressed or because you delivered at conference, you can mess up, steal and plunder, and shout racism or factional targeting when challenged. The entire apartheid project manifested similar narratives, *albeit* with particular undertones.

But it would be correct to pose the question: is such a comparison of the behaviour of the Afrikaner and post-1994 political elites not too simplistic? Even if we may be dealing with dynamics within one socio-economic formation, aren’t there nuances? Is this an inevitable course of a nationalist cause within a capitalist socio-economic formation? Without going into detail on the theorisation of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), which aims to create a National Democratic Society (NDS), it is critical to highlight the nuances, some of which may reflect qualitative contrasts. The African National Congress, and indeed the liberation movement at large, argue that the purpose of struggle was to resolve the basic contradictions spawned by apartheid colonialism: national oppression, class super-exploitation and gender discrimination. It is a nationalism of the oppressed that trumps narrow confines to embrace non-racial equality.

The NDR, it is argued, should result in the building of "... a society based on the best in human civilisation in terms of political and human freedoms, socio-economic rights, value systems and identity." The economic system of a NDS would essentially be capitalist, "shorn of ... racial and gender exclusions ... and freed from barriers to entry and competition" and it will have:

a mixed economy, with state, cooperative and other forms of social ownership, and private capital. The balance between social and private ownership of investment resources will be determined on the balance of evidence in relation to national development needs and the concrete tasks of the NDR at any point in time.
It is further emphasised, in the same document, that "[i]f there were to be any single measure of the civilising mission of the NDR, it would be how it treats the most vulnerable in our society". The results of Census 2011, and other data do underline the progress that has been made in improving the quality of life of the overwhelming majority of South Africans over the 19 years of democracy. One can quote instances such as the slight narrowing of the racial income gap, the extension of basic services to the majority of the population and a social wage unequalled in many parts of the world, the reduction of absolute poverty and the opening of access to opportunity undreamt of under apartheid colonialism.

Yet, the aggregates on the racial income gap conceal the income inequality within the black community, among others. There is also a need to drill deeper into the ebbs and flows of inequality trends within and among races even beyond income, which the grand narrative of Census 2011 may not fully clarify. Extension of access to basic services does not necessarily translate into quality of such services. Unemployment remains a terrible blot on the humanity of our society. While the state has played an important role as an instrument of redistribution, its effectiveness in this regard is hampered by poor capacity, patronage and corruption.

These are truths all South Africans are aware of, and there is consensus that the political economy, as currently configured, is unsustainable. To use the metaphor of colonialism of a special type: the pace at which the state (and the new political elite) can address all these issues, as compared to the historical period referred to above, is also constrained by the reality that the current political elite cannot resort to, but should in fact eliminate, the super-exploitation of the masses in the "internal colony". Such super-exploitation previously made it possible for the white political elite to buttress the living standards of the white lower classes in the "internal metropolis". Besides, the inherited impoverishment of the black majority, compared to the "poor white problem" of yesteryear, is much more massive in terms of intensity and extensiveness. And so, we come back to the question, is the evolution of class dynamics in post-apartheid South Africa a tragedy, a farce or neither?

**In Search of a New Development Trajectory**

In the maelstrom of a political elite striving to rise to the status of a ruling class, in intimate embrace or shadow-boxing with the established white economic elite, and in the midst of mass disquiet and tragedies such as Marikana, we can be forgiven for the temptation to invoke, quite extensively, Karl Marx's observations after the 1871 defeat of the Paris Commune:

> During the subsequent regimes [after the 1789 French Revolution – author], the government, placed under parliamentary control … became not only a hotbed of huge national debts and crushing taxes; with its irresistible allurements of place, pelf, and patronage, it became not only
the bone of contention between the rival factions and adventurers of the ruling classes, but its political character changed simultaneously with the economic changes of society … After every revolution marking a progressive phase in the class struggle, the purely repressive character of the state power stands out in bolder and bolder relief … The bourgeois republicans, who, in the name of the February Revolution, took the state power, used it for the June [1848] massacres, in order to convince the working class that ‘social’ republic means the republic entrusting their social subjection, and in order to convince the royalist bulk of the bourgeois and landlord class that they might safely leave the cares and emoluments of government to the bourgeois ‘republicans’… Under its sway, bourgeois society, freed from political cares, attained a development unexpected even by itself. … [F]inancial swindling celebrated cosmopolitan orgies; the misery of the masses was set off by a shameless display of gorgeous, meretricious and debased luxury. The state power, apparently soaring high above society and the very hotbed of all its corruptions.

These observations by Marx, perhaps not entirely applicable to the state of our state today, do send a chilling reminder of what should not be; for the arrival of the worst in our body politic may not announce itself by knocking on the front door. It is an injunction that the national democratic state should urgently organise itself into an effective instrument of rapid growth and development, or consign itself to monumental irrelevance as the democratic revolution strays from its course. For, without this, the state will be rejected as a mere dispensary of elite patronage, mocked as an instrument of pork-barrel regional or ethnic “delivery”, and attacked as a defender of super-exploitation. By avoiding this, we shall escape the fate that befell the pre-colonial Mapungubwe ”civilisation”, which failed to negotiate the vicissitudes of environmental change, allowed social stratification to rend society apart, suffered marginalisation as new neighbouring ”civilisations” emerged and trade routes changed, and failed to contain the excesses of a debased leadership.

South African leaders of transformation believe that there is a way out of the pedestrian economic growth and development in which we are currently trapped. This is reflected, in part, in the expression of intent to build a developmental state, in the manner of the so-called Asian tigers, which have historically sustained high rates of growth and social inclusion over decades, and thus lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. Such a state, it is argued, should have the strategic orientation for development, premised on the political will of the leadership to stake their all on a developmental project. It should have the legitimacy to mobilise society behind a vision and programmes to attain set objectives. Such a state should be optimally organised to meet its objectives; and it should have the technical capacity within the bureaucracy to bring its intentions to life.
We should, however, acknowledge that the trend in most of these Asian developmental states was to rely on the trickle-down economics of high growth rates. Further, in the earlier phases of the evolution of most of these polities, authoritarianism held sway. In contradistinction to this, South Africans assert that ours should be a democratic developmental state, and that social policy should continue to feature prominently as part of speeding up the drive for social inclusion or "developmental citizenship", values espoused in the country’s Constitution which are inspired, among others, by the African Claims of 1943 and the Freedom Charter of 1955. The fact that the South African leadership is striving a priori to build a developmental state is itself a positive reflection on the commitment to deal with the social challenges we face. In the words of Professor Linda Weiss, for South Africa to have set itself ‘… the unusual and challenging goal of becoming a developmental state … is a unique and noble enterprise: unique in so far as no state has ever self-consciously set out to become a Developmental State; and noble in so far as such a project draws inspiration from the experience of certain countries that achieved shared growth – growth with equity. Predatory states have appeared in abundance; developmental states are a much rarer breed.‘

In terms of effort, two striking instances of progress deserve mention. Firstly, it is the adoption by Cabinet and endorsement by Parliament and the "ruling party" of the National Development Plan (NDP), and the commitment that where there may be conflict between current policies and programmes and the NDP, the latter will take precedence. This is reinforced by the fact that all political parties and most of society also support Vision 2030 as elaborated in the NDP. Secondly, the setting up of formal monitoring and evaluation capacity and the performance agreements within the executive that attach to this have the potential to increase accountability and, thus, the implementation of what has been decided upon. If there was any urgent challenge to address in this regard, it would be ensuring that these latest initiatives are effectively operationalised and become truly embedded across all spheres of government.

Will and Capacity

The question has been raised quite legitimately whether, beyond declarations, there is the will and the capacity to implement the National Development Plan. This question should be approached differently: so popular and so legitimate should the NDP be that, in the election hustings in 2014, the basic question posed to all parties should be how their manifestos accord with Vision 2030, and what, concretely, they are going to do in the five years of their mandate to ensure that it is implemented. And the performance of government should be monitored against that yardstick. In other words, all of society should be the guardians of, and active participants in, ensuring that the NDP is implemented. What are the critical actions
that success in implementing a development plan requires, and how are the South African state and society at large faring in this regard? To cite a few of these: The first one is about a social compact. Professor Thandika Mkandawire, a leading development scholar, elaborates this notion thus:

Social compacts refer to the institutionalisation of consultation and cooperation on economic policy involving representation from the state, capital, labour and other organisations of civil society. Social compacts have been used to address distributive and growth objectives of society at the micro-level; to improve labour management at the firm level and, as in the current usage of "social pacts" in Europe, to manage the distributional issues of macroeconomics policies… The proactive initiatives emerge when societies aim at a future objective that requires high levels of cooperation and trust … and is evoked when nations seek to embark on ambitious projects that require coordination and co-operation in both the political and economic spheres. Nation-building and economic development are good examples of such efforts … Social compacts play an important role in such situations to assure citizens that their current sacrifices will be duly and fairly rewarded in the future.¹⁰

As such, in our situation, a social compact will have to be pro-active and all-embracing, covering such issues as investment, employment and income policy, interest rates, inflation and cost of living, competition policy, spatial issues and so on. It will require commitment on the part of all sectors of society to facilitate high economic growth and social inclusion, encompassing the totality of things required progressively to attain a decent standard of living for all. This demands activism across all sectors, and preparedness on the part of the broad leadership to make choices for the common good. It requires the will and the acumen to eschew narrow self-interest; and leadership capacity to accept and communicate decisions that may not entirely be popular with one’s own constituency.

It is, therefore, critical to avoid the danger of devaluing the notion of a social compact by confining it merely to immediate responses to a wave of strikes or even short-term measures to minimise the impact of the current global economic crisis. This is one of the weaknesses of the outcome of the 2012 High Level Dialogue on the Economy, besides the fact that it did not at all refer to Vision 2030 and the NDP. The second issue is about coherence in policy development and coordination. Researchers on developmental states caution that we should not expect an artificial homogeneity within as large an organisation as the state. In the words of Linda Weiss:

The state is not a unitary structure like an orange where all the segments fit neatly together. As a complex of political institutions, states are actually quite messy configurations … As power structures, we say that they are polymorphous. So the state may well be free-market in one sphere (like finance), yet developmental
in another (e.g. industry and technology), a promoter of free trade in some sectors (financial services), yet mercantilist in others (agriculture or textiles). But all scholars of developmentalism do correctly argue that, precisely because states are "messy configurations", one of the most critical and necessary attributes of a developmental state is a central institution, a pilot agency, with the strategic capacities, leverages and authority to drive economic policy and ensure its implementation. One of the weaknesses in the South African state currently is the multiplicity of centres from which economic policy is driven – Economic Development, Trade and Industry, National Treasury, Public Enterprises and so on – with each actually believing that it is the ultimate authority. As such, we run the danger of reliving the words of Alexei Tolstoi in his epic work, Ordeal:

The hurricane of events roared and the sea of humanity swayed. Everyone considered himself commander, and flourishing his pistol directed that the helm be turned now to port and now to starboard. All this was illusion ... The illusions were born of brief glimpses of the mirage.

The third issue is the balancing act by the state in providing societal leadership: what Peter Evans refers to as "embedded autonomy". On the one hand, the state should be so networked across society as to be able to exercise ideational leadership or what Antonio Gramsci refers to as "hegemony". On the other hand, the state should be buttressed by a professional bureaucracy that is insulated from undue political interference and patronage. The state as a whole should have the will to break logjams in the interactions among various sectors of society – to prevent narrow sector interests paralysing the capacity of society to move forward. In a society such as ours, with wide social fissures, deadlocks among social partners should be expected. While the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) was set up primarily to resolve critical issues among these partners, it has become fossilised in its approach; each constituency pursues frozen mandates; representation has been juniorised and the interactions are technocratic.

For example, earlier paralysis around interventions to deal with youth marginalisation, and the proposed youth wage subsidy in particular, reflects this malaise. In other words, the state can become too indecisive to act autonomously of interest groups. At the same time, informal forums of interaction such as the Working Groups of government and a variety of other social partners have been jettisoned, worsening levels of mistrust across society. The last issue is about the state’s sources of legality and legitimacy. On the face of it, issues of legality and legitimacy should not arise in the context of our state, given the generations of rights that the Constitution proffers, the separation of powers and the institutions to protect and enforce these rights. But in the context of tragedies like Marikana and the 2012 mine and farm workers’ revolts, as well as many instances of confrontation.
between the police and demonstrators, we may need to drill deeper to assess whether, unsighted, there aren’t worms eating into the very edifice of the state colossus.

And so, beyond the constitutional and formal legalities, we need to examine the sturdiness of the system of rule of law in relation to the most ordinary of citizens all the way to the highest echelons of society. When strikers and demonstrators carry weapons and, in fact, murder others with impunity; and when an impression is created that court orders are not honoured, we need to ponder whether the "threat of threat", combined with civilised and intelligent conduct, that should underpin state hegemony is not in fact hollow – ready to unravel in insidious but profoundly destructive ways.

We need to examine how the intent and capacity to provide services by all spheres of government impact on the legitimacy of the state. Needless to say, because of the levels of poverty and inequality in our society, an unavoidable feature of our nation, for a long time to come, will be the inflammable tinder ever ready to catch fire. In some cases, it may not be actual "delivery" that douses the fires of expectation, but the evidence of general progress and the hope that tomorrow will be better than today, as well as visible and effective measures to deal with corruption and patronage.

Where, as in the Marikana informal settlement, the social wage is virtually non-existent – with both the state and the mine-owners seemingly having washed their hands – the lack of hope is the spark that sets the tinder alight.

We need to examine whether our theoretical distinction between government and the state, as well as between the state and societal leaders, does matter in terms of the legitimacy of the state and the broader socio-economic formation. As such, unethical conduct by leaders in government, business, the trade union movement and the rest of civil society, impressions of lack of respect for public resources, and the ostentation of the elite delegitimise not only the party political and societal leadership, but also the state as such.

We need to do all this appreciating that ours is essentially a capitalist system, with a state that seeks, through developmental programmes, to bridge deep and wide fissures inherited from the system of internal colonialism. As the ruling elite, quite naturally, seeks to raise itself and those in its courtyard to the position of the ruling class, failure to more effectively socialise the benefits of economic growth has the potential to unleash a conflagration a million times more destructive than the broedertwis of yesteryear.

The reconfiguration of this capitalist system should entail more than just the racial dimension at elite level, the so-called black economic empowerment to which "economic transformation" is usually reduced. The time has come, in addition to all the other programmes of economic
transformation, for the political ruling elite and the ruling class, together to contribute to forging stakeholder capitalism in which the working class is a real beneficiary.

The aim in raising this matter is not to delve into various aspects of economic transformation, ranging from the structure of the economy, efficiency and cost of infrastructure, skills training, the multifaceted role of the state and so on. It is merely to emphasise that, at the core of the ownership component of economic empowerment programmes going forward, in mining, manufacturing, services and other industries, there should be meaningful employee share-ownership schemes (ESOPs) and community participation, which should be emphasised above all other ownership elements of BBBEE. This should be part of our contemplation on the place and role of labour: die beskouing van die arbeid of the current age.

CONCLUSION

This then is the central message: the state of the South African state and its legitimacy cannot be divorced from the state and legitimacy of the socio-economic system that it manages, and the conduct of the elite beneficiaries of this system. Is the extant and aspirant ruling class capable of behaving as more than just "a class in itself" but also as "a class for itself"? Is it capable of identifying and pursuing broader societal interests, and co-operating in forging a social compact for its own long-term benefit? As Professor Thandika Mkandawire and other accomplished African scholars have suggested, this perhaps is one of the crucial questions of the political economy of our times that researchers on our continent need to interrogate. Addressing this, and other issues, will be critical in defining the trajectory of the South African state and society at large in going forward.

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REFERENCES AND NOTES

1 Earlier versions of this article were presented by the author as the 2012 Harold Wolpe Memorial Lecture under the title, “The State of the State”; as well as the May 2012 Bua Thursdays event of the Young Communist League under the title, “Competing identities of a national liberation movement versus electoral party politics: Challenges of incumbency”; and some of the ideas were integrated into a chapter in the book, The future we chose: Emerging perspectives on the ANC Centenary, 2013.


3 Engels, F. Letter to J. Bloch in
Königsberg, http://www.marxists.org/... 1890/letters ...


7 Ibid.


11 See reflections by Linda Weiss titled Transformative capacity and developmental states: Lessons for South Africa.

12 Quoted from A.C. Denga, p. 105, see Ordeal by Alexei Tolstoi, 1986.